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A TRG President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a special
interest group at the 7thTriennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our membership base
has expanded rapidly, and includes nearly 600 active transportation researchers, policy-makers, industry
executives, major corporations and research institutes from 28 countries. Our broad base of membership
and their strong enthusiasm have pushed the group forward, to continuously initiate new events and
projects which will benefit aviation industry and research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG holds an international conference at least once per year. As
you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers, panel discussions and
invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a consecutive stream of 14 aviation
sessions at the 8 'h Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17: Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the
ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of
the University College of Dublin.
In 1999, the City University of Hong Kong has hosted the 3 rd Annual ATRG Conference. Despite
the delay in starting our conference sessions because of Typhoon Maggie, we were able to complete the
two-day conference sessions and presentation of all of the papers. On behalf of the ATRG membership, I
would like to thank Dr. Anming Zhang who organized the conference and his associates and assistants for
their effort which were essential for the success of the conference. Our special thanks go to Professor
Richard Ho, Dean of the School of Business and Economics of the University for the generous support
for the conference. Many of us also enjoyed the technical visit to the new Hong Kong International
Airport (Chep Lok Kok).
As you know, Professor Jaap de Wit and I look forward to welcoming you to University of
Amsterdam on July 2-4, 2000 for the 4thAnnual ATRG Conference.
As in the past, the Aviation Institute of the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent Bowen,
Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the 1999 ATRG Hong Kong
Conference (being co-edited by Dr. Anming Zhang and Professor Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG
members, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen, Mary M. Schaffart
and the staff of the Aviation Institute of University of Nebraska at Omaha for the effort to publish these
ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to thank and congratulate all authors of the papers for their fine
contribution to the conferences and the Proceedings. Our special thanks are extended to Boeing
Commercial Aviation - Marketing Group for the partial support for publication of this proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG website
(www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/) which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations and forthcoming
events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would appreciate it very much if you could
suggest others to sign up the ATRG membership. Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2Canada
E-mail: At rg(d_commerce.ubc.ca
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Volume 1The Conferenc_
The ATRG held its 3rJAnnual Conference at the City
University of Hong Kong Campus in June 1999.
The 1999 Conference contained 13 aviation and
airport sessions. Over 40 research presentations were
featured on topics pertaining to airports and aviation:
these titles are listed on the ATRG website
(http://www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/).
The l'roceedings
Once again, on behalf of the Air Transport Research
Group, the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation
Institute has agreed to publish the Proceedings of the
ATRG Conference in a four-volume monograph set.
Proceedings Order Information
The Proceedings of the 1999 ATRG Conference are
contained in a four-volume monograph set. Orders
within thc U.S. are $7.50 (U.S.) per monograph
volume, and international orders are $10.00 (U.S.) per
monograph volume to cover the costs of printing,
shipping, and handling. Allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
Please forward requests to:
UNO Aviation Institute
6001 Dodge Street
Allwine Hall 422
Omaha, NE 68182-0406
Phone: 402-554-3424 or 1-800-3 FLY UNO
Fax: 402-554-3781
e-mail: nasa@unomaha.edu
http://cid.unomaha.edu/-nasa
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and
Roger Stough
Nova Professor
The Institute of Public Policy
George Mason University
Abstract
High technology industry is a major user of air transport and many of the largest clusters
of high technology firms are located near to major international airports. This study looks
at the implications for the local economy of having good access to a particular form of
airport, namely those that provide hub services. It takes as its empirical base the situation
that has emerged in recent years in the US and explores at both the aggregate and case
study levels the impact on high technology employment of a community having access to
a major airport hub.
Introduction
Stimulating and maintaining economic prosperity in a region is a major challenge. Our understanding of
why some regions grow and prosper while others are less successful is far from complete. Increasingly
industries are 'footloose' and relocate relatively rapidly and cheaply and this makes the challenge of
defining appropriateregional policy strategies even more difficult.
There is evidence, however, that appropriate infrastructure is important in determining where and how
firms locate and expand. Simply building more infrastructure, however, is seldom by itself sufficient. The
infrastructure must be appropriate in its scale, form and design and its use must be effective and efficient.
Airports are an important form of modem infrastructure and, when carefully and thoughtfully developed,
can add to the economic potential of a region. As illustrated by a number of airports that have failed to
achieve their economic development goals, however, it is clear that simply constructing a substantial
airport is not of itself a guarantee that it will be used nor that it will stimulate the local economy t.
This paper considers the role that airports can play in assisting in economic development and offers some
quantification of the main effects.
The Impacts of Airports
The deregulation of domestic US air transport in 1977 (cargo)and 1978 (passengers) together with the
US's pursuit of Open Skies policies internationally from the 1980s have generated considerable benefits for
the travelling public 2. The market driven nature of air transport has enhanced its overall efficiency and
added significantly to the overall contribution that it makes to the US economy. Equally, the growth in air
transport has led to an inevitable expansion in airport facilities and in the ways in which airports are now
used. In particular, there has been a growth in hub-and-spoke operations with a consequential increase in
the number of indirect journeys being undertaken.
The growth in air transport through its add-on demands for air transport infrastructure, especially airports,
has implications for the scale and spatial distribution of economic development. An airport essentially has
four types of impact on the economy in its region.
Primary Effects.
These are the benefits to the region of the construction or expansion of the airport facility - the design of
the facility, the building of the runways, the construction of the terminals and hangers, the installation of air
traffic navigation systems and so on. The direct effects of this involve the local employment required in the
construction process and the work done by local contractors. Indirect, multiplier effects include the benefits
to the region of the wages and other incomes these workers and companies subsequent spend in the area
and the tax revenues available to local governments.
These are clear gains to the local community and the local economy but they are essentially short term,
being limited largely to the time period of the construction activity, and may be rather limited in their Order
of magnitude. It is a one-time effect. Also, airport construction involves a degree of specialist skill,
manpower and equipment that may not be available locally but must be brought in from other regions. This
leads to economic leakages away from the immediate area.
The most dramatic examples of error in this context are found outside of the US in the case of Shannon
Airport in Ireland and Mirabel in Canada.
The deregulations have generated a small industry in producing academic studies of variable quality but work
at the Brooking Institution. for example, suggests a net annual benefit of S12.4 billion in 1992 prices from domestic
passenger deregulation alone (S. A. Morrison and C Winston. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY,
The Brookings Institution. Washington. 1995) i
In general, while airport development can have beneficial primary effects, save in cases where there is a
policy imperative to create jobs in the very short term, these are not really the key concerns. Indeed, even if
there is a desire for immediate job creation, as the English economist, John Maynard Keynes said, you may
as well have one group of workers bury some money and have another dig it up again. This has the same
short term benefits, indeed possibly even larger since leakages are likely to be smaller, than building or
expanding an airport.
Secondary Effects.
Secondary effects are longer term effects that are associated with the local economic benefits of running
and operating the airport - the employment involved in maintaining the facility, in handling the aircraft and
passengers, in transporting people and cargo to and from the terminal and so on. Again there are direct
effects stemming from the immediate jobs that are created at the airport and in the activities immediately
associated with it. There are also indirect multiplier effects due to the on-going flow of income that the
airport's operation injects into the local economy, which is subsequently spent locally.
These secondary effects can be extremely important in the long run to a local economy in terms of
employment, income and, for local government, taxation revenue. The actual size of the secondary effect
will vary among airports depending upon the nature of their operations and the extent to which the local
economy is self-sufficient in meeting the needs of its residents; the indirect multiplier effects are larger if
the economy meet the demands generated by the flow of additional income directly associated with the
airport's activities.
To consider the potential scale of these effects, one can take Washington Dulles International Airport. Here
an analysis of what the local employment effects would be of downsizing passenger throughput was
conducted in the light of possible changes to the 'perimeter rule' at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport 3. This type of dynamic assessment is most relevant in assessing the economic impacts of air
transport because generally airport policies involve changing the scale of an existing facility rather than
building an entirely new one. The analysis initially assessed the direct airport employment effect of the
anticipated reduced traffic at Dulles if the perimeter rule were modified 4. The direct effect was then
translated into an overall secondary impact using a regional input-output table.
On the assumption of an initial drop of 2.2 million passengers in the ftrst year, the calculations imply 1,882
direct fewer jobs at Dulles with a further indirect job loss of 1,958 in immediate Northern Virginia region
as the result of reduced local spending. An immediate reduction of 3.3 million passengers would result in
losing over 5,400 jobs in the short term of which 2,758 would be directly related to the airport and the
remainder the result of the reduced spending that this produces _. The implications are clearly that reducing
the scale of airport activities does have adverse secondary consequences on the local economy because of
reduced employment at the airport and because of the resultant lower spending levels in the region.
Conversely airport expansions have positive secondary economic implications.
Tertiary Effects.
Tertiary effects stem from the stimulus enjoyed by a local economy as the result of firms and individuals
having air transport services at their disposal. While most forms of business activity now involve
K..1. Button, P. Arena and R. Stough RELAXING THE PERIMETER AND HIGH DENSITY RULES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR WASHINGTON DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT The Aviation Program, The Center
for Regional Analysis, The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason Universit)', 1998. The analysis was based on a
local input-output analysis and also offers guidance to the b'pes of jobs that would be most affected in the region of the
airport. There may be additional economic activities in this case because air traffic would divert to National Airport but
this is irrelevant in terms of gaining a handle on the scale of the secondary effects of having an airport in a particular
region.
The form of the estimating equation using time series data for 1977 to 1997 was:
LnTE_ = -4.317 ÷ 0.723 LnTP, - 0.213LnTP,.I + 0.334TP,.: R: = 0.99
where: TE, is employment in )ear t and TP,. TP,._. TP,.: are passengers in )'ears t, t-l, t-2 respecti_ el_.
.Although extrapolations far outside of the data base used to develop an input-output table is problematic, in this case
doing so _ ould suggest that the total secondar3 employment associated _ ith Dulles is somcthin_ o_ cr 21,000 jobs.
4considerable use of transportation, high technology companies make particular use of air transportation. It
has been estimated that those employed in the high-technology sector in the US fly over 1 6 times as much
as those in traditional industries 6 Corn antes in t ..... ""
• • p his general area conduct acttvmes requa'mg considerable
rater-personal contacts. These contacts are only possible with high quality transport. From a local
development perspective it is often these types of firm that form the basis for economic growth because
they are usually geographically mobile and represent a major growth sector•
One method of at least partly assessing the tertiary benefits of having a major airport is to directly contrast
the economic performance of such cities with those that have smaller airports. One would expect, all other
factors taken into consideration, that cities with large airports, and particularly those with hub airports,
would attract more of this geographically mobile industry as a result of the superior aviation services
enjoyed by their business travelers.
Additionally, some types of airport are likely to generate greater tertiary benefits than others of a similar
size. Major hub airports 7 in particular offer a number of benefits to business travelers that extend beyond
the simple size of a facility. These benefits include: more frequent flights; more direct flights (in 1996 hub
airports offered non-stop flights to nearly twice the number of cities as non-hub cities with 25% more daily
departures per city served'); more opportunities for same day return flights; greater likelihood of
international flights; services geared to local market needs; and the ability in many cases to send packages
on scheduled passenger services leaving after the major courier services have finished their daily pick-ups.
At the same time, residents of hub cities have the same opportunities of linking to other major hubs as do
those living in non-hubs.
To examine the benefits for any areas in terms of job creation in more dynamic sectors, the trends in high-
technology employment in large U.S. cities can be assessed against the provision of scheduled air transport
services. Defining high-technology industries is not simple. Here a fairly broad, but widely used, det'mition
is adopted 9. The index looks at clusterings of high-technology employment. As a result, it avoids the
distorted picture that can be drawn when reference is made to the role of a single dominant high-technology
company in a region. From a longer term planning perspective there are also advantages of not being a
"company town."
An econometric model is employed that takes variations in high-technology employment across all 321 US
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 1994 as the phenomenon to be explained t°. The calculations enable a
rough estimation of the high-technologyjob stimulus that proximity to a hub airport provides. In doing this
analysis, allowance was made for differences in the population sizes of the areas, number of Fortune 500
companies with headquarters, housing values, highway density, per capita defense expenditure and
percentage of employment in business services. It is found that proximity to a hub airport (as defined by the
Federal Aviation Administration, there are 56 hubs in the US t_) has a positive impact on the amount of
high-technology employment in an area t2. Put into concrete, quantitative terms, the calculations indicate
6 Simat, Helliesen and Eichner Inc. ECONOMICS IMPACT OF DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT:
AN UP-DATE, Washington, 1986
7 For practical purposes, when looking at concentration of airline activities, hubs are normally treated as airports that
have a large preponderance of flights operated as part of an essentially radial network by one carrier. In a few rareeases
sthereis a general recognition, that a hub has two main carriers but this only applies to a few major airports.
It was estimated that the disutility of having to make a transfer, irrespective of the additional overall duration
of an indirect flight, was about $22.5 in 1987 (T.H. Oum and M.W. Tretheway, Airline hub-and- spoke system,
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM PROCEEDINGS Vo]. 30, pp. 380-393, 1990).
9 The measure is known as the Armington Index.
to K.J. Button and R Stough with the assistance of S. Lall and M. Trice, THE BENEFITS OF BEING A HUB
AIRPORT CITY: CONVENIENT TRAVEL AND HIGH-TECH JOB GROWTH, The Aviation Program, The Center
for Regional Analysis, The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason Universib', 1998
t_ The FAA has classified communities into a four-class scheme depending on the total percentage of U.S.
passenger enplanements in all sets'ices and operated by U.S. certified carrierswithin the 50 states and other designated
areas (e.g. a large hub has 1.00% or more. a medium hub has 0.25% to 1.00%. and so on I.
_: In detail the model was estimated using ordinary least-squares and the pret_rred spccifii:ation was:
that the existence of a hub airport in a region increases that region's high-technology employment by over
12,000 jobs. This does not, of course, mean that all hub regions benefit by this amount but it is an average
across hub cities.
More detailed case study" analysis compares the situation at three non-hub airports (Nashville *_,
Indianapolis and Milwaukee) with the major airline hubs of Cincinnati (which is a Delta Air Lines hub) and
Pittsburgh (which is a US Airways hub). A simple visual inspection of trends in high-technology
employment in the five locations (Figure 1) shows the more rapid and even growth in high-technology jobs
in those areas with hub airports. While Milwaukee has seen some growth since the mid-1980s, this has
been demonstrably slower than either Pittsburgh or Cincinnati. Indianapolis has also seen growth in its
high-technology employment numbers but Pittsburgh has been steadily pulling away from it and Cincinnati
has gradually, albeit slowly, been catching up. Nashville, which has fluctuated between being a hub and not
being a hub, has seen a rather erratic growth path.
While the diagram is insightful, it cannot allow for variations in the nature of the different cities. The
selection of the hub and non-hub cities was designed to allow comparisons with similar, medium sized
cities but they are not identical. Further statistical analysis makes additional adjustments. The findings for
the period to 1997 are that, allowing for factors such as differences in personal income, total air passenger
traffic and a time path, the existence of a hub airport has exercised a positive and statistically significant
effect on the industrial composition of Cincinnati and Pittsburgh .4. In other words, the effect of a city being
a hub, and irrespective of the total volume of airline traffic passing through it, still attracts more high-
technology employment than a comparable non-hub.
Correlation between variables does not of itself imply causation in any meaningful sense. The economics
and scientific literature is full of impressive correlations that are spurious or meaningless. In the case of
airport hubs it could be argued that the economic growth that has been demonstrated at hub airport cities is
not due to the services offered by the airlines but rather that airlines moved to these locations simply to
exploit the areas' strong, natural economic performance.
The direction of causation can, however, be tested for. 15 Results for the Cincinnati area for data from 1979
through 1997 show that airline passenger traffic had a positive effect on high technology employment in
the local Metropolitan Statistical Area. The causal effect of passenger traffic on employment is a
reasonable proposition as it signifies increase in demand and earnings that have a multiplier effect in
employment. While increases in passenger traffic may have a positive effect on per capita incomes, this is
Ln high-technology employment = 5.407* + 0.503 hub airport* + 0.033 Fortune 500 companies* + 0.115 in
housing values + 1.354 In highway density* + 0.141 In defense expenditure* +
2.845 In service employment* + 1.405 In population size*
* denotes statistical significance at 990 confidence level; n = 303; R2 = 0.643.
13 For part of the period Nashville was a secondary American Airlines hub and this fact was allowed for in the
subsequent statistical analysis.
J_ In detail the model was estimated using ordinary least squares and the preferred specification was:
Ln high-technology employment = -3.25 + 1.48 In per capita income * - 0.07 time* + 0.12 hub dummy* - 0.75
Nashville dummy*
* denotes statistical significance at 99% confidence level; n = 40; R" = 0.980. Cincinnati and Milwaukee was taken as
the base variable. The estimation adjusts for heteroscedastcity.
_s The Granger (C. Granger, Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods,
ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 37, pp. 424-38, 1969) approach to the question of whether x causes .v is to see how much of
the current y can be explained by past values of)' and then to see whether adding lagged values of x can improve the
explanation, y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on
the lagged xis are statistically significant. It is important to note that the statement x Granger causes y does not imply
that y is the effect or the result of x. Granger causality measures precedence and information content but does not by
itself indicate causalib' in the more common use of the term. The test is to see if air traffic does NOT Granger cause
employment; the resultant F-statistic for Cincinnati of 6.328, at a probabilit3' level of 0.0148, implies that this can be
rejected with 95% confidence. Indicating the causality is almost certainly the other _vav. Equally. the test is to see if air
traffic does NOT Granger cause employment in Pittsburgh; the F-statistic of 6.419 and a probabilir3 of 0.07, implies
one can be 90°,0 confident the causality is the other _sa.v.
not so evident with the two-year time lags used to test for causality. In the short run, employment impacts
are more evident than earnings or income effects. Similar results are found for Pittsburgh.
These findings that trace a link from the existence of a hub airport to high technology employment may
initially seem counter intuitive in terms of traditional transport economics. The latter views transport
provision as being derived from the final needs of consumers and producers and hence transport follows
demand rather than visa versa. In the case of hub airports this traditional view can be misleading. Airlines
offer networks of routes and select hubs in order to meet the overall demands for their services. Only a
relatively small amount of traffic actually originates or is destined for a hub airport, the vast majority of
traffic is transiting. A hub location is, therefore, chosen to meet this wider network criteria. The area around
the hub, however, benefits from the extensive network of services that are provided at the airport; a
network that is well in excess of that which would be offered if the airport were not a hub.
Perpetuity Effects
There is an increasingly widely accepted school of thought arguing that economic growth, once started in a
region, becomes self-sustaining and may accelerate )_. Linked to this, there is also empirical evidence that
infrastructure investment can act as a catalyst for higher economic growth in an area; essentially it can act
as a kick-start mechanism )_. The construction of a new airport or the major enlargement of an existing
facility may act, therefore, to set in progress a much larger and longer term development process in a
region. This perpetuity effect is in addition to the tertiary effects that relate to the immediate migration of
firms to an area with good air transport services. It is longer term and affects the dynamics of an area. By
initially attracting undertakings to an area in sufficient numbers, airport development can lead to the
crossing of important thresholds in terms of economies of scale, scope and density. In particular in the
context of high-technology activities, an area can acquire a vital knowledge base that fosters local research
and development and makes the region quasi-independent of others. The regional economy can feed on this
to further its high-technology activities and hence to accelerate its growth.
This type of dynamic economic impact of an airport is the most abstract and the most difficult to quantify.
It has been little researched. It is long term and involves the interaction of an airport with all other aspects
of the local economy. It is, nevertheless, potentially a very real and important benefit that may be enjoyed
by a region with high quality air services.
Summary and Conclusions
Air transport is the fastest growing mode of transportation and by permitting the market to offer the
services industry and users demand, and by allowing competitive forces to act as a stimulus for efficient
supply, airline deregulation has served to assist national economic grow'th. At the more local level, the
availability of air transport services can act as a stimulus to the economic growth of regions and cities. It
achieves this through the employment and income generated in the construction and enlargement of
facilities (primary effects), through the on-going activities of the airport (secondary effects); through the air
services provided by the airport making the location attractive to mobile industry (tertiary effects); and
through its own long term momentum (perpetuity effects). In particular, there is empirical evidence that the
more mobile forms of modem industry, notably those associated with high-technology activities, are often
attracted to areas offering high quality air transport services. There is also evidence that it is not simply the
availability of an airport that acts as a catalyst for economic growth but rather it is generally the types of
service offered at hub airports that are most important.
_ This is known as 'endogenous growth theotT.".
_" D.A. Aschauer. Why is infrastructure imponan:?. In Munnell. P (ed.) IS THERE A SHORTFALL IN
PUBLIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT?. Conference Series. 34. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 1990
7Figure 1. Trends in High-Technology Employment at Case Study Locations
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Section 1
Introduction
The air transportation system is moving towards satellite based communications,
navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM). One purpose of the
CNS/ATM initiative is to help airplanes fly more precisely as well as to fly more user-
preferred or wind-optimal routings ("free flight"). CNS/ATM initiatives can reduce the
inefficiencies of operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) by relieving airport and
en route congestion. These infrastructure improvements should increase en route efficiency
and allow for increased flight frequency and more direct service between city pairs.
An important question for civil aviation authorities is "what would be the effect of
increased direct flight frequency and levels of direct point-to-point service on consumer
demand?" Understanding these effects is important since they help determine the dynamic
impact on demand of any NAS infrastructure improvements.
In this paper, The MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development (CAASD) studies the effect that changes in direct flight frequency and the
average number of trip segments (average levels of point-to-point service) have on the
demand for commercial passenger aviation in the United States. CAASD studied demand in
a sample of 47 origin and destination (O&D) markets stratified by trip purpose, trip distance,
market size, and passenger class. The results of the study found that both direct flight
frequency and the average number of trip segments (a proxy for the average level of point-to-
point service) are significant factors in explaining demand in many of the markets. Section 2
provides a brief discussion of how increased flight frequency and levels of direct service
increase the demand for aviation. Section 3 provides a technical description of the method
used to estimate the effect that changes in these variables have on demand. Section 4
provides the results and a discussion of those results. Section 5 provides extensions of the
results and explains the implications of the results on the NAS.
Section 2
Background
Airlines can influence the demand for aviation in several ways. Airlines can influence
the quantity demanded by changing price and can change demand by altering the level of
service. Service levels include factors such as direct flight frequency, load factors, and the
number of flights it takes to get from trip origin to trip destination (trip segments).
Airlines influence the quantity demanded by changing price (fares). As price increases,
consumers fly less. Figure 2-1 illustrated the process. In Figure 2-1, a price decrease from
pl to p2 results in a movement down the demand curve from plql to p2q2. When consumer
purchases are relatively more sensitive to changes in price, demand curves are relatively
flatter (less steep).
Price
pl
p2
Demand
ql q2
Quantity
Figure 2-1. Effect of Changes in'Price on Demand
Airlines can influence the quantity demanded by changing various aspects of the level of
service provided, including the amount of traveling and waiting time. Morrison and Winston
(1989) estimated that consumer willingness to pay for a one hour reduction in travel time
was about $54 (in $1996). Their estimate reflected travelers' opportunity costs and the
disutility of travel time (i.e., inconvenience of sitting in an airplane seat).
Consumer willingness to pay to reduce transfer time at airports is even greater. Transfer
time at airports includes the time waiting for flights at an airport. For example, these waits
can result from the time spent waiting between flights at a hub. Morrison and Winston
(1989) estimated consumer willingness to pay for a one hour reduction in transfer time was
about $116 (in $1996). Their estimate not only reflected the willingness to pay to reduce
travel time, but also the additional disutility of walking through terminals and waiting at
departure gates, t
This paper concentrates on two service factors that airlines can change to influence the
amount of transfer and travel time. The two service factors are direct flight frequency and
the number of flights it takes to get from trip origin to trip destination (trip segments).
Flight frequency (direct flights) is a major influence on waiting time. Consumers are
more likely to find flights close to their desired departure times when there is a greater flight
frequency between a particular city pair. Further, higher frequencies can reduce the average
load factors between a city pair. Reduced average load factors between a city pair increase
the probability of consumers obtaining a seat on their desired flight.
In many cases, increases in flight frequency reflect increased personal income in the
markets involved. In these cases, it is changes in personal income that has an effect on
demand. This paper concentrates on markets where changes in flight frequency independent
of changes in personal income have a significant effect on demand. In these markets,
increasing flight frequencies (independent of other factors) increases demand. Figure 2-2
shows the effect that these increases in flight frequency have on demand.
In Figure 2-2, the demand curves represeni how much consumers are willing to buy at any
given price. Willingness to pay reflects income and attributes of the product (e.g., flight
time, schedule convenience, number of flights, etc.). For Demand,, at a price of pl,
consumers are willing to buy ql units. As flight frequencies increase, the demand for
aviation shifts to the right because consumers' willingness to pay has increased with the
increased frequencies. The shift in the demand curve to Demand_, illustrates the process.
Morrison and Winston (1989) also found that consumer willingness to pay for reductions in scheduled
delay was only about $5 per hour (in $1996). The low willingness to pay for reductions in scheduled delay
is plausible since travelers generally plan ahead and make productive use of their time when there is a
schedule delay.
After demandhasshifted to Demand2,consumersarewilling to paymore for eachunit. At
q1,consumersarenow willing to payp2. Withoutan increasein price, thedemandincreases
to q2 aftertheshift from Demandlto Demand2.
Reducingtheaveragenumberof trip segmentsbetweenacity pair (increasingthelevelof
directpoint-to-pointservice)alsoincreasesdemand.While increasingflight frequencyis a
wayof addingdirect servicecapacity,reducingthenumberof flights neededto get from
origin to destinationis a way of improvingcurrentservicebetweena city pair market.
Consumersprefernon-stopor directserviceoverconnectingservicesinceit involvesless
time andhassle.Consumerwillingnessto pay for moredirect service(i.e., lesstransfertime)
is high.2 Consequently,reducingthis waiting timeby increasingthenumberof direct flights
is veryvaluableto consumers.
Price
p2
pl
Demahdj
......... ! .............. Demand 2
ql q2
Quantity
Figure 2-2. Effects of Changes in Flight Frequency on Demand
The influence of these two service factors is particularly important for certain routes. For
example, demand is more sensitive to frequency and trip segments in markets with more
business travelers since time is more valuable to them. As a general rule, whenever the value
of time is a significant component of demand or maintaining a time advantage over
competing modes of transportation (e.g., short haul markets) is important, demand is
particularly sensitive to changes in frequency and levels of direct service.
2 Morrison and Winston (1989) estimated consumer willingness to pay for a one hour reduction in transfer
time was about $116 (in $1996).
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Knowledge of how sensitive demand is to changes in price, flight frequency, and the
average number of trip segments would allow for a better understanding of the tradeoff
airlines face in setting fares and in deciding the number of flights and the level of direct
service between city pairs. Understanding these effects is also important since they help
determine the dynamic impact on demand of any NAS infrastructure improvements.
Conversely, understanding these effects help determine the impact of changes in airline
operations on air traffic control (ATC) infrastructure requirements.
The previous discussion and figures helps explain the relationship between improved
service levels (frequency and direct service) and increased demand. However, they do not
provide the precise causal relationship needed to quantify, estimate and forecast changes in
demand due to changes in those service levels. The next section will.
Section 3
Methodology
Traditional methods of estimating demand between city pairs use econometric analysis.
Econometric analysis of aviation demand involves determining, based on historical data, a
quantitative relationship between traffic (by passengers) and explanatory variables that
influence the level of traffic (e.g., personal income and average fares). For domestic
commercial passenger aviation between city pairs, demand is a positive function of personal
income and a negative function of average fares.
Most econometric studies, however, have not considered the effect of service variables
on demand. With frequency, part of the problem is identifying the extent to which frequency
determines traffic levels instead of changes in traffic levels (e.g., from changes in personal
income) determining changes in frequency. For example, in most markets increases in flight
frequency reflect increased personal income or other factors. Some studies, however, have
estimated the effect that changes in service variables have had on demand. These studies
concentrated on markets where changes in flight frequency independent of changes in other
factors have a significant effect on demand. The two seminal pieces on the subject are
Ippolito (1981), and Eriksen and Lin (1979).
Ippolito (1981) estimated the impact that changes in flight frequency had on demand in a
sample of monopoly flight segments. Ippolito found that for each one percent increase in
flight frequencies, demand increased by .76 percent. The increased demand is the same
effect shown in Figure 2-2. Eriksen and Lin (1979) studied the impact that changes in the
level of service had on demand. They defined "service" as the ratio of non-stop jet flight
time to the sum of average passenger travel time and time between desired and actual
departure. This measure reflects flight frequency, stops-and-connections, and aircraft speed.
Basedonasampleof 15 long-haulmarketsoverasix-yearperiod,theyfoundthat for each
onepercentchangein their servicevariable,demandincreasedby .43percent.
This studyusesmorerecent,precise,andbroadbaseddatato moreaccuratelyestimate
andforecastchangesin demanddueto changesin directflight frequencyandtheaverage
numberof trip segments.Thesamplefor thestudyconsistsof 47 city pairsusingquarterly
datafrom 1984to 1996. Thestudyestimatestheeffectthatchangesin direct flight
frequenciesandaveragenumberof trip segmentshaveondemand.Thestudyestimates
theseeffectsboth togetherandindependentof eachother.
The influenceof servicefactorsis moreimportantoncertainroutes. Demandis more
sensitiveto frequencyin marketswith manybusinesstravelersandin marketswhere
competitionwith othermodesof transportationisgreater.Forthesereasons,it is important
to haveabroad-basedsamplethat includesshort-andlong-haulmarkets,aswell asbusiness
andleisureoriginsanddestinations.Theeffectof frequenciesandpoint-to-point serviceon
demandalsovariesby type of traveler. Businesstravelersmaybemoresensitiveto changes
in thesevariablesthan leisuretravelers. Forthesereasons,it is importantto studyall
passengertraffic, andto studythe breakdownof thetotal intobusinessandleisuretraffic.
To estimatedemand,thestudyusesanordinaryleastsquares(OLS) regressiontechnique.
Thestudyestimatedthe following threeregressionmodelsfor eachcity pair. 3
Forafewofthecitypairsthathaddirectservicestartedordiscontinuedduringtheperiodstudied,the
studyusedanothermodelinsteadofthemodelwithFRQ.
InPax=constant+bl InPI+ b2Infare+ b3InTS + b4 In DUM
where DUM = dummy variable set equal to one when direct service was available.
In Pax= constant+bl In PI+ b2In fare+ b3 In TS [I]
In Pax = constant + bl In PI + b2 In fare + b3 In FRQ [2]
In Pax = constant + bl In PI + b2 In fare + b3 In FRQ +b4 In TS [3]
where:
In = natural logarithm
Pax = the number of origin and destination (O&D) passengers enplaned
PI = the combined personal incorrie of the two cities in the city pair (in constant $1996)
fare = average fare (in constant $1996)
TS = average number of trip segments per passenger (proxy for the level of direct, point-
to-point service)
FRQ = number of non-stop flights (in some cases non-stop and one-stop direct) 4
The United States (U.S.) Bureau of Economic Analysis is the source of the data for
personal income. BACK Information Services is the source of the data for passengers, fares,
trip segments, and flight frequency. BACK's "OD 1A" database provides the data for
passengers, average fares, and average number of trip segments. OD 1A represents true
origin-destination data gathered from ticket stubs. OD 1A data covers 10 percent of all
passengers of U.S. certified carriers. It provides a unique information package, combining
passenger statistics by route with data on fares and trip segments. BACK's OAG Passenger
and Cargo Flight Statistics provides the data for flight frequency. These data are a modified
version of data found in the Official Airlines Guide ®.
The study uses each regression model for three different passenger categories. The
categories are: all fare paying passengers (excludes frequent flyers): leisure travelers only
(defined as passengers paying discounted coach fares purchased at least two weeks prior to
traveling); and business type travelers only (defined as passengers paying fares for business,
The frequency variable does not include all available flights between a city pair. Non-direct flight
itineraries that use more than one ticket are not included. Consequently, the variable does not capture the
effects of increasing indirect flight frequency.
The all passenger category includes "mixed fare class" data not picked up in either the leisure or business
type categories. Consequently, the results for all passengers may be inconsistent with the sum of the other
categories.
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first class, discounted business or first class, or full fare coach purchased within two weeks
of traveling).6
Each equation measures the effect that changes in personal income and fares have on the
demand for aviation in that market. The expected effect of increases in personal income and
decreases in fares is to increase demand. Equations [1] and [3] measure the effect that
changes in the average number of trip segments have on demand. Trip segments are the
actual number of flights per passenger needed to travel between the city pair.7 A reduction
in the average number of trip segments increases the average level of point-to-point service.
The expected effect of decreases in the average number of trip segments is to increase
demand.
The quality of service offered by an airline is a vital competitive factor, especially in
short-haul markets where there is also competition from surface travel. The trip segment
variable used in this study captures the effect of an increase in the quality of current capacity.
It does so by measuring changes in the average number of flights needed to travel between an
O&D city pair market. A reduction in the average number of trip segments between an O&D
city pair implies an increase in the average level of point-to-point service.
Equations [2] and [3] measure the effect that changes in flight frequency have on
demand. The flight frequency variable measures the number of non-stop direct (or non-stop
and one-stop direct in some markets) flights between the city pair. 8 The expected effect of
an increase in direct flight frequency is to increase demand. The frequency variable used in
this study captures the effect of an increase in direct point-to-point capacity.
The regression coefficients provide a framework for estimating how changes in these
explanatory variables affect the dependent variable. The regression coefficients capture
these effects as constant elasticities. Elasticities provide a framework for isolating the
change in the dependent variable due to changes in the explanatory variable. The concept of
elasticity describes the effect on demand of a one percent change in the respective
The categories oversimplify actual purchase patterns. Business travelers often purchase tickets prior to two
weeks of traveling, and leisure travelers can purchase tickets at the last moment.
Number of flights with separate ticket coupons (actual change of planes). A direct flight with stops counts
as only one trip segment.
When a city has multiple airports, we include flights to all pertinent airports (e.g., Washington includes
both National and Dulles).
explanatoryvariable.9 For example,if thecoefficient for the farevariableisequalto -.7,
thenaonepercentdecreasein faresresultsin nearlya .7percentincreasein demand.10
Thestudyusesa sampleof 47 city pairsusingquarterlydatafrom 1984to 1996.The
criterionusedto selectthesampleis trip generationpurposes(generalbusiness,leisure,etc.),
trip length,andthepopulationof theMetropolitanStatisticalArea (MSA). Additionally,the
city pairsin thesamplearegeographicallydistributedthroughoutthecontinentalUnited
States.
Trip purposesincludedflights betweengeneralbusiness,manufacturingbusiness,and
leisurelocations.Generalbusinesslocationsarethosewhoseemploymentin the
combinationof"Service, Finance,andPublicSectors"(SFP)is greaterthan110percentof
thenationalaverage.Manufacturing businesslocationsarethosewheremanufacturing
employmentis greaterthan 108percentof thenationalaverage.Leisurelocationsarethose
with thefollowing characteristics:employmentin SFPisgreaterthan110percentof the
nationalaverage;employment in manufacturingis lessthan10percentof thetotalemployed;
andthepercentageof SFPemployedin financeis lessthan90 percentof thenationalaverage
of financeemploymentin SFp.l 1 Additionally, thesampleincludeslocationsthatdidnot fit
into anyof theabovecategories.TheselocationsareAtlanta,Cincinnati,Houston,
Pittsburgh,andSacramento.Theseareeconomicallyimportantlocationsor oneswith
importanthubs. Nine of the city pairs in the sample included one of these Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs).
MSAs are large or small depending on population. MSAs with a 1996 population of
less than one million are small. Nine of the city pairs in the sample included small MSAs.
There are three categories for trip length. The categories included less than 750 miles,
750-1499 miles, and greater than 1500 miles. The sample includes 24, 13, and 10 city pair
markets in the sample that fell into these categories.
There are five general categories for city pair markets in this study. These categories
include: from general business to general business; from general business to leisure; from
leisure to leisure; from general business to manufacturing business; and from manufacturing
9 Elasticity = [(1.01) '_t_"°r_°'m_i'"'-1] * 100
10 Elasticity= [(l.01) "7-I] * 100=-.694
11 The source for employment data is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). BLS aggregates data
according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories. All population and employment data refer
to 1996.
business to manufacturing business.12 The numbers of city pairs in each category are 31, 6,
1, 5, and 4, respectively. 13 Within each category, there are categories for city pairs by
distance and by size. Table A- 1 in the appendix shows the city pairs in their respective
categories.
Section 4
Results and Discussions
4.1 Results
Table 4-1 shows the summary results for the coefficients for the price and trip segment
variables for the models ran with the trip segment variable (TS) only. 14 Table A-2 in the
appendix presents the complete results for the models ran with the trip segments variable(TS).
12
13
14
These categories represent trip purpose as a function of relative employment patterns. Obviously, travel
within a category is for all the aforementioned reasons. Trade, industry, and academic sources often use
trip generation purposes like these to analyze markets. While the percentages used here to define each
category are somewhat arbitrary, they adequately differentiate between trip purpose.
City pairs with "other cities" are included in one of the five categories.
Summary results are only for the price and trip segment coefficients that are significant at a 90 percent
level of confidence or higher. The 90 percent confidence is used instead of the 95 or 99 percent confidence
to capture more markets where the underlying variables may be significant. The impact of the TS and fare
variables in some of these markets, while not as strong as in those si_ificant at a 95 percent confidence or
higher, may still strongly influence demand.
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Table 4-1. Summary Regression Results with TS (Equation 1)
Passenger
Category and
Variable
Number of
Significant TS
Coefficients Mean Median
All - fare 46 -.76 -.75
All -TS 21 -1.68 -1.29
Maximum Minimum
-.26 - 1.47 .26
-.35 -5.11 1.25
Standard
Deviation
Leisure - fare 35 -.88 -.81 -.39 -2.14 .39
Leisure -TS 27 -4.34 -2.66 -.82 -29.09 5.91
26 -.98 - 1.02 -.40 - 1.64 .35
-4.17 -2.69 -.87 -26.99 5.07
Business -
fare 15
Business - TS 29
The estimated regression coefficients provide a framework for estimating how changes in
the explanatory variables affect the dependent variable. 16 The regression coefficients
capture these effects as a constant elasticity. As noted in Section 3, these elasticities provide
a framework for isolating the change the dependent variable due to changes in the
explanatory variable.
The second column in Table 4-1 shows the number of markets where TS is a significant
factor in explaining demand in each of the respective categories. The results show that TS is
a significant factor in about 60 percent of the markets in the leisure and business passenger
categories (27 and 29 markets for leisure and business, respectively, out of a total of
47 markets in the sample), and about 45 percent in the all passenger category. The third and
15
16
The business fare elasticity is significant in fewer markets than the leisure fare elasticity. If aggregated
across all the 35 markets where the leisure fare is significant, the business elasticity would be considerably
lower.
Most of the models have adjustments for serial correlation. A common finding in time series regression is
the presence of serial Correlation (residuals are correlated with their own lagged values). Serial correlation
is inconsistent with the assumption in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression theory that the disturbances
are not correlated with each other in any fashion. The presence of serial correlation results in inefficient
and unreliable coefficients. Econometricians have developed extensions of regression analysis to deal with
serial correlation. Correcting for serial correlation provides for statistically more reliable coefficients and
estimated standard errors. The adjusted coefficients provide more reliable estimates of the independent
variable's impact on the dependent variable and on its significance level.
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fourth columnsin Table4-1 showthemeanandmedianregressioncoefficientvaluesfor TS
in themarketswhereit is significant. In markets,whereit is asignificant factor,aone
percentincreasein theaveragenumberof trip segmentsreducesdemandby about
2.70percentin boththeleisureandbusinesscategories(basedon the medianvalues).17 In
somecases,thecoefficientfor TS isverynegative(e.g.,Pittsburgh-Philadelphiat -14.96for
leisure). In thesample,the marketswith themostnegativecoefficientsfor theTS variable
areshort-haulmarketswhereamoveawayfrom point-to-pointservicewouldresult in most
consumersdriving instead.
Table4-2showsthesummaryresultsfor thecoefficientsfor theprice andfrequency
variablesfor themodelsrun with thefrequencyvariable(FRQ)only. 18TableA-3 in the
appendix presents the complete results for the models ran with the flight frequency variable
(FRQ).
17 We use median values to reduce the impact of outliers.
18 Summary results are only for the price and frequency coefficients that are significant at a 90 percent level
of confidence or higher.
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Table 4-2. Summary Regression Results for Models with FRQ (Equation 2) 19
Passenger
Category
and
Variable
Number of
Significant
FRQ
Coefficients Mean Median Maximum Minimum
All - fare 46 -.80 -.79 -.20 - 1.52
All - FRQ 18 .39 .35 .83 .06
All - DUM 4 .30 .19 .11 .72
Leisure - 34 -.84 -.78 -.33 -1.83
fare
Leisure - 19 .53 .50 1.38 .13
FRQ
Leisure - 1 .42 ............
DUM
Business - 26 - 1.33 - 1.34 -.53 -2.70
fare 20
Business - 7 .85 .80 1.18 .51
FRQ
Business - 1 2.33 ............
DUM
Standard
Deviation
.28
.24
.29
.33
.36
-x.
.51
.21
The second column in Table 4-2 shows the number of markets where FRQ is a
significant factor in explaining demand in each of the respective categories. The results of
the models show that direct flight frequenc'y is a significant factor in explaining demand in
some markets. It is a significant factor in about 40 percent of the markets in the leisure and
19
2O
The sample has five city pair markets where direct air service either started or was discontinued during the
period studied. The impact of this effect is a significant factor in explaining demand in four of those
markets in the all-passenger category. In these markets, the effect of having direct air service increased
demand by between 11 and 72 percent.
The coefficient for business fares is higher than in the model with the TS variable. The difference is due to
the absence of the TS variable. Some of the change in demand attributed to fares in this model are
probably the result of changes in the average number of trip segments.
13
all passenger categories, but only about 15 percent in the business passenger category.21 The
third and fourth columns in Table 4-2 show the mean and median regression coefficient
values for FRQ in the markets where it is significant. In markets, where it is a significant
factor, a one percent increase in the number of direct flights increases demand by about .5
and .8 percent in the leisure and business passenger categories, respectively (based on the
median values). In four cases, the coefficient for FRQ is very high (greater than one). In
two of those markets, the average capacity per plane increased substantially. However, the
two other markets do not have any characteristics that would explain why the coeffÉcients are
so high.
4.2 Discussion
While the markets with the most elastic trip segment elasticity are short-haul markets, the
TS variable is significant in markets of all distances. The proportion of long-haul markets
(more than 1,500 miles) where TS is significant is not significantly different from short-haul
markets (less than 750 miles). 22 The study also compared the summary results to the results
from each general category. For example, the summary coefficient of price for leisure
passengers is compared to the average coefficient of price for leisure passengers in the
general business to leisure category. There are not any statistically significant differences
between the categories.23
The FRQ variable is significant in markets of all distances. However, the proportion of
long-haul markets (more than 1,500 miles) where FRQ is significant is significantly higher
than in short-haul markets (less than 750 miles). 24 As before, the study compared the
21
22
23
24
In many of the markets, increases in direct flight frequency were probably due to increases in personal
income. Changes in demand in these markets were probably the result of changes in personal income or
other factors. Consequently, the frequency variable is not significant in the majority of the markets.
The differences are not significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
The differences are not significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence in all but two of the
30 tests. In those two tests, the differences are not significantly different at a 99 percent level of
confidence.
The differences are significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
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summary results to the results from each general category. As before, there are not any
statistically significant differences between the categories. 25
Table 4-3 shows which of the two variables are significant when running the regressions
with both the TS and FRQ variables together (equation [3]). The results show the total
number of markets where the variables are significant.
Table 4-3. Comparison of Results (by Number of Markets)
Passenger
Class
Trip Distance
(miles)
All <750
All 750-1500
All >1500
8
2
Leisure <750 15
Leisure 750-1500 3
Leisure > 1500 4
Business <750
750-1500
>1500
TS
Business
Business
4
3
FRQ (or
DUM)
2
15 0
7 1
Both
2 5
3 6
0 1
1 5
None
10
3
2 3
The third column in Table 4-3 shows the number of markets where only TS is a
significant factor in explaining demand in each of the respective categories. The fourth
column shows the number of markets where only FRQ is a significant factor, and the fifth
column shows the number of markets where both are significant factors. While the TS
variable is significant across all passenger categories and trip distances, the variable for
frequency is not. For short-haul markets (less than 750 miles), TS is likelier than FRQ to
have an impact on demand. This is especially true in the leisure and business passenger
categories. For long-haul markets (greater than 1500 miles), FRQ is likelier to have an
impact than in short haul markets. When running the regressions with both TS and FRQ, the
25 The differences are not significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
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proportion of long-haul markets where FRQ is significant is significantly higher than in
short-haul markets in all of the passenger categories.26
Section 5
Extensions and Implications
5.1 Extensions
The results of the study show that the average number of trip segments (the average level
of point-to-point service) has a significant effect on demand in about 60 percent of the
markets in the leisure and business passenger categories.27 In both of these markets, a one
percent decrease in the average number of trip segments increases demand by about
2.7 percent (based on median values). If the median results of the sample are applied to the
whole country, then these elasticity measures may be useful in estimating NAS-wide
impacts. 28
A reduction in the average number of trip segments (an increase in the average level of
point-to-point to service) will have dynamic effects on demand. If changes in the average
number of trip segments also have a significant impact on 60 percent of all domestic
passenger traffic, then a one percent reduction in the average number of trip segments
increases demand by about 1.62 percent system wide (.6 multiplied by an elasticity of 2.7).
Consequently, a one percent reduction in the system wide average number of trip segments
will increase demand by about 6.9 billion revenue passenger miles (RPMs) (based on 1996
passenger traffic).29
26
27
28
29
The differences are significantly different at a 95 percent level Of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
The all passenger category includes "mixed fare class" data not picked up in either the leisure or business
type categories. Consequently, the results for all-passengers may appear inconsistent with the sum of the
other categories. For consistency, we do not use the results from the all-passenger category in this section.
This section uses the median value of elasticities in markets where the trip segment variable is significant
in a broad-based sample of 47 city pairs that is reasonably representative of the NAS. Trip segments are
more significant in some markets than in others, while in other markets they are not significant at all. The
results of this study also provide information on analyzing these specific markets.
Airlines are likelier to reduce the average number of trip segments in markets where it matters most (often
short-haul markets). Airlines are likely to reduce trip segments only in markets where changes in trip
segments have a significant impact on demand. Improvements in the NAS implemented system wide
should result in airlines trying to exploit potential gains to trade in all these markets. However, airlines
16
Theresultsof thestudyshowthatchangesin direct flight frequency(point-to-point
capacity)haveasignificant effectondemandin about40 percentand 15percentof the
marketsin the leisureandbusinesspassengercategories,respectively.In thesemarkets,aone
percentincreasein direct point-to-pointflight frequencyincreasesdemandby about.5 and.8
percent,respectively. If the medianresultsof thesampleareappliedto thewholecountry,
thentheseelasticitymeasuresmayalsobeusefulin estimatingNAS-wide impacts.a0
If changesin direct point-to-pointflight frequencyalsohaveasignificantimpacton
40percentand 15percentof all leisureandbusinesspassengertraffic, thenaonepercent
increasein direct flight frequencyincreasesleisuredemandby about.20percent(an
elasticityof .5 multiplied by .4) andbusinessdemandby about.12percent(anelasticityof .8
multipliedby. 15). Basedonestimatesof leisureandbusiness'sshareof total traffic, the
systemwideelasticityis about. 18percent.31 Consequently,aonepercentincreasein system
wide direct flight frequencyincreasesdemandby about750million RPMs(basedon 1996
passengertraffic).32
Increasedconsumersurplusis probablythemainbenefit to societyof improvedaviation
servicefactors. TheincreasedRPMsfrom theincreasein flight frequencyandthereduction
in averagetrip segmentsincreaseconsumersurplussincethey increaseconsumerwillingness
to pay. Consumersurplusis the differencebetweenwhatconsumerspayandwhatthey
wouldhavebeenwilling to pay for theproduct. Federalguidelineson "bestpractices"for
regulatoryactionscall for theuseof consumersurplusin anydecision-makingprocess.
Theseguidelinesalsostipulatethatconsumersurplusbegivena monetaryvaluewherever
possible.Basedon roughestimatesof theconsumersurplusfor domesticpassengeraviation
(Homan1998)andconstantprices,theconsumersurplusincreasesannuallyby about
30
31
32
mayputmoreemphasisinhigherelasticitymarkets.Consequently,hesystemwideincreaseindemandof
1.62percentisprobablyunderstated.
Thissectionusesthemedianvalueof elasticities in markets where the flight frequency variable is
significant in a broad-based sample of 47 city pairs that is reasonably representative of the NAS. Flight
frequencies are more significant in some markets than in others, while in other markets they are not
significant at all. The results of this study also provide information on analyzing these specific markets.
The December 7, 1997 Washington Post reported that about 70 percent of all passengers are leisure
passengers and that about 30 percent are business related passengers.
Airlines are likelier to increase flight frequencies in markets where it matters most. Airlines are likely to
increase flight frequencies only in markets where changes in frequency have a significant impact on
demand. Improvements in the NAS implemented system wide should result in airlines trying to exploit
potential gains to trade in all these markets. However, airlines may put more emphasis in higher elasticity
markets. Consequently, the system wide elasticity of. 18 percent is probably understated.
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$390 million following a one percent increase in flight frequency and about $3.3 billion
following a one percent reduction in average trip segments.
5.2 Implications
This study is part of a project in support of the Federal Aviation Administration's
(FAA's) Office of System Capacity to better understand the implications of FAA decisions
on the NAS and its users. One of these decisions is the extent that the air transportation
system moves towards satellite-based communications, navigation, and surveillance/air
traffic management (CNS/ATM). A purpose of the CNS/ATM initiative is to help airplanes
fly more precisely as well as to fly more user-preferred or wind-optimal routings ("free
flight"). CNS/ATM initiatives can reduce the inefficiencies of operating in the NAS by
relieving airport and en route congestion. These infrastructure improvements should increase
en route efficiency and allow for increased flight frequency and more direct service between
city pairs. Future increases in the number of direct flights and reductions in the average
number of trip segments will also occur due to changes in airline operations and airport
improvements. In all these cases, the results of the study show that the dynamic impact on
demand will put an increased burden on NAS capacity.
History has shown that airlines have usually chosen to accommodate growth by adding
frequencies and inaugurating new city pair services. Over the last 20 years factors such as
deregulation and improvements in airplane performance have influenced airline market
development to an even greater extent. Consequently, airlines have been able to employ
frequency and new city pair growth even more fully. For example, the availability of
intermediate size, long range airplanes favors new services and greater frequencies. The
North Atlantic market demonstrates this effect. Here, the advent of fuel efficient twin jet
aircraft performing extended range twin engine operations (ETOPS) has encouraged new
services. The smaller capacities of many of these planesalso promotes nonstop services
between new city pairs.
As noted in this report, increased frequencies and fewer trips between trip origin and
destination provide greater value for consumers. The more valuable air service has
stimulated demand beyond what has occurred due to just increased incomes and lower fares.
As airlines continue to increase flight frequency and add point-to-point service, this dynamic
effect on demand will continue. The results of this study show that continued increases can
have a significant impact on demand. This impact on demand can result in additional
infrastructure requirements for the NAS. For example, if long term improvements in
services result in a 10 percent increase in flight frequency and a 10 percent reduction in the
average number of trip segments, then demand would increase by nearly 20 percent (based
on 1996 passenger traffic).
The results of the study also have implications for studying airline decision-making and
the effect of hubs. The extensive use of hubs in the deregulatory era has allowed for an
18
increase in the potential number of connections offered by airlines. These increased
connections allowed for increased frequencies, the introduction of point-to-point service
between new city pairs, and a reduction in the average number of trip segments between
many O&D city pairs. These factors have resulted in significant dynamic effects on
de mand. 33
Currently, airlines face tradeoffs between improving service and cutting costs. Airlines
face tradeoffs between price sensitive leisure travelers and more time sensitive business
travelers. Airlines also face tradeoffs between offering service from hubs or bypassing hubs.
Knowledge of the underlying price and service elasticities can help in understanding these
tradeoffs. Future work being done in fiscal year 1999 that integrates these relationships into
a study of hubs and airline decision-making processes will provide a better understanding of
those tradeoffs.
33
The hub system gives passengers from spokes and passengers from hubs more fi'equent service than would
be possible with single plane service (as often was the case before deregulation). Hubs also resulted in
fewer passengers changing airlines (interlining) when they changed planes. For more information, see
Morrison and Winston (1995), pp. 19-28.
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Appendix
Sample and Regression Results
Table A-1. City Pairs in the Sample
City Pair Size Distance
Manufacturing to Manufacturing _.:'_i:,i:._I' i
Charlotte - Milwaukee large to large <750 miles
Cincinnati - Charlotte large to large <750 miles
Cincinnati - Detroit large to large <750 miles
San Jose - Detroit large to large >1500 miles
General Business to Manufacturing _..-.
Chicago - Chattanooga large to small <750 miles
Denver - Dayton large to small 750-1499 miles
Boston - Cleveland large to large <750 miles
San Diego - Detroit large to large > 1500 miles
Wichita - Birmingham small to small <750 miles
General Business to Leisure
Seattle - Reno large to small <750 miles
Tampa - New Orleans large to large <750 miles
Las Vegas - Kansas City large to large 750-1499 miles
Cincinnati - Orlando large to large 750-1499 miles
El Paso - Tucson small to small <750 miles
Omaha - Orlando small to large 750-1499 miles
Leisure to Leisure
Orlando - New Orleans large to large <750 miles
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Table A-1. City Pairs in the Sample (Continued)
City Pair
Size
General Business to General Business
Washington - Raleigh
Nashville - Raleigh
St. Louis - Albuquerque
Phoenix - Salt Lake City
Cincinnati - Omaha
Washington - Nashville
Phoenix - San Diego
San Antonio - Dallas
Sacramento - Salt Lake City
large to small
large to small
large to small
large to large
large to small
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
Tampa - Atlanta large to large
Washington - Jacksonville large to large
Chicago - Buffalo large to large
Denver - Kansas City
Pittsburgh - Philadelphia
Boston - Washington
Seattle - Los Angeles
San Diego - Dallas
Houston - Miami
Austin - Chicago
New York - Miami
Denver - Atlanta
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
large to large
Distance
<750 miles
<750 miles
750-1499 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
<750 miles
750-1499 miles
750-1499 miles
750-1499 miles
750-1499 miles
750-1499 miles
750-1499 miles
")9
Table A-1. City Pairs in the Sample (Concluded)
City Pair Size Distance
General Business to General Business : i . _ :
Philadelphia - St. Louis large to large 750-1499 miles
Los Angeles - Denver large to large 750-1499 miles
Washington - San Francisco
Boston - Houston
New York - Phoenix
Seattle - St. Louis
large to large >1500 miles
large to large >1500 miles
large to large >1500 miles
large to large >1500 miles
Miami - San Francisco large to large >1500 miles
Seattle - Chicago large to large > 1500 miles
San Francisco - Boston large to large > 1500 miles
Washington - Los Angeles large to large > 1500 miles
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Table A-2. Regression Results with TS Only
City Pair Passenger Class PI (t-stat) fare (t-stat) TS (t-stat)
Manufacturing to Manufacturing
Charlotte
Milwaukee
.°
.o
Cincinnati
Charlotte"
,o)
Cincinnati
Detroit"
San Jose-Detroit
.°
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
3.15 (6.75) t
4.16 (5.24)t
.68 (.36)
NA
1.80 (2.54)"
NA
2.3E-5 (3.12) I
-2.26E-5 (1.57)
.0002 f4.1I)'
1.06 (3.5I)'
2.91 (2.79)'
-..58(-3.28)t
-1.04(-3.86)I
.81 f1.00)
-.75(-3.60)j
.34 (1.17)
-.97(-I.42)
-,,50(-2.27)"
.38 (.81)
NA
-.922 (-4.31 )'
-.87 (-2.48):
-I.95 (-3.35) _
-.29 (-.89)
-4.38(--6.29)l
-3.90(-6.27)l
-I.03(-.60)
-5.02(-I.22)
-9.97 (-2.62) t
-I.16(-3.35)I
-1.75(-3.34)I
R= &N
.92 51
.91 43
.65 35
.90 51
.49 49
.85 44
.83 51
business i .66 ( I.I 8)
,,General Businessto Manufacturing
Chicago
, Chauanoofa
,.°
Denver-Da_non
,,-
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
NA
3.13 (3.18)'
NA
-.02(-.15)
.08 f.39)
NA
.32 (1.01)
-.85 (-3.26)j
-.55(-2.25)2
.35 (.63)
-I.16 (-6.85)I
-1.36f-4.96)t"
.I3 (.71)
.49 45
.81 51
.65 52
.67 45
-.06(-.09) .37 44
.56 (.38)
-5.73(-2.53)_-
.49 51
.64 45
.76 51
.70 51
.72 45
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Table A-2. Regression Results with TS Only (Continued)
City Pair Passenger Class PI (t-stat)
General Business to Manufacturing
Boston all
Cleveland"
"" leisure
"" business
allSan Diego
Detroit
• 16 (,40)
fare (t-star)
-.79 (-7.17) I
TS (t-stat)
NA
.56 51
-.77(-I.18) -.89(-4.79)_ -.54(-.46) .41 45
1.25(.37) -.38(-I.01) -2.74(-2.95)_ .56 45
,30 (I.14)
.57(38)
" leisure .82 (2.92)z
" business
.79 (1.33)
4.03 (4.45)'
allWichita
Birmingham"
-1.23(-I0.09)=
-1.35(-I1.78)'
-.72(-3.34)'
-.51(-2.21)"
-.38(-I.19)
NA
leisure
business
.20 (.83) .69 52
-.02(-.09) .77 49
-.15(-.35)
-1.80(-1.67)_
-.29 (-.30)
R = & N
NA NA
.34 51
.39 50
.58 43
NA
General Business to Leisure
Seattle-Reno"
,,o
all 1.72 (3.33)'
-.43f-2.13)2 -3.23(-5.86)'
.91 51
leisure 1.96(3.86)l -.22(-I.01) -3.21(-5.88): .90 45
"'" business 1.85 (1.14) -I.31(-4.02)I -2.68(-I.67)3 .74 51
Tampa all .26 (.43) -I.02(-8.01): -.54(-2.08)-" .g7 51
New Orleans"
"" leisure I.I0(.32) -.57(-2.43)" -.82f-1.65)3 .76 45
"" business 12.27t.99) -I.14(-4.28)t -.87(-1.94)_ .85 51
Kansas City all .74 0.97)" -.48 (-2.75)' .22 (.50) .78 51
Las Ve[as"
"" leisure -I.04f-.80) -1.21(-3.13)' .25 f.35) ,71 45
"" business .69 (.66) -1.34 (-2.96)l -2.97(-6.03)_ .89 51
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Table A-2.
CitvP=ir [ PassengerClassI Vl(,-stat)
General Business to Leisure
I
Cincinnati
Orlando"
u.
14.
El Paso-Tucson"
Omaha-Orlando"
i.
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
Regression Results with TS Only (Continued)
fare ft-stat) TS (t-stat) R = & N
1.50 (4.g9) I
3.86 (5.32)I
-.48f-.22)
NA
-.75f-.86)
NA
2.60 (6.10)l
2.86 (14.80)=
4.16 (2.05)2
Leisure to Leisure
Orlando all .42 (1.28)
New Orleans"
"" leisure 2.89 (4.12) i
"" business 13.63 ("1.33)
General Business to General Business
Washington all .38 (1.42)
Raleish"
"" leisure .07 (.03)
"" business NA
-.61(-3.30)' -1.77(-.4.53f
-.22(-.64)
-.40(-I.91)3
-.82(-3.56)i
-I.07f-3.67)'
NA
-.54(-1.89f
-.77f-6.14)I
-1.27(-5.27)I
-3.31 (-5.89) _
-2.19 (-2.96) 1
-.17 (-.55)
-.2, (-.52)
NA
-1.29(-4.27)i
.02 (.03)
-2.23 (--4.12)'
.86 51
.90 45
.81 51
.84 51
.76 45
NA
.85 47
.87 49
.93 40
-.75(-8.48f -1.99(-I0.06)' .93 51
-.13(-.66) -2.26(-7.22)I .75 45
-.59(-2.04)' -3.24(-6.03)' .91 51
-.45 (-4.19)'
-.4 (-.14) .52 46
-.44(-1.69)3 -3.07(-I.07) .78 40
NA NA N_
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Table A-2.
City Pair I Passenger Class PI (t-stat)
General Business to General Business
Nashville
Raleigh"
6,'
L,*
St. Louis
Albuquerque
Salt Lake City
Phoenix"
all
Cincinnati
Omaha"
Washington
Nashville"
,,,
Phoenix
San Diego
,.,
,°°
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
"" leisure
"" business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
Regression Results with TS Only (Continued)
fare (t-star) TS (t-stat 1 R' & N
.81 (7.24) t
!.58 (9.50) I
-.77 (-.81)
2.10 (3.1 I) I
5.59 (10.49) I
10.94 (2.75) t
.80 (I.55)
1.51(2.20)"
-1.25(-62)
NA
-.59 (-3.95) I
-.73 (-2.82) I
.52 (.85)
-.78 (-4.88) I
NA
--56 (-I .77) 3
-.91 (-4.97) I
-.16(-.52)
-I.64 (-5.48)i
-I.08 (-4.07)I
-.78 f-.74) -.73 (-2. I 1)"
-5. I I (-1.44)
.77 (3.63) I
1.12 (3.73) I
.85 (I.53)
.91 (3.65) t
.26(.58)
-.26 (-1.72) _
-.05 (-.29)
.06 (.21)
-1.14 (-4.34) _
-.35 (-2.04)-"
-I.93 (-5.92)t
-1.39 (-2.43)_"
-.37(-1.09)
-.04 (-.08)
-.14 (-.30)
-.44(--56)
-2.80(-2.37)"
-2.77(-2.26)2
-55(.70)
.91 (.94)
.43 {.53)
-.38(-.89)
-.80 (-1.39)
-2.58(-8.48)I
-14.04(-1.13)
leisure NA .30 (.67) -I 2.67 (-2.64)'
business 3.79 (3.26) I -1.41 (-3.15) I 30.54 (.84)
.92 51
.91 45
.71 51
.89 52
.78 49
.87 49
.92 51
.74 45
.88 51
.55 51
.39 45
.59 49
.42 51
.51 45
.77 51
.65 52
.74 45
.90 45
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Table A-2. Regression Results with TS Only (Continued)
City Pair Passenger Class
General Business to Genera]
San Antonio
Dallas
all
leisure
Salt Lake City
Sacramento"
Tampa-Atlanta"
Washington
Jacksonville
Chicago
Buffalo"
business
all
leisure
"" business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
Denver
Kansas City
Pl (t-star) [ fare {t-stat)
Business
.20 (2.96/
NA
1.50 (1.67) ]
-1.80 (-I.44)
.29 (1.43)
3.46 (5.51 )=
NA
.95 (6.61) I
1.66 (3.I I)'
.50 (.72)
-.30 (-.53)
.65 (.66)
-2.46f-1.38)
.84 (5.14) =
TS (t-stat)
-.54(-4.08)' -4.55(-.82)
-.96(-4.68)l -29.09 (-5.42)j
-1.18 (-8.54)_
-.98(-7.35)'
-.65(-2.31)2
-I.03(-5.31)'
-.76 (-8.70)t
-.46 (-2.12):
-.48(-2.17)*"
-.90(-7.29)l
-.02(-.II)
-.93(-2.84)t
-.69 (-I 1.74) =
-.64(-I0.29)'
-.54(-5.95)'
-.95(-3.23)'
-26.99 (-I.90)_
.53 (.83)
-3.05 (-2.48) 2
1.18(1.52)
-I.31(-.82)
-2.91(-1.68)_
-I0.07 (-3.12)I
-.59(-2.90)I
-I.22 (-2.87)'
-1.57(-2.44)2
-.O2(-.08)
-.63(-2.48)z -1.83(-2.1I):
.58 (.98) -3.33(-5.59)'
-5.11(-3.52/
-4.77(-2.58)'*
-7.58(-3.19)i
R = &N
.44 52
.81 45
.93 49
.92 51
.84 45
191 32
.94 51
.94 45
.81 51
.69 52
.65 45
.40 51
.80 48
.52 45
.82 47
.90 52
.84 49
7_ _1
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Table A-2.
City Pair Passenger Class PI (t-star)
General Business to General Business
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
o,*
Boston
Washington"
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
"" business
Seattle
Los Angeles"
.,
all
San Diego
Dallas"
leisure
"" business
all
Houston-Miami"
Austin-Chica_o
Regression Results with TS Only (Continued)
fare (t-star) I TS (t-star} R2 & N
2.28 (.87)
-I .47 (.54)
1.00 (6.74) _ -.70 (-12.00) t
-.93 (-I.97)"
1.07 (8.07) j
.60 ( 1.347
-.74 (-11.20) t
2.84 (8.37) n -.84 (-4.52) u
NA .08 (.17)
3.27 (4.43) t -.02 (-.19)
3.62 f3.78}_ -.04 (-.36)
12.66 ('I.69)3 -.25(-1.20)
.83 (4.00} I
-.83(-6.48)t
-2.27 (-I.24) .89 52
-14.96 (-3.52) I .76 45
-8.44(-I0.89)n
.28 (.53)
.91 51
.66 51
-I.81(-1.73)3 .71 45
-3.15(-1.22) .58 51
-4.61(-3.00)I .63 51
-3.18(-2.0I)" .64 45
-.84 (-.51)
-.34(-1.51)
.81 51
.80 51
leisure 2.24 (3.62) n -.64 f-2.44)-" -.34 (-.80) .80 45
business NA NA NA NA
all NA -.76 (-6.42) t -1.47 (-1.85) J .83 51
.22 f.18}
-2.91(-I.09)
leisure
all
all
leisure
business
2.32 (9.70)i
2.64 (10.12)a
1.65(2.82)i
-2.66t-2.25}" .77 45
-2.23(-3.47)I .91 51
-.60t-1.44) .90 52
-1.36(-4.10)* .91 49
-.39(-I.70)_
-.69(-2.90)t
-.56 (-5.39) I
-.52 (-4.08} I
-.41 (-I.90) l
-I.31 f-3,45) T .33 52
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Table A-2.
City Pair Passenger Class
General Business to Genera]
New York
Miami
all
Los Angeles
Denver
"* leisure
"" business
Denver-Atlanta all
"" leisure
"* business
Philadelphia all
St. Louis"
"" leisure
"* business
all
4**
Washington
San Francisco"
,o •
Boston -HOUStOn
discount
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
P[ (t-stat1
Business
Regression Results with TS Only (Continued)
Rz &N
.15 (.60)
1.78{3.30)l
NA
1.02(7.52)i
1.36(I.69)3
3.48 (5.07)l
-I.57(*.l3)
1.13(4.95)_
3.09 (3.47)*
-7.29(-.81)
-.42(-.50)
1.95(4.08)'
1.09 f6.53)l
1.18(4.25)_
fare (t-stat) TS (t-stat)
-.46 (-3.44) I
-.46(-2.27)z
-.85(-3.34)*
-I.12f-6.07)*
-I,09 (-3.42)t
-.60f-1.88)3
-I.I0(-5.19)l
-.98(-3.76)l
-I.37 (-2.94)l
-.71 (-13.37)I
-.81 (-,4.95)i
-.06(-.13)
-.34(-2.34)"
-I.08(..4.90)I
-I.02 (-3.38)I
-.73(-7.01)_
-.69f-3.50)I
-I.08 (-4.44)a
-2.32(-2.72)l
-2.36(-I.68)3
-5.60(-7.31)l
-.29 (-.56)
-.31 (-.46)
-1.47 (-1.527
-1.55(-2.5I)"
-2.39(-3.39)I
-I .57 (-2.65)l
-.48(-.93)
-.26 (-.24)
.20 (.24)
-I .29 (-4.10)*
NA
-I.25 (-2.16):
-.73 (- 1.9173
-I.58 (-3.02) I
-3.35 (-7.20) I
1.28(1.57)
-.05(-.04)
.49 52
.79 45
.92 51
.81 52
.88 45
.83 48
.52 51
.73 45
.83 5 I
.85 52
.82 45
.91 51
.67 47
.87 44
.77 50
.62 52
.61 45
R7 _I
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Table A-2.
Cit_' Pair Passenger Class I PI (t-stat)
General Business to General Business
New York
,,Phoenix
,jl
Seattle-St. Louis
Miami
San Francisco"
**°
Seattle-Chica_zo
6,"
°*°
San Francisco
Boston
*°
,L •
Washington
Los Angeles'"
L°o
all
discount
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
Regression Results with TS Only (Concluded)
fare (t-stat) I TS (t-stat) R 2 & N
.83 (4.42) ]
1.65(5.64)l
NA
.51(.97)
1.40(2.75)l
-I.73 f-.52)
NA
1.28(3.18) I
2.08 t2.18)2
-2.74t-1.265
.80(2.73)l
2.21 (6.955 I
NA
1.56 (2.41)"
-.57(-5.21)t
-.60(-3.50)l
-.66(-3.33)i
-1.47(-5.86)l
-l.71(-5.70)_
-1.05f-3.30)l
-1.07(-5.93)l
-.76(-390) I
-.27(-.92)
-I.17(-5.43)l
-1.15(-3.45)I
-.77(-5.45)I
-I.60 (-4.07)l
-2.83(-6.36) I
-I.08f-1.66)3
-.54(-.84)
.34 (.51)
-.14(-.47)
-.06t-.t5)
-.41f-l.01)
-.24(-.42)
-2.14 (-7.23) 1 1.15 tl.225
-1.23 (-3.05) I -I .79 (-2.28):
-1.58 (-3.31) I
-2.74 (-3.995 I
NA
-.44 (-4.34)I
-1.16(-5.11)I
-I.47(-5.9851
-.44(-I.4-4)
.73 (I.01)
-2.30f-5.93)_
.76 52
.86 45
.73 5l
.68 52
.73 49
.68 51
.71 51
.67 45
.92 51
.61 52
.71 45
.70 51
.58 52
.67 49
NA
.73 48
.74 45
RS _1
Legend:
1. Significant at a 99 percent level of conference
2. Significant at a 95 percent level of confidence
3. Significant at a 90 percent level of confidence
* Adjusted for first order serial correlation
** Adjusted for fourth order serial correlation
NA. Adequate data not available or spurious correlation results when variable included
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Table A-3.
City Pair Passenger Class PI (t-stat)
Manufacturing to Manufacturing
Charlotte all 3.75 (4.02f
Milwaukee"
leisure 6.60 (3.09) t
,,.
business -3.47 (-1.42)
all -3.43 (-i.52)
leisure 2.97 (.80)
business NA
all 2.7E-5 (3.44f
leisure
business .000 i (3.41 )l
all .97 (16.60f
"' leisure 1.92 (4.75f
,,.
business 1.50 ( 1.33)
Genera] Business to Manufacturing
Cincinnati
Charlotte"
Cincinnati
Detroit"
San Jose-Detroit
Chicago
Chattanoo[a"
aJI
leisure
business
NA
-I.69E-5 (-I.I 3)
3.19 (3.37f
NA
Regression Results with FRQ Only
fare (t-stat) FRQ (t-slat)
-.82 (-4.09) I
-.96 (-2.76) I
-I.51 (-I .46)
-.79 (-3.8 I)'
-.36 (-.95)
-2.70 (-3.07) I
-.54 (-2.50)"
.06 (.12)
NA
-.98 (-7.63f
-.75(-4.40)_
.36 f1.35)
.57 (1.79f
.56(I.17)
.20 (.23)
-.35(-I•36)
-.84(-1.31)
-.04f-.07)
.16(1.06)
1.32 (2.34)"-
-.76 f-.69)
.24 (3.56) ]
(DUM)
.42 (4.74f
(DUM)
NA
-.81 (-3.40f
-.69(-I .53)
.48 (.87)
• I 1 (1.93) 3
(DUIVI)
13 (1.14)
(DUM)
.14 (1.13)
(DIIM_
R _ &N
.83 26
.80 26
.31 26
.90 51
.55 45
.69 44
.83 51
.53 45
.78 51
.65 52
.57 49
.53 44
.52 51
.59 45
.76 51
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Table A-3.
City Pair Passenger Class Pi It-stat)
General Business to Manufacturing
Denver-Dayton" all -.13 (-.89)
,.°
.o
Bor4on
Cleveland'
.-
.o
San Diego
Detroit"
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
allWichita
Birminfham"
leisure
" business
General Businessto Leisure
Seattle-Reno" all
"" leisure
"" business
Regression Results with FRQ Only (Continued)
fare (t-star) FRQ (t-slat) Rz & N
.07 (.35)
-.86 (-1.52)
• 10 (.20)
-.83 (-1.225
4.40 ( 1.545
.02 (.03)
.53 (1.95) 3
.60(.72)
.75 (1.20)
4.01 (4.48)]
NA
-I.15(-6.41)I
-1.38(-5.20)*
-.01 (-.05)
-.80 (-6.37/
-.92(-4.715'
-.56 (-I.215
-1.19 (-7.46)t
-1.30f-I0.245'
-.g8 (-3,785j
-.52(-2.19)"
-.35(-I.16)
NA
.13 (2.35): .69 51
(DUM5
.72 45.06 (.87)
fDUM)
.01 (.06)
(DUM5
-.13(-I.01)
-.05(-.32)
-.51 (-.89)
.17 (I.94) J
.22 (3.11)'
-.02(-.II5
.06 (31 )
(DUM)
-.04 (-.25)
(DUM)
NA
.72 51
.55 51
.40 45
.48 45
.68 51
.76 44
.33 46
.35 50
.58 43
NA
.58 f1.82)_ -.36f-2.23)"
.96 (3.17)I -.12f-.77)
2.35 fl.70)_ -1.64(-4.86)_ "
.70 (9.61/ .92 51
.72 (11.277' .92 45
-.63 (-I 33) 74 _;I
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Table A-3.
City Pair Passenger Class
General Business to Leisure
Tampa
New Orleans"
Kansas City
L Las Vegas'
Cincinnati
Orlando
El Paso-Tucson"
Omaha
Orlando"
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
Leisure to Leisure
Orlando all
New Orleans"
"'" leisure
"" business
Regression Results with FRQ Only (Continued)
PI (t-stat) fare (t-staQ [ FRQ (t-star) R 2 & N
.29 (39)
1.13 (.40)
.71 (.11)
.65 (2.13) 2
-.47(-.48)
3.17 (1.52)
1.52 (7.22)'
4.41 (4.16)t
.84 (.30)
NA
-.73(-.78)
NA
1.37(3.53)'
2.88 (12.13)'
1.80(1.09)
-.48(-.93)
-2.47(-.64)
-3.16(-I.48)
General Business to General Business
Washington
Raleigh"
Nashville
Raleigh"
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
.47 (.94)
.78(-,23)
NA
.79 (5.83f
-I .15 (-7.86)'
-.45 (-I .81 )J
-I .50 (-5.37) I
-.88 (-3.68) I
-I.13(-2.99)I
-I.51 (-2.74)'
-I.17(-6.96f
-.94 (-I .98) 2
-.53 (-2.44) 2
-.94 ¢-4.35) _
-I.II (-4.29) j
NA
-.58(-2.I0)"
-.78(-6.05)t
-I,05 (-4.08) I
-.90(-5.02)l
-.20(-.42)
-I.87 (-5.82)j
-.46 (-4.51 )1
-.45(-I.68)3
NA
-.55(-3.71)'
.2 f.80)
.55 (.84)
-.01 (-.15) .86 51
•16 fl.13) .75 45
-.27(-1.38) .85 51
-.01(-.09) .80 51
-.36f-1.32) .71 45
-.04(-.07) .82 51
.09 (1.20) .81 52
-.20(-I.08) .80 45
.12(.68) .77 51
•20 (3.47)' .86 46
•27 (3.58)i .82 40
NA NA
.72 (5.64)_ .84 51
(DUM)
-.01 (-16) .87 49
(DUM)
2.33 (5.30)_ .94 40
fDUM)
.33 (2.51)" .80 51
.50 {2.01 )-" .56 45
-.22 (-.63) ,84 51
-.03(-.22)
.17 (,53)
NA
.09 (I.43)
.52 46
.77
NA
.92 51
.50 (3.30) _ .88 45
-.26 ¢- _ol ,_-r _,
4O
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Table A-3. Regression Results with FRQ Only (Continued)
City Pair I Passenger Class PI lt-statt fare (t-stat) [ FRQ (t-star) [ R l & N
General Business to General Business
St, Louis all 1.93 (3.1 I) I
Albuquerque
leisure 4.99 f7.69) I
"'" business 8.50 (2.18)"
Salt Lake City all .17 (.32)
Phoenix"
"" leisure 1.01(1.09)
1.43 (2.71)t
NA
"" business
Cincinnati all
Omaha"
"" leisure
"" business
Washington
Nashville"
,,,
Phoenix
San Diego
all
leisure
business
all
-1.59 (-I.54)
NA
.82(3.60)t
1,23f3.74)_
.97£65)
.78 (3.96)l
-.68(-4.21)' .24 (2.19)2
NA .22(1.41)
-.66(-2.12)" ,75 (I.76)I
-.85(-6.06)t .45 (3.90)i
-.48f-1.39)
-I.72 (-5.37)'
-I.13(-4.40)t
-.74 (-2.I8)'
.32 (.89)
-.30(-1.93)-_
-.06(-.29)
.36 (.64)
-.58(-2.17)z
.65 (1.44)
-I.40 (-3.03)l
-.58 (-4.48) _
-.41f-l.51)
-1.25(-I0.86)z
-.97(-7.79)t
-.90 (-3 10) I
-I.41 (-5.41) _
.22 (.64)
-.23(-.29)
.09 (1.42)
(DUM)
.10 (I.01)
(DUM)
.19 (.83)
(DUM)
.14(1.33)
.89 52
.79 49
.88 49
.93 51
.71 45
.87 51
.56 51
.39 45
.57 49
.43 51
.27 (1.54) .52 45
.44 (1.09) .43 51
•68 (4.18)t .74 52
San Antonio
Dallas
Salt Lake City
Sacramento"
.°
Tampa-Atlanta"
°.,
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisurebusiness
NA
3,81 (3,89) _
.21 (2.60) I
NA
.94 (7.21 )l
.19 (.29)
1.49 fl.21)
.17 (.10)
.47 (2.28)"
3.31 (446) t
NA
-.75(-9.49)'
-.68f-2.62)i
-.91 (-4.03) I
1.38(1.67)I
.43(.59)
-.03(-.23)
-.49f-l.15)
.09 t51 )
.37 (1.74)_
-.01(-.03)
NA
.72 45
.90 45
.44 52
.83 45
.92 49
.93 51
.82 45
.91 32
.07 (I.10) .94 51
-.18 f-.81) .93 45
-.38 (-I.13) 77 ql
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Table A-3. Regression Results with FRQ Only (Continued)
General Business to General Business
,° °
.°
Chicago
Buffalo"
1,°
j,I
Denver
,°
,,°
Pittsburgh
Washington all
Jacksonville
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
,,°
,,°
Seattle
i, °
,,°
San Diego
Dallas'
Houston-Miami"
,,-
.7l (5.37)u -.93(-7.30)I
(.01)
-.31(-.56)
-.21)
(-.96)
.75 (3.48)j
(8.20)*
NA
.96 (6.69) I
leisure
business
all
(.43)
(.30)
1.23 (4.42) j
leisure
business
all
(2.23) 2
NA
-1.28 (-.79)
leisure
pusiness
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
all
all
leisure
business
.I l (2.15)2
f3.0,4)I
NA
NA
(.02)
:84 (9.95)r
06 (.02)
(-.06)
-.67(-9.49)=
-.78(-I1.55) i
-.70(-13.02)t
-.72(-I1.45)_
NA
-.09 (-.81)
3 (-.24)
I-.74)
-.79 (-5.60) n
-.62 (-2.37):
NA
(-8.20) J
f-3.03)'
-5.84)*
.06(2.19)"
•I.._..33(2.02)"
.08(.64)
(-.42)
.04 (.40)
1.70) s
NA
.14 (i.32)
(I.33)
-.05 (-.71)
(1.49)
NA
.83 (2.92) =
-.05(-.26)
-.43 (-1.08)
NA
.24 (1.39)
96)
(-.89)
.15 (I36) 3
'2.51)z
!5 (-A.4)
&N
.67 52
.61 45
.34 51
.80 48
45
.68 47
.87 52
.82 49
.70 51
.89 52
.71 45
.69 5 I
.66 51
.71 45
NA
.60 51
.65 45
.83 51
.79 51
.80 45
NA
.83 51
.75 45
.90 51
.91 52
.89 49
.28 51
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Table A-3.
,-----_______ Regression Results with FRQ Only (Continued)
_(t-stat)
essto Genera/
all
-.56 (-1.13) -.69 (-5.72) f
ISure l
51/'less
-.71(-15.67)J
-.20 (-l.ll)
I I_R 9(t-sta_
•09 (.56) .42 52
•03 (/5)
•16 (2.35)"
.12 (I.32)
45
51
52
,15
48
.46 5 !
45
51
.86 52
45
51
.57 47
44
-.21 (-.42) 50
•36 (2.65) _ 46
_1.31) I 46
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Table A-3. Regression Results with FRQ Only (Concluded)
New York
Phoenix
'4
Miami
.it
.,°
San Francisco
Boston
.,°
Washington
Business to General
all
Legend:
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
all
leisure
business
all
leisure
business
all
.o
leisure
NA
E.54)
NA
NA
12)
.89)
.32 (.91)
NA
-.35(-3.27)I
-I.09(-6.17)i
NA
-.47 (-4.83) t
.26 (3.39)i .76 52
'.96)
.66) _
-.07(-I,14)
45
51
52
.74 49
51
.72 51
-.96) 4 I
NA NA
I)l 7 5i
L02)' 45
134) 3 .69 51
.39 (3.76) I .60 52
3"43)= .65 49
2"68)t 51
30(1.51) i .73 48
45
25 51
I. Significant at a 99 percent level of conference"
2. Significant at a 95 percent level of confidence
3. Significant at a 90 percent level of confidence
* Adjusted for first order serial correlation
** Adjusted for fourth order serial correlation
NA. Adequate data not available or spurious correlation results when variable included
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Glossary
ACRONYMS
ATC
BLS
CAASD
CNS/ATM
ETOPS
FAA
MSA
NAS
O&D
OAG
OLS
PI
RPMs
SFP
SIC
U.S.
TERMS
DUM
FRQ
TS
Air Traffic Control
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
The MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development
Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management
Extended Range Twin Engine Operations
Federal Aviation Administration
Metropolitan Statistical Area
National Airspace System
Origin and Destination
Official Airlines Guide
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Personal Income
Revenue Passenger Miles
Service, Finance, and Public Sector
Standard Industrial Classification
United States
Proxy for the presence of direct air service in markets where direct air
service was started or discontinued during the period studied
Number of Direct Flights (nonstop, or nonstop and one stop)
Average number of trip segments (proxy for the average level of direct
point-to-point service)
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Methods for Economic Appraisal in the Norwegian Aviation Sector
S BPdTHEN t
K S ERIKSEN
H M HJELLE
M KILLI
E-mail contacting author." svein.brathen@himolde.no
Alternatively contact: harald.hj elle@himolde.no
Paper presented at the 3rd Air Transportation Research Group (ATRG) Conference
City University of Hong Kong, June 6-8 1999
The Norwegian Civil Aviation Administration (NCAA) is responsible for building and
operation of the Norwegian airport system, and the air traffic management systems. The air-
port network for scheduled transport consists of 26 short take-off and landing airports, and 15
full length runway airports. The number of passengers arrived/departed on domestic routes
amounts to approx 19 millions per year for a population of 4.5 millions, placing Norwegians
among the most frequent flyers in Europe.
In 1998, the Ministry of Transport and Communications initiated a national transport planning
process, encompassing all the transport sectors. The report from this work will be launched in
late autumn 1999. To be able to select profitable projects across sectors, the need for an in-
strument for economic appraisal in the aviation sector has emerged.
In the autumn '98, the Standing Advisory Committee (SAC) for Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
in the Norwegian public sector launched a final report, giving methodological advice to future
CBA work. Simultaneously, Molde College and the Institute of Transport Economics were
commissioned by the NCAA to develop methods for-economic appraisal in the aviation
sector. This work was supposed to be developed with reference to the recommendations from
the SAC report, and the experiences from CBA work carried out in other parts of the transport
sector, the road sector in particular.
This paper presents the main contents of this work. Methodological problems will be
addressed, such as the handling of project risk and uncertainty, projects with mutual depen-
dency, and the methodology for analysing projects influencing the probability of fatal acci-
dents. The CBA methodology in the aviation sector is also compared to the SAC report, and
the arguments for some important divergences are commented upon.
S BRAATHEN and H M HJELLE, assistant professors, Mold," College. Molde, Norway.
K S EKIKSEN and M KILLI, research economists, Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo, Norway.
Introduction: Economic and financial analysis within the
NCAA 2. Decision-making between the devil and the deep blue
sea ?
The NCAA has a somewhat special role in the Norwegian transport sector compared to other
authorities like e.g. the Public Roads Directorate (NPRD) and the Railtrack administration
(NSB). NCAA's role is special due to the fact that the framework for the economic activities
is given by revenues from aviation taxes and commercial activities related to the airports.
These revenues amounted to approximately NOK 2.7 billions in 1997.
Although toll financing has become very popular on Norwegian public roads, the vast
majority of road projects are financed by public funding. When public investments are
considered, the natural question is: How will this project serve the community? What are the
total costs, and the total benefits of the project? Only projects where the total benefits exceed
the total costs (and where equity problems are acceptable) should be recommended for
implementation. Because this is such a natural setting for investments based on public
funding, the NPRD has developed tools for economic impact assessment over the past 30
years. Any proposed road project is now subject to a thorough and broad analysis that
includes external effects (time, accidents, environment), aimed at visualising the true econo-
mic costs and benefits to society.
Whereas politicians have demanded broad and thorough analysis from the NPRD for years,
the NCA.A may seem to have been left alone with their prioritising, because they "do not
demand public funding". The picture is not quite as simple as that: For larger investments,
like new airports et cetera, politicians have engaged in the debate. The general picture is still
the same: Almost any road investment is subject to public scrutiny, whereas the NCAA has a
more autonomous position because they are exempted from the annual public debate on the
use of scarce public funds.
Investments in the Norwegian aviation sector have therefore been made on the basis of
financial cashflow analysis alone. Still, a lot of investments are effectively determined by
guidelines and requirements established by institutions like ICAO and ECAC.
The fact that investment decisions made by the NCAA affect other parties, should indicate
that there is a need for a broader perspective in the analysis of such projects. In its efforts to
optimise the transport system as a whole, the Ministry of Transport has called for actions to
improve cross modal planning in recent years. This also means that the methodology with
respect to analysis procedures should be harmonised. This is the reason why the NCAA wants
to develop a tool for incorporating impacts for passengers, operators and the environment into
their analysis.
Making priorities subject to a full economic impact analysis instead of a more narrow
financial cashflow approach, may significantly alter the portfolio of projects that reaches
implementation. Many investments may very often represent a financial loss for the NCAA,
but still be good projects when benefits for the operators or the passengers are taken into
account. Typical benefits that may justify such projects are:
: Nor_egian Civil Aviation AuthoriD'
• Reductions in travel time
• Reductions in accident risk
• Reductions in environmental hazards
The dilemma of the NCAA is, however, still present: It still has to finance its activities
through revenues from user charges and other commercial activities, rather than from public
funding. This must be combined with the "public service obligation" to take the welfare of
passengers and operators into account when deciding on how to spend this revenue. As a
result of this, the NCAA may very well face decision dilemmas where the financial analysis
says one thing, while the economic impact analysis give other recommendations.
Many other civil aviation authorities are in the same, - or similar, situations. Their role is a
mixture of running a business and carrying out the responsibilities of providing public
services. Whereas the road administrations around the world have done a lot of development
work to establish a good methodology for a broad impact assessment, the work that is done in
the aviation sector is far more limited. The next three sections present some issues related to
such an effort. Section 2 gives a brief overview of cost benefit analyses (CBA) in the aviation
sector. Section 3 discuss some important factor prices used in CBA. Section 4 deals with
some methodological topics, and in section 5 we give some brief examples to illustrate why
the broader view of the impact analysis is necessary. Section 6 provides some conclusions.
2 Cost-Benefit analysis (CBA) in the aviation sector- an
overview
CBA is a systematic attempt to measure, value and weight together all the costs and benefits
with respect to whether the project is profitable or not. One main purpose with CBA is to
provide a basis for the choice and the ranking of projects. Therefore, it is important that the
analyses are comparable across different projects. CBA gives the net changes in the use of
real resources, measured in monetary terms. The most important economic effects to be
analysed within the aviation sector are:
• Changes in generalised travel costs, often in terms of changes in time costs. If present,
changes in air ticket costs and transport costs to/from airports should also be taken into
consideration.
• Environmental effects, like noise and emissions.
• Effects on safety.
• Investments and operating costs.
Network effects are relevant when flight corridors and routes are affected. These include
effects on the generalised travel costs for passengers in other parts of the network, as well as
for different operators.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the flow of resources in the aviation sector that is relevant in CBA.
TIlE INITIAL SITUATION (without the project):
Passengers Airlines
Benefits Costs Revert. Costs
WTP Tickets Tickets. Operating+
Time costs (subsidies) capital costs
Other travel Air charscs
expenses
CO2-tax
Seat lax
(PSO-tax)
NCAA The State
Rerun. Costs Rerun. Costs
Air chorgeJ Operating + Seat tax (PSO
Other commercial capitol costJ CO2 tax routes)
activities CNS/AT_[ (PSO-tax) Other
purposes
Airline NCAA
. .... ooo ...... o...... . ................ °....... s
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Changes tn
travel lime
+
e_peo,. I ,"_1 l
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Figure 2.1 The resource flow in the aviation sector
Figure 2.1 presents the flow of economic resources between agents in the aviation sector. The
upper part of the figure describes the present flows in the Norwegian aviation sector. The
system is driven by the passengers willingness to pay (WTP). One part of the total WTP is the
actual payments made through the air tickets. These payments constitute the revenue side for
the airlines. The cost side for the airlines consists of various charges for the NCAA's services,
taxes to the government, and costs concerning operations and capital. The air charges consti-
tute the revenue side for the NCAA, to cover the costs of different services. The revenues for
the State consist of taxes for CO2, and a seat tax. The PSO tax is in brackets because taxes to
cover the expenses for operation of routes under Public Service Obligation are still not levied.
The lower part of the figure shows the situation when a project is implemented that alter the
travel costs. The changes in generalised travel costs is the main factor on the benefit side, and
should be calculated against the costs for airlines and the NCAA, where the external effects
are also taken into consideration. Eventual network effects should also be a part of the picture.
A CBA should be considered because frequently there are no reason to expect that changes in
air ticket prices will be able to capture the changes in consumer surplus that is caused by the
project. To illustrate this, figure 2.2 shows a situation where the changes in air ticket revenues
do not reflect the changes in economic benefits for the passengers.
Consider two airports with different demand elasticity. A reduction in generalised travel costs
from Go to Gl gives an increase in consumer surplus 03) and increased air ticket revenues R.
The difference in R does not coincide with the difference in B.
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Figure 2.2 Revenues and consumer surplus
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In the aviation sector, CBA is recommended for the following most common project catego-
ries:
1. Projects motivated from standards or regulations. If there is an unambiguous link bet-
ween the project and standards/regulations, there is no point in doing a CBA. A cost-
efficiency analysis should in most cases be sufficient. However, there may be a case for
CBA if there are alternatives with different effects for the benefit side or the external cost
side.
2. Projects with environmental effects. CBA should be done if there are effects for third
parties that are not included in the NCAAs financial analyses. These effects may be either
environmental externalities or travel costs. If the environmental effects are internalised
through procedures for recycling/disposal, or the implicit costs of choosing a more
environmental-friendly design are captured in the financial analysis, then a CBA may be
omitted. The underlying assumption is that there are no effects in the traffic market.
3. CNA/ATM/1LS-services. When considering improved equipment for navigation,
communication and instnmaent landing, a CBA may be carried out if alternative routing of
flights affect travel time, or if accident risk or the environment is affected. If standards or
regulations demand such items, refer to point 1 above.
4. Terminals. A CBA is relevant if the travel time is affected or if there are changes in airline
costs (from e.g. delays or operating hours) that are not internalised. Small projects are
normally subject to a financial analysis only.
5. Extended runways. These projects normally affect regularity, the size of aircraft to be
served, and possibly the accident risk (however, one should be aware of "risk compensa-
tion" here). As a main rule, CBA should be carried out for such measures.
So far, the CBA within the aviation sector in the future seem to be carried out comparable to
what is actually done in e.g. the road sector. However, there are some methodological issues
which become apparent when analysing projects within the aviation sector. A couple of these
issues are addressed in section 4. The next section discusses a bundle of important factor
prices concerning intangibles in the CBA.
3 Factor prices
3.1 Genera/
To evaluate all consequences of planned investments in the air sector in money terms, we will
find that in many cases there are no markets for the effects that we want to include in the
analysis. In other cases we do not recognise the market price as a measure of the real value of
the consequences. This may be due to monopolies or other market failures.
The methods to evaluate factor prices should be consistent across sector borders. This does
not mean that prices should be the same all over, but that the principles for calculation of
prices should be consistent across sector borders.
The main methods of assessing these unit prices are in some way or another based upon the
society's willingness to pay for reducing or increasing certain variables. These methods are
mainly:
• Willingness-to-pay (WTP) surveys
• Damage cost analyses.
• lndirect valuation
Normally, damage cost analyses will include an element of WTP, because it is often
necessary to take into account also the costs of statistical lives and reduced health.
3.2 Value of time
The value of travel time savings is frequently the largest element in CBAs for projects in the
transport sector. The purpose of the trip is an important criterion when calculating this effect.
Here we have chosen to concentrate only on private travel and business travel. Commonly the
value of travelling time that alternatively might be spent working, has been calculated by
applying gross wage costs. For leisure travel the common approach has been to apply the net
wage rate, since that is the amount that the wage earner must sacrifice to have additional
leisure time.
In recent years there have been several attempts to estimate the value of time (VOT). Among
these is the Norwegian value of time study (Ramjerdi et al 1997). The main purpose of the
study was to produce VOT estimates for CBAs in the transport sector. The scope of the study
was to estimate the VOT for travel with cars, buses, ferries, trains and aircraft. Several travel
purposes are analysed, but we will only focus on business and private travel.
The methodology applied is two approaches to WTP analysis, Stated Preference (SP) and
Transfer Price (TP). Private travel demand may be expressed as a function of generalised
travel cost and analysed by means of a logit model. For business travels, attempts were made
to estimate VOT by means of a revised version of"Hensher's formula" (Hensher 1977). This
formula is founded on the assumption that both employer and employee will benefit from
shorter travelling time.
The estimate found for business travel by air turned out to be higher than the marginal
productivity of labour (the gross wage rate). Therefore it is recommended in the Norwegian
VOT study that a conservative estimate should be applied till further analyses are carried out,
meaningthatfor thetime beingthe estimatefor businesstravelby air is theaveragegross
wageratefor thisgroup.
In table3.1theactualvaluesof VOTfor theair sectorareshown.
Private travel Business travel
Travel time 173 213
Waiting time between departures 19 71
Table 3.1 Value of time for air travel (NOK)
The VOT for delays are from the equivalent Swedish study (Algers & al 1995), and assumed
to be 50 % higher than the VOT for travelling time.
The methodological approach in the Norwegian study has formerly been applied in similar
studies in Britain (Bates & al 1987), The Netherlands (HCG 1990) and Sweden (Algers et al
1995). It is fair to say that the results of these analyses, including the Norwegian one, have
been discussed a great deal for methodological weaknesses. However, they are the most
updated estimates we have so far, but they should of course be applied with care.
3.3. Accident costs
Accidents luckily occur very rarely in regulated air traffic. When they occur, however, the
consequences usually are of huge dimensions. We therefore will have to look into accident
frequencies as well as accident costs, to be able to include changes in accident risk into the
economic appraisals.
Accident frequencies
NCAA has performed an analysis of accident risks in Norwegian commercial aviation, both
route and charter traffic as well as other commercial traffic. From a data set consisting of all
flights within the Norwegian territory for the period 1985 - 1994, accident risks are estimated
(Fugleberg 1999). The effects of certain security, measures are estimated. These are precision
landing system, radar control and rows of landing lights > 720m. In addition the effects of
terrain factors like hills or peaks are analysed. Additional estimations are performed to isolate
the effects of scheduled 3 versus non-scheduled flights on accident risk and to adjust for the
total risk of having an accident during the whole leg, including take-off, cruise and landing.
On average 16% of all accidents for scheduled flights are fatal.
The results show that accident risk for scheduled flights, varies between 1.05 per million legs
and 3.6 per million legs, depending upon combinations of the above mentioned security
measures. The effect of introducing e.g. radar control (ILS not being used) is a reduction of
accident risk from 3.0 per million to 1.5 per million. For non-scheduled flights the accident
risk varies between 2.1 per million and 62.9 per million. Introducing e.g. radar is estimated to
reduce risk from 49.6 per million to 2.1 per million (without ILS).
Costs of accidents
The costs per accident are assumed to consist of loss of statistical lives, injury costs, material
costs and administration costs. However, injury costs are omitted because they are found to
Route and charter flights
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be of little importancein the aviationsector4. From Elvik (1993)and in analogywith
calculationsfor the railway sector,the cost of a statisticallife in anaviationaccidentis
estimatedto beNOK 17.0millions,which isabout2.0mill Euro.Materialcostsareassumed
to be 100%of aircraftvaluefor fatalaccidents.For non-fatalaccidentsthematerialcostis
assumedto be50%of aircraftmarketvalue.Averagematerialaccidentsforscheduledflights
are found to beNOK 44 millions. Averageadministrativecostsare foundto beNOK 4
millions.
Foranaverageaccidentweassumeanaveragenumberof 60passengersin theaircraft,arisk
of fatalaccidentof 0.16andamortalityrateof 0.9.Thematerialandadministrativecostsare
asstatedabove.Wemaythenconstructanexampleof thecostsof oneaccident:
Lossof statisticalives:
Materialcosts:
Administrativecosts:
Total:
NOK 147millions
NOK 44millions
NOK 4 millions
NOK 195millions
Theaveragecostof oneaccidentmustbecalculatedseparatelyfor eachairport.To calculate
the expectedreductionor increasein accidentcosts,the cost of one accidentmust be
multipliedwith theactualaccidentrisk orby thechangein risk dueto theinvestmentor the
measurestaken.
3.4 Environment costs
Environment costs in the aviation sector consist of noise and emissions (local, regional and
global effects). In addition we have pollution of ground and water from de-icing of aircrafts
and nmway. This is taken into account by adding the fully satisfying remedy costs to the cost
side of the analysis.
Noise
As one of the biggest sources of environment disturbance on and close to airfields, noise is
treated in a detailed way in the CBA manual for the aviation sector. The basis is a WTP
analysis performed in 1994 at Fornebu airport close to Oslo, where noise problems have been
substantial over a long period of time (Thune-Larsen 1995). The applied method was conjoint
analysis (CA) in combination with contingent valuation (CV). This was used to estimate the
people's willingness to pay for a reduction of subjective noise disturbance by 50%. Within
each noise zone of 5 dBA EFN (which mean that noise is weighted differently over the day)
the WTP for noise reduction is measured.
We then calculated the WTP for noise reductions for people that are much annoyed by airport
noise within each noise zone. This leads us to a WTP for a reduction to 50 % of noise
disturbance of NOK 3600 per year for much annoyed persons within the noise zones (50 dBA
or more). Assuming for practical purposes that this value is constant per percent change, we
may derive that a change in subjective noise disturbance is worth NOK 72 per year per
percent reduction.
This goes for noise increases as well as decreases. In reality, however, there is reason to
believe that the percentage change in cost is bigger for deterioration than for improvement in
' For fatal accidents the risk of losing ones life is found to be about 0.9.
the environment factor (Sa*lensminde & Hammer 1994). The bigger the change, the bigger the
error made by applying a linear approximation is.
For the whole country, inside zone 50 - 55 dBA there are 5% of the population that feel
<<much annoyed_) by air-traffic noise, increasing gradually to 31% for zone 65 dBA and
above. The change in noise disturbance that people perceive (subjective noise) is assumed to
be proportional to the logarithm of the noise pressure measured by dBA EFN. A map of the
assumed noise zones before and after the planned project is effectuated, must be derived from
measurements. Then the change in number of people that are much annoyed may be
calculated for each noise zone. The total WTP from <<much annoyed>) people may then be
calculated.
Local and regional emissions
Local emissions are connected to take-off and landing under the altitude of 100 meters.
Emissions from aircraft under an altitude of 1000 meters are usually classified as regional
emissions.
The combustion of aircraft fuel leads to the emission of a lot of substances that may influence
the environment in several ways. Since some of these substances are proportional to fuel
consumption and others are not, we have chosen to evaluate only a small number. Our
calculations therefore only include NOx, VOC (volatile organic components) and particles.
Since there seems to be no WTP-analyses or other recent relevant studies for Norway, we
have chosen to apply values that are recommended in a meta-analysis from ECMT 5. The
authors have analysed numerous European studies of indirect (shadow) cost of emission of
NOx, VOC and particles. Other emission costs are reviewed as well. But emissions of these
substances are small from air transport, or the costs are considered to be taken care of by other
components. The valuation of VOC is assumed to reflect the cost of other substances as well.
There is a need to separate between densely and sparsely populated areas since the
concentration of the substances is important for the damage effect. We have not considered
the possibility that the emission of these substances may have other effects, e.g. on the
production of ozone or greenhouse effects. The numbers are in the form of cost per kilogram
emission and transformed from ECU.
Densely populated areas Sparsely populated areas
NOX 70 35
VOC 70 35
Particles 615 0
Table 3.2 Costs in NOK per kilogram from local and regional emission to air.
For the airports in question, the average emissions are calculated from composition of the air
fleet that uses the airport. The emission factors of each category of aircraft are assumed
known from special tables calculated by NILU 6 that should be updated regularly in the future.
The average length of a leg by the most common aircraft to and from the airport is calculated,
and the average emission costs per leg may be found. From this the change in emission costs
per year may be calculated.
The council of transport ministers in the OECD, ECMT (199g).
Knudsen & Stromso¢ (1990), Nonvegian Institute for Air Research.
Global emissions
Global emissions are understood as having an impact on the global environment, regardless of
the location of the emissions. Such problems are the depletion of the ozone layer and the
greenhouse effect. Here we will concentrate on the latter. Among the gases that contribute to
the greenhouse effect, carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important one. We will consider CO2
as a representative for all climate gases and place all climate costs on this gas.
We are aware that some gases that are emitted in the higher layers of the atmosphere are
under suspicion of contributing more to climate changes than gases that are emitted on the
ground level. Among these are NOx and VOC, and we assume that the price for local and
regional emissions to some extent will compensate for that.
It seems that neither damage costs nor WTP will give a satisfactory answer to what the best
way of assessing the cost of CO2 emissions will be. We have chosen to use _dndirect political
willingness to pay)), i.e. to take the Kyoto agreement as a "constraint". We then calculate the
price or tax on CO2 that will be necessary to fulfil the Kyoto-agreement for Norway's part.
This means that CO2 emissions should be stabilised on the 1990-level from 2010 on. Calcu-
lations are made by means of the macro-economic model GODMOD (Jensen 1998). The
calculations show that it will be necessary to charge NOK 740 per tonne CO2 in 2010 to
stabilise on the 1990-level. The main underlying assumption is that an international agreement
forces all industrialised countries to charge CO2-emissions to fulfil their part of the Kyoto
agreement. If we assume that the charge is 0 in 1990, with a linear increment, the charge in
year 2000 will be NOK 370. This may be seen as a compromise between the presence and the
future, not letting either of them take all the costs.
The consumption of fuel per minute on a standard flight can be found from the above
mentioned tables. The burning of one kilogram jet-fuel produces 3.15 kilograms CO2.
Knowing the average additional flight-time produced by the planned project makes it possible
to calculate the CO2-cost connected to a specific investment.
In the next section, some methodological topics will be discussed that frequently emerges
when doing CBA within the aviation sector.
4 CBA for aviation projects - some methodological topics
4.1 The interdependency problem
Within the NCA.A's jurisdiction, it will quite frequently be the case that the value of a single
project will depend on whether other projects are implemented or not. When working with
economic analyses of specific interdependent projects, it is necessary to ensure that adequate
limitations are made so that only projects with a strong case for mutual interdependency are
considered. Otherwise, one may end up calculating the economic benefit of an entire airport
system, because there is almost always a possibility to identify more or less significant inter-
dependency with other projects, within the project's economic life span. When doing analytic
work, one important challenge is to define and deal with this kind of interdependency in a
practical way. This problem will now be assessed in two ways. First, the nature of
interdependency will be examined. Thereafter, some practical guidelines will be developed.
The discussion is limited to projects with sequential interdependence.
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Figure 4.1 Traffic growth - sequentialdependency
One indicator of mutual dependency is
impacts in the traffic market. Figure 4.1
illustrates the problem of sequential inter-
dependency, illustrated by the impacts from a
stepwise upgrading of an airport. "I"3repre-
sents the traffic growth in a 30 year span,
without any capacity constraints on the
airport. In year 5, the lack of terminal
throughput capacity limits the traffic growth
to To. If the capacity is expanded, the growth
rate will follow T3 until the next capacity
constraint occur, for instance the number of
gates available. Without expansion, the traffic
growth is limited to Tl. Correspondingly, if
the need for extra runway length in year 18 is
not met, the growth is limited to T2. The
figure shows that the benefits from the
expanded terminal building in year 5 are
limited if the number of gates remain unchanged after year 10. The traffic is assumed to be
growing, but with an annually declining growth rate. This is so because even if there are no
excess capacity during peak hours, the assumption is that there are capacity available between
peak hours to be used by people who are able to change travel behaviour.
The NCAA operates with guidelines for capacity expansion. If these guidelines take the form
of mandatory regulations, then it can be said that a project A in year X will entail project B in
year Y and project C in year Z. A strong sequential interdependency is established, implemen-
ting project B before project A is meaningless. This is a case for designing a package of
projects, where the net present value for the entire package is calculated.
However, there are several points to be made when it is necessary to design project packages:
1. Sequential project packages may be designed from standards that represent constraints
considering the planning and decision-making process. When the demand side is given,
criteria are established to define the timing and sequence of the various measures to be
taken. The projects in the package are resolved simultaneously.
2. If such constraints are not defined, one should assess different packages, and implement
the most profitable one.
3. With respect to the financial side of the story, project packages makes it difficult to assess
the financial profitability of single projects. This may be in conflict with a financial frame-
work that deals with the profitability of single projects (as in the NCAA).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the investment costs and armual revenues from the project package in
figure 4.1. The situation is simplified in the sense that the annual revenues are constant when
the capacity constraint is effective. The annual operating costs are omitted.
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Figure 4.2 Costs and revenues - sequential dependency
The area D is the revenues in the base
case. The area C is the additional reve-
nues when the terminal is upgraded in
year 5, area B is added revenues when
the number of gates is increased in year
10, and C is added when the runway is
upgraded in year 18. The Is are the
different investments and R is the
residual value of the investments after
year 30 (the economic life span).
This illustration applies for both the
financial revenues and the passengers'
benefits in a cost-benefit perspective.
To design a framework for a practical
approach to solve this kind of interde-
pendence problems, the following gui-
delines have been recommended to the
NCAA:
A. The case of uncertain dependency: If there are reasons to be in doubt whether the projects
T2 and "1"3will actually be carried out, then the recommendation is to consider the projects
as separate and independent. The consequence is that the projects are analysed with
respect to declining traffic due to capacity constraints occurring at a later stage. Thus, the
traffic volume that constitutes the market for e.g. project T_ is defined by the area between
the curves TI and T2 in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.3 Decision tree - sequential dependency
• If Tl is a profitable project on its own,
it may be implemented independently.
Area C in fig. 4.2 is the relevant revenue
area.
• If profitability of T_ over the life cycle
is dependent of the implementation of T2
and/or T3, then a strong connection
through binding decisions on implemen-
tation of the entire profitable package
must be established.
• However, linking of projects is not
recommended if profitability of the pack-
age is dependent of projects to be imple-
mented more than 10 years from now.
Most often, it is not possible to make mea-
ningful binding decisions for a long time
span. The decision tree in figure 4.3 illu-
strates this situation.
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B. The case of certain dependency: If there is no doubt about the strong dependency, then the
projects should be considered as a package within the following framework:
1. Projects that are linked within a time span of 10 years are considered within the
package.
. For projects to be implemented more than 10 years from now, the recommendation is
that the interdependency is linked with such a degree of uncertainty that they should
not be included in the analysis.
4.2 The network problem and the value of time.
Network considerations emerge frequently when doing economic appraisal of projects for e.g.
increased airport capacity. The network effects can be categorised as follows:
A. Effects within the airport network, affecting services for airlines and passengers.
B. Effects on other transport modes.
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Figure 4.4 Traffic growth with andwithout
constraints
Point B will be commented upon here.
The effects on other transport modes are
mainly connected to traffic spill-over.
When capacity constraints are reached
during peak hours, several adjustments
may take place. Some traffic will divert
to less attractive slots. Other parts of the
traffic market will either be deterred
because of higher generalised transport
costs, or change to other modes. These
effects may seem trivial from a
theoretical viewpoint, but there are some
practical matters that should be carefully
examined:
1. Traffic forecasts. The forecasts deter-
mine the traffic diversion and traffic
deterrence from capacity constraints. Figure 4.4 illustrate the number of passengers that
constitute the market for improvements in airport infrastructure. The lower curve
represents the anticipated traffic volumes that will use the airport under the capacity
constraint, while the upper one indicates the forecasted number of passengers without the
constraint. The distance between the two curves gives the forecasted amount of traffic that
will be served by the extended airport capacity, but which will either be diverted to other
modes or deterred from travelling, without airport capacity expansion.
. Alternative transport modes, traffic deterrence and the travellers' benefits. As an airport
reaches the capacity constraint, transport costs increase abruptly. Figure 4.5 illustrates
this situation. The marginal generalised travel costs for using the existing airport
infrastructure is given by MCA I. As capacity problems emerge (at volume X0), MC
increases towards infinity as the capacity constraint is reached (somewhere near XI). The
MCR curve is the generalised travel costs of using alternative transport modes, e.g. road
transport combined with the use of a nearby airport. This curve makes the generalised
Cast
reservationcostsfor the air passenger.If the generalisedtravelcostsby air exceedthis
level,somepassengerwill switchto thecompetingmode(hereX2- Xl), otherswill give
up travelling.
D, The curve MCA 2 is the generalised transport
cost if the capacity is increased. For simplicity,
this cost is represented as constant. The
i MC^, benefits from this capacity increase are given
' by the shaded and the hatched area. The shaded
area represents the benefits for those who
switch to competing modes, while the hatched
area illustrates the benefits for the traffic that is
deterred because of the more expensive
alternative mode, compared to the travel costs
t,,E^2 after the capacity is expanded. In addition toI
Trmic('x these areas, there will of course be benefits
from cost reduction for the traffic XI - X0.x, x_ x_ x,
Figure 4.5 Benefits of increased airport
capacity 3. The value of time in transport chains. The
value of time for a typical air passenger is
significantly higher than for various surface transport modes (see section 3.2), especially
for leisure travels. Most VOT studies are directed towards partial analyses of travellers in
different sectors, without studying the consumer's VOT through a chain of various
modes. When using the recommended VOTs of different transport modes in an analysis
which includes diversion of traffic from one mode to another, one might face a rather
dramatic change in VOTs which raises questions about the rationale for this big
difference. After all, the same group of travellers is considered, although some
differences may be explained from the characteristics of the transport mode. These
questions are important when considering multi-modal passenger transport.
4.3 Defining the base case and different projects.
Defining the project's main objective is the point of departure for the CBA. It is important
that the description of the objective does not include any specific means. As an example, if
the take-off and landing routines on a given airport create unacceptable noise for the
surrounding dwellings, the objective should be "reduce the noise by xx EFN" and not e.g.
"build a mound to reduce aircraft noise by xx EFN). In this way, no relevant means to meet
this objective are excluded.
The definition of the base case is also a vital prerequisite for the CBA, because the projects or
project alternatives are compared to the base case. The list of possible projects that meet the
objectives should be complete. The CBA may well show that all the projects turn out to be
unprofitable, leaving the base case as the most profitable one. In such cases, none of the
projects should be implemented.
The base case should represent the expected situation during the economic life span without
any changes, i.e. without any project being implemented. However, one point has to be
stressed. The base case has to include projects that are approved for implementation. Thus, the
base case is not necessarily a 'do nothing' alternative, but should include the expected effects
from approved, but not yet implemented projects. Correspondingly, optimising the use of the
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existing infrastructure should be included in the base case. Another aspect that should be
taken into consideration, is the technological development. As an example, the number of
aircraft movements on a given airport may represent a constraint which may be desirable to
relax. An eventual trend towards larger aircraft will influence the forecasted aircraft
movements and thus the need for increased capacity of this kind.
4.4 NCAA as a corporation.
Up to now, NCAA has mainly operated on the basis of financial analyses, where the indivi-
dual airport is the financial unit. There has been a weak tradition for consolidated account,
where e.g. the entire network of airports is considered. If the situation of airport 1 influences
the traffic volume on airport 2, this may give a net financial effect for the NCAA that is not
represented by financial analyses at the airport level. As an example and as commented in
section 4.2, capacity constraints on airport 1 may transfer passengers to airport 2 which is
situated in the vicinity. The revenue effect for the NCAA from this transfer effect may be
practically zero, because the transferred passengers generate revenue to the NCAA via airport
2 with connected routes. The CBAs are in essence "global" analyses where such network
effects should be taken into account. Financial analyses must include the entire influence area
to be able to capture all the financial effects without double counting.
4.5 Project risk and uncertainty
Dealing with project risk and uncertainty has always been a major challenge for investors,
regardless of whether the project is financed with private or public funds. The fact that we are
dealing with future effects makes our estimates just that - estimates with an inherent
uncertainty. This brings us over to a stochastic world where we should be dealing with
probabilities and expected values rather than deterministic figures.
Traditionally, the treatment of project risk and uncertainty has been on a very crude level in
most impact assessments. In the Norwegian public roads sector the only treatment of risk has
been to carry out a simple sensitivity analysis of alternative figures for investment costs and
traffic forecasts. Recently, a national standing advisory committee on cost benefit analyses
(SAC) has given its recommendations on "good practice" for economic impact assessments in
the Norwegian public sector. One of the main suggestions for improvements was related to
the treatment of project risk and uncertainty. The previous debate on this issue has to a large
extent been related to the level of the discount rate in the calculations of the net present
values.
Returns on private investments are usually a composite of two factors: A risk free rate of
return plus a compensation for the risks of that investment. The last part is commonly denoted
"the risk premium". There have been some disagreements about whether or not (or to what
extent) one should include such a risk premium in the discount rate for public investment
analysis. In order to discuss this question we need to divide the risk premium into two further
components: Non-systematic risk which is risk connected to the outcome of the specific
project in question, and systematic risk which is due to "macro-factors" like general business
cycles, fluctuations in the oil prices etc. The latter kind of risk is unavoidable and genuine
even to a whole public sector. The former kind is, some argue, not relevant when analysing
public projects because it is diversible, meaning that a negative surprise in one project
eventually will balance with a positive surprise in another. Additionally, the risk will be
distributedover all taxpayers, and because any project will be small compared to the total
budget for public spending, the effect of a possible "surprise" can be ignored.
SAC argued, partly on this basis, that if all figures were calculated as expected values (based
on some information on relevant probability distributions), the only relevant risk premium to
include into the discount rate was the systematic risk component. The size of this component
would in turn depend on to what extent the returns from the project had a (positive or
negative) correlation to the National income. The concrete recommendation was to categorise
typical public investments into risk-groups with different discount rates, on the basis of such
information.
In this work for the NCAA, we have chosen not to follow SAC's recommendations on this
issue, partly on a fundamental background and partly on a more practical one:
Thefimdamental counter-argument is, as we see it, that the assumed diversity of project
specific risk is not plausible when we are talking of only a part of the "public" budget (i.e.
the budget of the NCAA). There is no precedence that should support an assumption that a
bad outcome in a NCAA project would be compensated e.g. from the health budget, - not
even from the budget for the public roads. As seen from our point of view, this project
specific risk is therefore highly relevant to the decision-maker.
The more practical problem emerged when we were seeking empirical evidence on the
relevant risk premiums for typical NCAA projects. Trying to extract such information
from the stock exchange proved impossible. There was no information available that
could enable us to assign a "market value" for the risk premium to the relevant project
categories. There is, however, no fundamental reason why this information should not be
obtained at a later stage through further analysis. The job that needs to be done is to find
"market copies" of the different public investment projects, - and then extract the risk
premium on the stock exchange for this group of market copies.
So, does this leave us with "business as usual" as our only option for the treatment of project
risk and uncertainty? Not quite. We have found it necessary to stick with the rather crude
approach of using one single discount rate with no risk-dependent discrimination between
projects. However, we have made some important steps in the right direction towards a more
satisfying treatment of project risk: First, we have recommended that the use of expected
values should replace the use of most probable outcome. This is an important step forward
because it forces the analyst to thoroughly assess the range of possible outcomes and the
connected probabilities for these outcomes. We realise that one rarely will have a formal
probability distribution as a platform for the calculation of expected values, but even the use
of subjective probabilities will be an improvement. Second, we have advocated that the use of
sensitivity analysis should be extended and improved. By stressing the fact that
• Only factors that effectively are affected by risk and uncertainty should be altered
• The range for variation is within plausible limits
• Factors that typically would be correlated, also should be altered together in a scenario,
there are reasons to expect that the information value of the sensitivity analyses will improve.
The last bullet-point above moves the sensitivity analysis over to a scenario analysis where
one e.g. can illustrate the effects of general business cycles and create one scenario under a
cycle peak, and another under a cycle trough. The latter would then typically include a lower
estimate for investment costs and a low traffic forecast.
5 The use of CBA in the aviation sector- two examples
In our report to the NCAA, the CBA methodology is implemented on a couple of projects, to
show how CBA should be carded out in practice. This section presents briefly two cases that
represent important parts of the NCAA's jurisdiction.
5.1 Terminal building at Stavanger airport, Sola
5.1.1
HAU
The setting
TitD •
BGO
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Figure 5.1 Alternative routes, travels from SVG
The setting for the first example is a
medium-sized airport at Sola near
Stavanger (SVG) where the capacity
constraints in terminal capacity is assumed
to be the limiting growth constraint in the
near future. Without expanded capacity,
one segment of the growing number of
passengers is able to adapt to less
attractive slots until these slots are full.
This example focuses on the remaining
segment which in stead will use the
services of neighbouring airports,
resulting in more expensive transport
mainly because surface transport have to
be used between these airports. This
situation is described more formally in
section 4.2. The increase in transport costs
entails deterrence effects in this traffic
market. Figure 5.1 shows the SVG airport
and the neighbouring airports. Without
extended capacity, people use car to the
airports in Kristiansand (KRS) and Haugesund (HAU), and air transport from there. Bergen
(BGO) is situated too far to serve as an alternative airport. Passengers with Bergen as their
final destination will go there by car.
In this example, the main benefit of extended terminal capacity will be the travel time savings
(TTS) of travelling from SVG instead of using HAU and KRS as altemative airports. In
addition, TTS for travellers with KR.S and BGO as final destinations are taken into conside-
ration. To be able to calculate these benefits, traffic forecasts have to be made. In addition, the
following factors have to be assessed:
• The travel purposes (business travels and others).
• The destinations from SVG.
• The level of diverted traffic, and the distribution between HAU and KRS.
• Time costs and other costs for surface transport.
• The share of travels that are deterred because of higher transport costs.
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In addition, there are reasons to expect some delays for passengers and operators during peak
hours. The benefits of avoiding delays may be significant, and should be object to careful
attention. The details in the forecasts of traffic and delays are not examined in this paper.
These benefits are calculated against the investment costs and operating costs for both the
NCAA and the operators. Environmental effects and the eventual value of changes in accident
risks are also to be included. The accident risk assessment is done by comparing the changes
in accident risk when transferring passengers from air to surface transport. Especially when
the actual surface transport is by car, a significant rise in accident risk in terms of expected
loss of statistical lives has to be included in the calculations. All the economic effects within
the project's life span is discounted, and the net present value is calculated, using an
appropriate discount rate.
5.1.2 The project: New passenger terminal building
The main objective is to increase the passenger capacity at SVG airport. The main obstacle is
the terminal building. Various solutions have been assessed, and the most convenient project
is a new terminal building, which is submitted to a full economic assessment.
The investment costs have a discounted value of NOK 275 millions. The residual discounted
value of the investment after 30 years is NOK 7 millions. The increased operating costs are
NOK 170 millions, discounted over a 25 year span.
These kinds of projects within the NCAA have up to now been assessed by means of financial
analyses. If the project has proven positive financial NPV, then the project has been approved
for implementation. It is worth noting that the financial analysis do not comprise the benefits
or costs from travel time savings, environmental external effects and changes in accident risk.
It may well turn out that a financially unprofitable project may prove clearly profitable in the
economic sense, when these intangible factors are taken into consideration. In this case, the
surface transport to nearby airports takes between 2 and 3 hours, resulting in extra time costs,
vehicle operating costs and accident costs as the most significant effects.
5.1.3 The analysis: Costs and benefits.
The various costs and benefits for this projects are calculated over the project's economic
lifetime. In addition to the net present value (NPV), the most important effects are presented
for various agents like the NCAA, the State, the passengers, the operators and the
environment. The presentation method is chosen to inform the decision-makers of both the
economic and the financial effects. Table 5.1 illustrate the real economic effects, including
external effects and excluding fiscal taxes. The financial cashflow is also illustrated. The
resource flows and cashflows from figure 2.1 are recognised.
The benefits adds up to NOK 582 millions, exceeding the costs of 541 millions. Thus, the net
present value is NOK 41 millions, This indicates that the project should be carried out from an
economic perspective. The NPV/Cost ratio should be > 0, and is approximately 0.1 here. This
ratio is a pure ranking criterion. The cost side in the NPV/C ratio is the payable costs for the
NCAA, and gives NPV with respect to the use of NCAA's budget. However, the main
decision criteria should be the NPV > 0. Project ranking under budget constraints is done by
use of the NVP/C ratio.
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Economic impacts Financia_
Rev-C_'_nuci
Costs and benefits
SVG example
CI. l Business travels
C 1.2 Others
C 1.3 Delays
C1.4 Ticket costs
SI Accident costs
S1.2 Injuries
S 1.3 Material damage and administration
E I The cnvinmmcnt
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PTTf Yis-_l _Vt_s
P 1.2 VAT on NCAA investments and operating costs
:; ,opcra_.ors_unnes"
F27g Ug6-_g costs
P2.2 Aviation charges to the NCAA
P2.3 Fiscal aviation taxes
P2.4 Ticket revenues
P2.5 Delay costs
!SUMfinancial camhfloe operatorx/airlines
['4 NCAA
P_.-g "1nve--C'dT't_Tnts
P4.2 Residual value
P4.3 Maintenance and operations
P4.4 Revenues from aviation taxes
P4.5 Other commercial activities
SUM financial camhflow NCAd
SUM economic impacts
Net present value (NPV)
NPV/CosI ratio
Benefits Costs
370
0
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n.a.')
n.a.
n.a.
6
36
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21
.i
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-7
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.... ' ..41
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62
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! 95
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21 i
!5 71 l 309 _"-
n.a. i 22
I
i 275
I
i 171
95 [
22 i
1
117 ! 446
Table 5.1 SVG example, economic impacts and financial cashflow (mill. NOK).
5.1.4 Economic viability vs. financial cashflow.
The new SVG terminal seems to be economic profitable. However, the financial cash_flow
gives a negative result of NOK 329 millions, meaning that this project would not have passed
a simple cashflow analysis. It is the travel time savings and the increase in accident costs that
give the most significant contribution to the difference between the economic and the
financial assessment here. As pointed out in section 1, this kind of difference gives reasons to
discuss NCAA's role as a self financing agent in markets where elements of intangible goods
constitute a significant share of the economic impacts. This example represents an obvious
case for focusing on the role of economic vs. financial analysis as basis for decisions within
the NCAA.
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5.2 Instrumentation for precision landing (ILS)
5.2.1 The setting
The setting for this example is a small local airport (MOL) that is served by two air services:
One following a triangular route from the national hub (OSL) via MOL and the neighbouring
town to the north (KSU) and back to OSL. This route is serviced by Boeing 737 aircrafts at a
frequency of five flights per day. The other service is a coastal route between the regional
hubs BGO and TRD, which is servicing MOL and KSU both on the northbound and the
southbound route. This coastal service is serviced by Fokker FS0 aircrafts. The situation is
illustrated in Figure 5. I.
N
(,.oH,) \ ...................
)/ _ Fagemes
(NDB)
BGO SL
Planned ILS-project
Figure 5.1 Illustration of the flight connections servicing MOL (non scale)
Currently MOL has an ILS system for landing from the west. When western winds exceed 5
m/s the approach is done by a circulating manoeuvre from the west, followed by a landing
from the east. Westem winds totally dominate the weather-conditions in the area, meaning
that the vast majority of landings is currently done from the east.
5.2.2 The project: ILS from the east
The NCAA wants to carry out an impact analysis of building an ILS system for landings from
the east. The necessary initial investment for such a system (partly based on components
transferred from another airport) is estimated to be NOK 5 millions and the system is likely to
have a economic life of 15 years. Within a planning horizon of 25 years this gives a discoun-
ted (7% discount rate) total investment of NOK 6.4 millions. The investment will after 25
year have a residual value of NOK 0.3 millions. Discounted maintenance and operating costs
are estimated to amount to a total figure of NOK 2.4 millions.
The establishment of ILS systems is usually motivated through their anticipated effect on
flight safety. However, in this case the system will also have other important effects on both
the user benefit side, and on the operator side. Apart from the northbound BGO-MOL leg,
approaching the airport from the west represents a detour from all connected airports. This
means that passengers currently face an estimated travel time loss of between 2.5 and 5
minutes compared to a direct approach from the east. Equivalently the operators would save
aircraftoperatingcostsfrom a shorteraverageleg,andconsequentlytherewouldalsobea
positiveenvironmentalimpactdueto lessfuel consumption.
5.2.3 The analysis: Costs and benefits
Based on the method for economic impact assessment established through this project, we
have carried out an analysis of the overall economic viability of this ILS system. We have
divided the impacts into effects for the NCAA, for the operators, for the passengers, for the
operators and effects for the environment. In order to illustrate the financial cash/low
implications, we have included figures that illustrate the cashflow for the operators and for the
NCAA. In table 5.2, the columns representing economic impacts illustrate the real economic
impact, including external effects and excluding fiscal taxes.
Costs & Benefits Economic impacts Financial cashflow
Ben-h"_-_
0.3
0. I
1.3 0.1
13.6 .[ 13.6
ILS example
•1 Passenger bcnclits
Cq71-13_T_e ss journey
C 1.2 Other journeys
Accident costs
S'ITI S_VhV6 s
SI.2 Injuries
Si .3 Material damage and administrative costs
:;I lhe environment
E'rT__ _-dTe_t on-6_l_(NOx,VOC,Part.)
E 1.2 Global emissions (CO2)
'l Ihc State/general taLXCS
P77]" "flse'/'g_'_avi'ation taxes
PI.2 VAT on NCAA investments and operating costs
'20pcralorstairlincs
Fz.-l"Ope-T_-Fffgcosts
'4 NCAA
P"47.1_ts
P4.2 Residual value
P4.3 Maintenance and operations
SUM.........economic impacts _ ._;_.., . .., :'........._r._.",::_z._.._' ':
Net present wlu¢(NPV).. _;. _ ,," .... ,:%i__'._
NPV/Cost ratio, ._- , •_,., ' ' .... -, _,5¢,
4.9 6.1
0.2 0.3
2.2 2.4
Table 5.2 ILS system example, economic impacts and financial cashflow
The benefit side amounts to NOK 49.2 millions, and the costs (maintenance and investments)
totals NOK 7.2 millions. Thus, the project has a net present value of NOK 42 millions, and a
net benefit/cost-ratio of almost 5. This should indicate that the project should be carried out,
and that it probably also would be ranked among the top projects in comparison with other
projects within a budget constraint.
5.2.4 Economic viability vs. financial cashflow
If we consider the financial cashflow figures for the NCA.A, the project does not seem to pass
a simple cashflow analysis. The project does only cause extra investment and maintenance
costs for the NCAA. However. if we include the effects for the operators into the cash_flow
analysis,thetotalsavingsin operatingcostsexceedthecostsof theNCAA, andtheproject
seemsviablealsofromacashflowviewpoint.
Thevastmajorityof thebenefitin theeconomicimpactanalysisstemsfrom benefitsin the
intangiblescategory;i.e.thepassengersandtheenvironment.Althoughtheestablishmentof
ILS systemsis mainlydoneasa safetymeasure,this is acasewherethemajorbenefitsfrom
theprojectcomesfromareductionin traveltimeandlessenvironmentaldamage.
In otherwords:Thiscasegivesarationalefor theextensionof thescopeof impactassessment
in the aviationsectorfrom a purefinancialcashflowanalysistowardsthebroaderviewof a
full economicimpactanalysis.
6 Conclusions
The NCAA is an agent that is responsible for its own financial viability. At the same time, the
NCAA's role in the Norwegian transport sector calls for a broader economic appraisal of
projects within its jurisdiction. Making priorities subject to a full economic impact analysis
instead of a more narrow financial cashflow approach, may significantly alter the portfolio of
projects that reaches implementation. The dilemma for the NCAA is obvious: One may very
well face situations where the fmancial analysis says one thing, while the economic impact
analysis gives other recommendations. The financial source for NCAA's activities is the
revenues from user charges and other commercial activities. The significant elements of
intangibles may call for some kind of public-private partnership, to be able to take the welfare
effects properly into account.
In this paper, we have briefly described the CBA tool that is developed for the NCAA. Even if
there are still problems to be solved, like e.g. the value of time in multi-modal passenger
transport, the method is applicable to most projects. The two examples included in the paper
illustrate the decision dilemma where unprofitable financial results are achieved on one hand,
and profitable economic outcomes on the other.
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A behavior of inter-city traveler such as air and/or high speed rail passenger is affected by
relatively lower frequency services. This paper proposes a disaggregate modal choice model
which can evaluate the reduction of utility caused by low frequency of services. The model adopts
arrival margin time as an index of influence of a destination arrival time. A questionnaire surveys
were carried out for the travelers between Akita and Tokyo both at the airport and the railway
station. The results show that line-hole time, egress time, and arrival margin time are the major
choice factors of transportation mode for a long distance travel. It is clarified that an estrangement
between a desirable trip schedule and service schedule makes negative utility for a passenger.
Keywords: Air traveler t s behavior, Arrival margin time, Disaggregate iogit model
1.Introduction
Most of inter-city air transportation network in Japan has low frequency service, while
competitive railway network has much more frequent services. If the timetable of a transportation
service doesn't fit for passenger's desirable itinerary, a traveler will choose an alternative
transportation mode whose schedule is closer to his desirable time. Air passenger demand in Japan
has been estimated by using the departure airport choice models and/or trip generation
models.(Morichi and et. AI. 1994). The previous models take account of flight schedule as for an
expected waiting time. For example, a half of average flight time span is added into the travel time
for a modal choice behavior model. Since popular local inter-city air services in Japan have only
two, three or four flights in a day, the assumed waiting time must be 2, 3 or four hours which is
apparently different from actual waiting time.
This paper discusses the mode choice behavior of inter-city traveler and proposes the arrival
margin time that will play a center role of traveler's timetable valuation and directly affect to the
transportation mode choice. Traveler's evaluation is formulated as a linear utility function with the
variable of the arrival margin time. Then, traveler 's modal choice behavior is modeled by a popular
disaggregate logit model.
2. Traveler's Modal Choice Behavior
(1) Factors of Modal Choice
Time-related factors and monetary cost factors must influence traveler 's modal choice behavior.
Previous modal choice models deal with line-haul time, egress time, access time, and the expected
waiting time as time-related factors. In addition to these factors, this paper proposes an arrival
margin time for the most important index of traveler's mode choice. A definition of the arrival
margin time is shown in the following section.
The alternative, which maximizes traveler's utility, should be chosen through the model. If a
transportation service whose schedule does not match with a traveler's desirable itinerary, the
traveler feels some sort of disutility to use that transportation mode. A desirable arrival time is
definedas the time, which realize the maximum utility and must also include some amount of
margin time from the time deadline for a certain trip purpose. Unnecessary time difference between
a desirable arrival time and an actual arrival time must decrease a traveler _s utility. Actual arrival
time at a destination, which is automatically fixed by the timetable, will influence traveler _sutility as
shown in Fig-l.
Utility Function
p,,_.
Arrival Time
early '_ late •
Desirable Arrival Time
Figure 1 The General Concept of a Utility Function
(2) Definition of Arrival Margin Time
This paper defines arrival margin time as the time difference between desirable destination arrival
time and actual destination arrival time (either plus or minus) as shown Figure-2 (1) and-2 (2).
Time difference between traveler's itinerary and the timetable, that is, arrival margin time must
bring disutility. If actual arrival time is earlier than desirable arrival time, arrival margin time is
positive value. The disutility is brought by the unnecessary early departure time or by the
unnecessary idle time at the destination. If actual arrival time is later than the desirable arrival time,
arrival margin time is negative value. The disutility is brought by the late arrival time at the
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destination which close to the deadline. One should feel very bad.
Fig-2 (1) A Concept of The Arrival Margin Time (+)
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Fig-2 (2) A Concept of The Arrival Margin Time (-)
Time
For the sake of convenient calculation, time difference between actual node arrival time and the
time deducted egress time from desirable destination arrival time is regarded as arrival margin time.
It is assumed that those values (Fig-2 (I) and Fig-3) are equivalent.
Evaluation of disutility is possible by adopting arrival margin time as an index.
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Fig-3 Calculated Arrival Margin Time
(3) Model Design
Time related factors and monetary factors influence traveler's modal choice behavior.
Disaggregate Iogit model s) is introduced as the modal choice model. It is assumed that utility
function is linear in the parameters. Systematic component of utility is shown as follows.
K
vo,=Zo, x,,,
k=l
Where
n: traveler
i: alternative
A,,: set of alternatives
(i)
V,: systematic components of the utility of/
X,,k: characteristic ofi, n, and k
0 k: parameter
Based on random utility theory, the assumption that the random component is Gumbel distributed
brings the probability P_,,that traveler n would choose alternative i as follows.
e v*' 1
P,, ZeV, _ S.,eiV:v.), (i_A,) ( 2 )
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3. Surveys of Inter-City traveler's behavior
(1) Outline
In order to estimate parameters, questionnaire surveys are carried out. The behavior of travelers
between Akita and Tokyo (about 600km) both at the airport and the railway station are surveyed.
Since long-haul bus services and private cars can not compete with air and rail, then ignored.
(2) Surveys
The questionnaire survey of air passenger's behavior is carried out at Akita airport. The survey of
railway passengers is carried out at Akita railway station only for the bullet train bound for Tokyo.
Results of the survey are shown in table-1.
The survey items are as follows:
1. purpose of the trip
2. originate place of the trip
3. destination place of the trip
4. desirable arrival time
5. access transportation mode
6. egress transportation mode
7. passenger nsattributes (age, sex, and occupation).
Table-1 Results of Surveys
Route Mode NumberofSamplss _ofRespondents
hkita Tokyo Air 526 37'_
Tokyo hkita Air 650 41%
Akita Tokyo Bul.btTrah 615 32*/,
Tokyo Akita Bu_tTrah 228 12_
4.Modal Choice Model
(1) Selection of Variables
If desirable arrival time is not defined, arrival margin time can not be computed. Passengers who
didn't enter desirable arrival time are ignored. To suppose arbitrary desirable arrival time will
decrease the confidence of the model. It is assumed that entered desirable arrival time is the time
which brings maximum utility. Since the influence on behavior of early arrival is different from the
influence of late arrival, arrival margin time should be distinguished positive value and negative
value. Positive value and negative value are dealt with different variables.
The variables included the model are positive arrival margin time, negative arrival margin time,
line-haul time, egress time, access time, fare, age, bn the way" trip dummy, and business trip
dummy.
(2) The Assumptions of Routes and Travelers
Some assumptions are implicit in this model.
• Railway services are higher frequency If railway alternative is chosen, there is no time
difference between the itinerary and the timetable. Travelers can choose the railway service
whenever he wants to use, and the arrival margin time is zero.
• The differences of each alternative are timetable, fare, and travel time (line-haul, access, and
egress). Characteristics of the alternative included systematic components of utility are
described by these factors.
A traveler's mode choice model is constructed based on the assumption stated the above. There are
seven choice altematives for the passenger between Tokyo and Akita. They are a railway service all
over the day or one of the six air flights available in a day.
(3) Passenger Segmentation
Utility function seems to be different between on the way trip and the way back trip. The
difference of trip purposes, such as business trip and private trip, must also affect to the shape of
utility function. Passengers are segmented by the trip characteristics in the above and parameters of
the model are estimated independently.
Passengers are segmented as follows.
Table-2 Segmentation of Samples
Seelrnentatbn Pattern se_rn ent 1 se_irnent 2
non-segm entatbn
Pattern 1
Pattern 2
on the way trip the way back trip
bushes_; !:rip private trip
(4) Estimation Results of Parameters
Model parameters of both trip directions from Akita to Tokyo and from Tokyo to Akita are
estimated separately. Positive arrival margin time, negative arrival margin time, egress time, and
line-haul time are adopted as significant factors of the modal choice model, while variables of access
time, fare, age, _0n the way"trip dummy, and business trip'dummy are omitted from the model by
the t-test.
a) The Parameters of the Trip from Akita to :rokyo
The estimated parameters of the trip from Akita to Tokyo are shown in table-3 and figure-4. Non-
business trip model can not be built because of shortage of samples. The results show a contrastive
characteristic of the function between '6n the way"trip and the way back trip. Regarding the on the
way trip model, it was found that the later arrival after the desirable arrival time should reduce the
passenger's utility more than the unnecessary earlier arrival for unit time period.
Regarding the way back trip, on the contrary, the earlier arrival would reduce utility more than the
later arrival. Line-haul time affects more to the way back trip passengers than passenger on the way
trip. Relative importance of parameters for business trip model are almost the same as those of non-
segmentation model, however, all of them, travel time in particular, are found to be more sensitive.
Egress time especially influences the most on the modal choice behavior for business trip
passengers.
b) The Parameters of the Trip from Tokyo to Akita
Samples of _ack" trip and non-business trip are too few to calculate the models. Egress time
variable is rejected by the results of t-test. The results of non-segmentation model, '6n the way"
model, and business trip model are almost similar (table-4, fig-5). The reason is that the differences
between samples of each model are small The ratio of an the way" trip samples to all samples is
high in this route, and the ratio of business trip samples to all samples is similar.
Later arrival factor contributes to disutility more than earlier arrival factor and line-haul time
factorelatively. The units of all factors are minutes. The ratio between each parameter means the
weight between factors.
c) The evaluation between the route from Akita to Tokyo and the route from Tokyo to Akita
To evaluate difference of traveler _sbehavior between these directions, samples of the models are
not segmented. The results of the models of both directions are shown in table-5, and fig-6. Positive
arrival margin time, negative arrival margin time, and line-haul time are adopted as the factors of the
models. Characteristics of parameters of both models are almost the same. The parameter of negative
arrival margin time is as from three to four times much as the parameters of line-haul time. These
results show the differences of each evaluated weight of time related factors.
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Table-3 Result of rAkita---Tokyo TripJ
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-0.0093 (-11.65) -0.0051 (-5.97) -0.0155 (-3.03) -0.0142 (713.24)
228 139 96 186
0.335856 0.314277 0.311105 0.35012g
: t-va he
Table-4 Result of I'Tokyo--Akita TripJ
Tokyo Akita
AMT bos itive)
AMT ne_a tire
lhe-haul tin e
chai-souea
2
non-segment [ on the way trip
sam0bg;114 ] sampbs:99
-0.0097 (-7,11) -0.0083 (-5.90)
-0.0212 (-5.66) -0.0208 (-L44)
-0.0066 (-7,42) -0.0069 (-6.66)
172 142
0.337536 0.316057
*AMT :arrivalmargiatint
busiaess trip
sam obs:95,
-0.0110 (-6.64)
-0.0213 (-5,31)
-0.0068 (-7.03)
151
0.343215
: t-vabe
Table-5 Result of Both Routes (non-segmentation)
non-segm ent
AMT _oshke)
AMT nezative
liae-haultm e
cha b_quea
2
*AMT : arrivalm ar
Akita Tokyo
sam pbs:158
-0.0103 (-7.21)
-0,0167 (-7.18)
-0.0045 (-6.38)
220
0.323725
h tine
Tokyo Akita
sam pbs:114
-0.0097 (-7.11)
-0.0212 (-5.66)
-0.0066 (-7.42)
172
0.337536
: t-va he
5. Conclusion
(1) Summary of the Results
This paper proposes inter-city traveler _ modal choice model specified evaluation of the timetable.
Arrival margin time signifies time difference between traveler's itinerary and the timetable. It is an
index of passenger _sevaluation of the timetable in the model. The model can estimate the influence
of the timetable to traveler's utility.
As the results of t_n the way" trip model and back" trip model, parameters of disutility by the
time difference between itinerary and the timetable vary according to trip purposes.
Later arrival brings more disutility than earlier arrival in On the way" trip. The characteristic of
back" trip is the contrary. (fig-7)
These results show that the degree of constraint of desirable arrival time of bn the way" trip is
larger than the constraint of back" trip. Line-haul time has great influence on Sack" trip traveler's
behavior, but influence on bn the way" trip traveler is relatively small. On the way" passengers
will regard certainty of arrival time as important and back" passengers will regard total travel time
as important. Business trip travelers are relatively sensitive to time related factors. Arrival time tends
to be constrained in business trip. Therefore it is natural that the factors of later arrival and
uncertainty of arrival time are regarded as important.
(2) Summary of Method and Problem
It is possible to express time difference between traveler's itinerary and timetable by arrival
margin time. Traveler's evaluation of the timetable is reflected in utility function. Disutility of earlier
,_ _,., The Way Back
early late
Desirable Arrival Time
arrival and disutility of later arrival can be estimated respectively by regarding positive arrival
margin time and negative arrival margin time as different variables.
In this paper, model samples are segmented according to the purpose of trip. The purpose of a trip
is a factor of the differences of utility functions. Characteristics of parameters are different between
segments.
The method to regard arrival margin time as an immediate index of evaluation of the timetable has
Figure-7 Relation Between Utility and Arrival Time
problems. The distinction of entered desirable arrival time is a problem. Although this paper regards
entered desirable arrival time as the time maximizing utility of the passenger, a respondent may be
constrained arrival time. And it is supposed that entered time might include margin time to avoid
later arrival. The meaning of arrival margin time is varied by the interpretation of entered desirable
arrival time. It is necessary to exclude the bias of a reply in future.
(3) Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper are shown as follows.
• This paper proposes the method to consider traveler _sevaluation on the timetable and develops
inter-city modal choice model. Factors of the traveler _ modal choice behavior are line-haul
time, egress time, and arrival margin time. Arrival margin time is applied to estimate traveler
evaluation of the timetable.
• Time related factors such as arrival margin time, line-haul time, and egress time are regarded as
important. The influences on traveler's utility of each factor are different according to the
purpose of trip. Later arrival brings large disutility especially in bn the way" trip and business
trip.
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Abstract:
The key civil airports in Australia were administered by a government department until
1988. At that stage, the Federal Airports Corporation was formed to operate a system of
airports along commercial lines. By 1994, though, policy thinking shifted in favour of
privatisation, largely to allow the government to reduce its debt burden. So fax, the
government has received US$2.6 billion for 17 of the 22 airports. All but one of the
remaining airports are in the Sydney region where on-going debates about an appropriate
site for a second major airport have delayed the sales.
The paper describes the sales processes involved for the 17 airports and presents details
about the new owners, the commitments they have entered into, and the regulatory
system that has been established for the post-privatisation era. It is too early to assess the
performance of the new owners, but this paper documents the pre-privatisation situation
to assist future researchers.
Key words: airports, privatisation, performance
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Introduction
Prior to the 1980's, the Federal Government had financial responsibilities for aerodromes
in Australia serving regular air passenger services and it owned and operated all of the
major airports. Over a period of time, it had attempted to pass ownership and
management of the airports serving narrower regional needs to the local authorities while
expressing an objective to recover all of the costs of maintaining and development the
civil aviation sector from users. During the mid-1980's, though, the case for a stronger
system of f'mancial accountability became pressing. The local ownership programme was
accelerated and the major airports were corporatised under the Federal Airports
Corporation (FAC).
In part, the commencement of the FAC in 1988 reflected national policies designed to
reform the public sector and to increase the scope for competition. However, by 1994
policy-thinking shifted in favour of privatisation and, subsequently, the FAC was
disbanded and 17 of its 22 airports were sold to the private sector. The remaining 5
airports have been set up as airport companies wholly-owned by the Government in
preparation for sale. However, four of these are in the Sydney region where further
progress on privatisation cannot be achieved until continuing issues about the siting of a
second major airport have been settled. Starting from a position where it budgeted to
receive US$1.4 billion for the sale of all of the FAC's airports, including Sydney, the
Government so far has collected US$2.6 billion _ in gross proceeds. Taking the FAC's
estimates of earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT) together with the
sale prices, the average price-earnings ratio was 17.1. This is much higher than price-
earnings ratios of privatised airports in Europe. Should Sydney's airports be sold on
similar terms, the Government would receive another US$1.8 billion after deducting sale
expenses 2.
In this paper, we describe the backgi'ound to privatisation and how the process was
conducted in Australia In addition, we present details about the new owners. One of the
aims of the Government was to maximise the proceeds from the sales, and on this score it
has been successful. But the privatisation initiative also had other objectives. These are
set out in the paper and we examine the mechanisms that were put into place during the
sale process and we describe the post-sale regulatory framework.
A key concern is that the new airport owners have scope to increase their aeronautical
charges because they are local monopolies and their demand is insensitive to price. As a
result, the post-privatisation regulatory framework in Australia involves price-capping
t All dollar values in this paper have been expressed first in constant (1998/99) dollar values using the
Australian Consumer Price Index and then have been converted at the rate of one AUD is equal to S0.633
US.
: No allowance has been made in this estimate for assets held by the Government at Bado_e_'sCreek.
Badgerys Creek had been proposed as the site for Sydney's second major airport but. fol_o_{'ingan
unfavourable environmental impact study, the Government is considering other optton_
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and monitoring. The paper describes these regulatory frameworks, but it is too early at
this stage to assess the success or otherwise of these mechanisms and to shed light on
issues raised in the literature on the regulation of airports. Such issues include, for
example, the risk that price-cap regulation results in a weak incentive to invest in capacity
and to improve quality. The Government is committed to undertaking a review of its
regulations prior to 2002, and there is no doubt that researchers and policy makers will
revisit these matters.
By documenting the processes that led to privatisation, explaining how privatisation was
effected and the commitments that have been entered into by the Government and the
new owners, the intention of the authors is to facilitate future research. Furthermore, the
paper illustrates the complexity of an exercise in selling off a system of airports and the
demands it creates for information about airports and the markets they serve. The paper
commences with information about the size and growth performance of the Australian
airports, and then describes how Government policies towards airports moved gradually
to privatisation. Remaining sections document the sales processes and their outcomes
together with an account of the new regulatory framework. Although it is too early to
pass judgements on the success or otherwise of privatisation other than in terms of the
amounts received by the Government, we conclude with observations about the initial
actions of the new airport lessee companies.
Airports offered for sale
Table 1 shows the relative sizes of the airports in the last year when the FAC owned and
operated its full set of 22 airports 3. Australia's major cities are located around the
periphery of a large land mass and there has been little potential for the development of
hub-and-spoke airline networks in the domestic mai'ket. As Australia's most populous
city, Sydney is the major domestic airport, followed by Melbourne. However, Sydney is
the dominant international gateway while Brisbane vies with Melbourne as the second
busiest international airport.
It is clear from Table 1 that the air transport traffic is concentrated at a small number of
airports. Approximately two-thirds of all domestic airline trips in Australia occur within
the triangle formed by connecting the eastern capital cities of Sydney, Melbourne and
Brisbane. The national capital, Canberra, and the country's premier resort area, the Gold
Coast (Coolangatta Airport), are the major centres also included in this area. To the west,
Adelaide and Perth each serves more than 3 million passenger movements each year, but
Perth's international traffic is more than 7 times the size of Adelaide's. Of the remaining
capital cities, Darwin is advantageously located in the far north of Australia to serve as an
important regional gateway, while Hobart is situated in an island State with a small
In a sense, the privatisation process commenced in April 1993 when the small general aviation airport,
Cambridge, located close to Hobart Airport was sold to a local investor. This reduced the number of FAC
airports from 23 to 22.
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resident population. The busiest general aviation airports are located in or near the major
cities.
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Table 1: Relative size of the FAC's airports - 1996/97
Airport Type of airport Passengers Aircraft Tonnes Revenue Share of FAC
(millions) _ (thousands) i landed US$1998/99 Revenue
(millions) (millions)
Sydney International 20.76 275.6 12.32 158.60 39.6%
Melbourne International 13,48 152.3 7.03 81.31 20.3%
Brisbane International 10.26 157. l 5,32 68.14 17.0%
Perth International 4.59 95,2 2.42 33.89 8.5%
Adelaide International 3.69 103.1 1.60 18.00 4.5%
Coolangatta (Gold Coast) 2 Domestic 1.94 86.0 0.74 6.52 1.6%
Darwin International 1.01 8 I.l 0.69 5.49 1.4%
Canberra Domestic 1.76 107.2 0.78 5. l 0 1.3%
Bankstown (Sydney) 3 General aviation 0.00 621.0 0.00 4.69 1.2%
Hobart 2 Domestic 0.85 15.0 0.32 3.49 0.9%
Townsville 2 Domestic 0.68 59.9 0.32 2.85 0.7%
Alice Springs 4 Domestic 0.80 44.3 0.37 2.84 0.7%
Launceston Domestic 0.59 45.5 0.26 2.71 0.7%
Essendon (btelbournc) General aviation n.a. 68.9 0.08 2.33 0.6%
Parafield (Adelaide) General aviation n.a. 292. I n.a. 1.30 0.3%
Moorabbin (Melbourne) General aviation 0.03 342.1 n.a. 1.17 0.3%
Jandakot (Perth) General aviation n.a. 378.0 n.a. 0.75 0.2%
Archerfield (Brisbane) General aviation n.a. 254.5 n.a. 0.73 0.2%
Mount isa Domestic 0.10 6.7 0.05 0.45 0.1%
Total 60.55 3,185.8 32.29 400.35 100.0%
Notes: (1) Passenger and aircraft numbers are totals for arriving and departing movements; (2) Limited international services
operate from time to time to Coolangatxa, Hobart and Townsvillle airports; (3) Camden and Hoxton Park general aviation airports
included with Bankstown; (4) Tennant Creek included with Alice Springs.
Source: Federal Airports Corporation, Annual Report 1996/97.
The marketability of Australia's airports was largely influenced by an impressive record
of growth and profitable operation. Table 2 shows that the total passenger throughput for
the FAC airports between 1987/88 and 1996/97 grew'at an average annual rate of growth
(AARG) of 7.8%. Airports with above-average growth, Brisbane and Perth, were
becoming important gateways as Australia's popularity as a long-haul tourist destination
increased. As a group, the airports serving domestic traffic grew at the slowest rates,
though these were still buoyant markets over the long-term.
Aircraft movements grew less strongly as larger aircraft assumed greater importance so
that landed tonnes improved almost in line with the number of passengers. Indeed, for
Sydney, Brisbane and Perth, landed tonnes increased at a faster rate than the number of
passengers. When the FAC was formed, one of the goals it was set was tokeep its
aeronautical charges as low as possible by increasing its income from other sources. The
FAC's successes in this regard, achieved largely through retailing and property sources,
shows up in the growth rate for revenue. As a result, the FAC's airports collectively
earned a surplus before depreciation, interest and taxes of US$262 million in 1996/97 on
an asset base of US$1.99 billion 4. However, Tables 2 and 3 also show that some of the
smaller domestic and general aviation airports did not share in the growth and profits (as
calculated in the FAC's accounts).
This does not include Head Office activities
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Table 2: Average annual rates of growth of FAC airports - 1988/89 to 1996/97 t
Airport Type of airport Passengers Aircraft Tonnes Revenue
landed
Sydney International 5.7% 3.3% 6.0% 11.9%
Melbourne International 7.0% 4.4% 4.6% 9.1%
Brisbane International 8.5% 4.7*"0 8.9% 14.4%
Perth International 8.3 % 5.3% 9.7% 14.1%
Adelaide International 6. 1% 2.9% 5.4% 10.6%
Coolangatta (Gold Coast) 3 Domestic 6.8% 1.0% 4.7% 8.2%
Darwin: International 7.5% -1.0% 6.3% 11.0%
Canberra 2 Domestic 4.1% 0.5% 2.6% 4.8%
Bankstown (Sydney) 4 General aviation n.a. 0.6% n.a. 21.7%
HobarP Domestic 6.8% -10.6% 3.6% 9.3%
Townsville zJ Domestic 4.2% -5.8% -3. 1% 1.7%
Alice Springs 28 Domestic 2.3% 0.9*/. -1.7% 5.2°/.
Launceston Domestic 5.1% 2.3% -3.6% 3.3%
Essendon (Melbourne) General aviation n.a. 0.4% -5.9% 4.5%
Parafield (Adelaide) General aviation n.a. 2.5% n.a. 17.4%
Moorabbin (Melbourne) General aviation n.a. -0.9% n.a. 16.8%
Jandakot (Perth) General aviation n.a. 4.5% n.a. 15.0%
Atchcrfield (Brisbane) General aviation n.a. -0.3% n.a. 11.8%
Mount Isa _ Domestic 5.9% -17.9% 0.2% 5.7%
Total 7.8% 3.0% 7.0% 12.5%
Notes: (1) Alice Springs, Canberra, Danvin, Mount Isa and Townsville airports were transferred to the FAC during 1989/90, the
year of a lengthy pilots' dispute. The AARG for these airports is for the shorter period of 1990/91 to 1996/97; (2) AARG of for
period 1990/91 to 1996197; (3) Limited international services operate from time to time to Coolangat'ta, Hobart and Townsville
airports; (4) Camden and Hoxton Park general aviation airports included with Bankstown; (5) Tennant Creek included with Alice
Springs.
Sources: Federal Airports Corporation, Annual Reports 1987/88 to 1996/97.
Table 3: Profitability of FAC airports - 1996/97 (US$000 at 1998/99 values)
Airport Total Operating EBDIT l Depreciation EBIT _ Assets
Revenue expenses
Sydney 158,598 51,088 107,510 40,054 67,456 786,945
Melbourne 81,305 ' 26,568 54,737 17,032 37,706 307,371
Brisbane 68,137 18,920 49,216 21,875 27,342 343,289
Perth 33,888 11,635 22,253 4,908 17,345 140,865
Adelaide 17,997 7,380 I 0,617 2,899 7,718 94,981
Coolangatla (Gold Coast) 6,519 2,601 3,918 721 3,198 26,573
Danvin 5,495 3,004 2,491 3,189 -699 45,233
Canberra 5,101 2,278 2,823 510 2,313 32,556
Bankstown (Sydney) 4,694 2,620 2,074 1,398 676 80,182
Hobart 3,493 1,788 1,705 623 1,082 8,750
Townsville 2,848 2,014 835 1,360 -525 18,785
Alice Springs 2,841 1,813 1,028 1,430 -402 17,044
Launceston 2,712 1,377 1,335 562 773 10,797
Essendon (Melbourne) 2,330 1,749 581 677 -96 19,135
Parafield (Adelaide) 1,297 770 527 355 172 15,369
Moorabbin (Melbourne) 1,166 885 28 t 263 17 13,074
Jandakot (Perth) 746 1,061 -315 281 -596 8,757
Archerfield (Brisbane) 731 801 -70 161 -231 9,428
Mount Isa 455 38S 66 379 -313 7,189
Total 400.353 138,740 261.613 95.677 162.937 1,986,324
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Notes: (I) Earnings before depreciation, interest, taxes; (2) Earnings before interest, taxes.
Source: Federal Airports Corporation, Annual Report 1996/9L
The path from government department to private ownership
After World War II, a large number of aerodromes became available in Australia for civil
aviation operations. As the volume of air traffic increased, most of the Federal
Government's funds were directed towards the busiest airports serving larger aircraft.
Local communities had to bear the financial burden of developing their own aerodromes
until 1941 when maintenance grants were available for all aerodromes with regular
passenger transport (RPT) services.
An Aerodrome Local Ownership Plan (ALOP) was introduced in 1958 under which all
aerodromes that served a local rather than a national need were to be owned, developed,
operated and maintained by the communities they served (Bureau of Transport
Economics 1985). The Government offered to transfer its aerodromes to local authorities
- free of charge, and with an agreement to pay half of future approved maintenance and
development for an agreed period. The intent of this policy was that the Government
would support a local aerodrome wherever an RPT service could be sustained.
Over the next two decades, the financial burden on the Government increased as
responsibilities were broadened to include general aviation and aerodromes on mission
stations. By 1981, there were 436 aerodromes eligible for assistance, the Government
itself continuing to own 81 civil airports, including 12 operated by the Department of
Defence. Successive governments in Australia had set themselves the objective of
achieving full cost-recovery from the civil aviation sector, but an inquiry calculated that
only 55% of costs were being covered through charges on the industry in 1982-83.
Moreover, the inquiry found that there were significant problems with the system of
administering civil aviation in Australia (Bosch et. al. 1984).
As a result, the local ownership programme was accelerated so that, by 1994, the
Government had divested itself of all but the 23 airports vested in the newly-formed
Federal Airports Corporation (FAC). The most significant transfer of ownership during
this period was Cairns Airport which, under the ownership of the Cairns Port Authority,
became Australia's fastest growing international gateway.
The FAC commenced with 17 airports and an asset base of US$0.8 billion on 1 January
1988, but another 6 airports were added in April 19895. The formation of the FAC
occurred against the background of a wide-ranging programme of microeconomic reform
sweeping the Australian economy. The corporatisation model was intended to give the
management of the airports greater commercial freedom and to emulate governance,
management, and incentive systems employed in the private sector. The FAC was
s The additions in 19S9 included airports shared with the Department of Defence - Canberra. Darwin and
Townsville. The total of 23 airports was reduced in 1993 when Cambridge Airport was sold.
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responsible for the operation of the airports, including terminal facilities 6 and other
commercial services, but did not include air traffic control. It became liable for payroll
taxes in 1998/99 and for income tax in 1991/92, and it had to earn a reasonable rate of
return and pay dividends to the Government 7. Residual powers lay with the Minister of
Transport to direct the FAC to perform certain functions in the public interest 8.
It was intended that the FAC would operate the airports along commercial lines. Table 4
presents selected performance measures for 1991/92 and 1996/97 to document the
situation during the early 1990's. The results for 1997/98 for Melbourne, Brisbane and
Perth were taken from annual reports produced by their new owners and cover the first
year of operation as privatised airports. The remaining results for 1997/98 in Table 4
were achieved by the FAC in its final year of operation.
For the group of airports, revenue per employee increased by more than 54% over the
five years up to 1996/97, reflecting the combined effect of a 16% reduction in the number
of employees and a 43% increase in real revenue. Despite the onset of the Asian
economic crisis in the middle of 1997, there was a further improvement of 11.3% in
revenue per employee across all of the airports in 1997/98. This was assisted by the
strong improvement in performance between 1996/97 and 1997/98 at Melbourne,
Brisbane and Perth airports under their new owners - 37%, 35% and 30%, respectively.
Over the same period, Sydney Airport's revenue per employee increased by 21%. Much
of this improvement is correlated with increases in the number of passengers and landed
tonnes. However, Table 4 also shows that revenue-earning performance generally
improved in real terms throughout the 1990's.
Despite a record of improved performance within a corporatised structure, there were
continuing debates about the merits of fully privatising the airports (Mills 1995, White
1996). The distances between the main Australian airports places a limit on the amount of
competition that can occur and it was recognised that privatisation would have to be
accompanied by regulation. Price caps were the preferred approach, although the problem
of creating workable incentives for the airport operator to improve quality and capacity
had been observed (Rovizzi & Thompson 1992). The FAC had been criticised for its
failure to use social cost-benefit analysis to justify capital expenditure works, but the
incentive for private sector owners to do this would be considerably weaker (Forsyth
1993). Also, Australian airports were designed to cater for two major domestic carriers
and new entrants to the airline industry after deregulation in 1990 complained about their
access to terminal facilities. The question arose whether a private owner of the airport
would ensure competitive access.
6 Prior to the FAC taking control of its airports, the Government negotiated long-term leases for terminals
with the domestic airlines, Ansert and Australian (later merged into Qantas).
7 The target rate of retum was 7.5% on assets before taxes.
s For example, the FAC was directed to waive its landing charges for domestic airlines during the extended
pilots' dispute in 1989, for which it was compensated.
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One of the events that influenced attitudes to privatisation was a review of aeronautical
pricing at Sydney International Airport. The FAC continued the practice of setting
uniform, weight-based prices for aeronautical services for all of the airports. There was
one exception - congestion charges were permissible at Sydney Airport as management
device. As a result of continuing criticism of the way charges were being imposed,
especially by airlines, the Government directed the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA
1993) 9 to undertake a review.
Table 4: Performance measures for selected years (expressed in 1998/99 US$
values)'
Revenue per employee Revenue per passenger Revenue per landed tonne
Airport 1991/92 1996/97 1997/98 1991/92 1996/97 1997198 1991/92 1996/97 1997/98
Sydney 280,920 417,214 502,571 7.26 7.64 8.23 12.24 12.88 14.17
Melbourne 222,237 366,009 502,907 6.01 6.03 6.55 11.04 11.57 12.97
Brisbane 326,714 475,269 641,899 6.37 6.64 7.10 12.55 12.80 14.63
Perth 161,406 284,038 368,460 6.80 7.38 7.26 12.94 14.00 13.58
Adelaide 161,277 240,290 246,580 4.56 4.88 n.a. 10.09 11.27 n.a.
Coolangatta (Gold 193,378 199,238 232,378 3.65 3.36 3.99 9.07 8.81 10.20Coast)
Darwin 106,101 198,096 187,259 5.74 5.43 5.50 8.35 8.01 8.27
Canberra 124,743 208,700 219,861 2.87 2.89 3.28 6.20 6.55 7.74
Bankstown (Sydney) 105,109 180,092 211,095 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hobart 98,911 132,384 121,856 5.87 4.10 3.96 15.25 10.96 11.14
Townsville 89,272 147,674 132,674 3.90 4.17 4.72 7.07 8.87 9.80
AliceSprings 88,410 156,888 145,735 3.24 3.54 3.53 6.38 7.62 8.30
Launceston 96,675 110,852 114,297 6.03 4.62 4.20 13.18 10.37 9.35
Essendon ('Melbourne) 70,296 104,031 116,885 n.a. n.a. n.a. 25.30 29.73 29.90
Par'afield (Adelaide) 39,892 114,683 109,200 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Moorabbin 69,098 I 11,549 97,839 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(Melbourne) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jandakot (Perth) 30,189 71,102 57,939 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Archerfield(Brisbane) 66,744 85,986 102,515 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mount Isa 75,I12 127,790 150,259 4.41 4.77 4.73 6.I0 9.00 8.33
Total2 20 I,141 310,270 345,300 6.39 6.73 n.a. I1.82 12.62 n.a.
Notes: (1)Melbourne, Brisbane and Perthairportswere operatedby theirnew owners throughoutthe 1997/98 financialyear.The
Phase 2 sales were effected at varying stages during 1997/98, but the data in the table were reported by the FAC in its Annual
Report on a full-year basis; (2) Total results for 1997/98 do not include Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports.
Sources: Federal Airports Corporation, Annual Reports 1991/92, 1996/97 and 1997/98, Australia Pacific Airports Corporation,
Annual Report 1997/98, Westralia Airport Corporation, Annual Report 1997/98, and Brisbane Airport Corporation.Limited,Annual Report 1997/98.
The PSA believed that efficiency would be promoted if each airport set its own fees and
that this form of cross-subsidisation should be removed. In addition, the PSA argued that
aeronautical services should not be funded from non-aeronautical revenue and that
congestion charges should be applied to fully manage demand at Sydney Airport. The
PSA further recommended that the FAC and the PSA work jointly on a price-capping
methodology.
"; The PSA was absorbed into the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
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The completion of this inquiry coincided with a shift in policy towards privatisation of
government business enterprises with the proceeds being used to reduce government debt.
After wide-ranging public debate, the ruling Australian Labor Party resolved its
objections to privatisation. In April 1994, the Government announced that it intended to
sell its airports and a scoping study was commenced to guide the Government's thinking
on how best to proceed.
The privatisation process
Preparing for the sales
The Government had made an allowance of US$1.4 billion (1998/99 values) in its budget
estimates for the sale of the FAC but its advisers, ANZ McCaughan and Salomon
Brothers, proposed a higher net value in 1994 of US$1.8 billion (1998/99 values). In
proceeding with the sale, it was clear that an important objective was the maximisation of
the proceeds from the sale, but the Govemment announced that it had set a number of
sales and ongoing objectives to be met by the winning bidder. Apart from net proceeds on
a risk-adjusted basis to the Commonwealth, financial strength and management
capabilities to operate and develop airports, extent of local participation, airport
development plans and commitment to the effective development of airport services,
environmental credentials and equitable treatment of FAC employees were to be included
in the selection criteria.
The Government also set a limit of 49% foreign ownership and a requirement that the
majority of directors of an airport lessee be Australian citizens or Australian residents.
Restrictions were placed on cross-ownership of major airports and airlines were limited to
a maximum share of 5% of the airport operators.
Privatisation of a single airport, let alone a system of airports, is a complex exercise. Four
years were to pass between the announcement of a policy decision to privatise Australia's
airports and the conclusion of two phases of the sale process. Even then the most valuable
airport, Sydney, was put to one side pending resolution of uncertainties about the
development of a second major airport in the Sydney region. Table 5 summarises the key
milestones leading to the sale of the first set of airports.
Preliminary work took 16 months to complete, but key issues had to be addressed. A
scoping study evaluated sale options and led to decisions to sell the FAC as a set of
individual airports rather than as a system. This was to be achieved through trade sales in
a public tender process rather than through a set of public floats. The initial intention was
to retain the FAC as a public corporation providing airport management and technical
services on a commercial consultancy basis, but later developments linked to the
problems of Sydney Airport resulted in the Government's decision to exclude the FAC
from the privatisation process (White 1996).
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The structure of the FAC did not facilitate the sale as proposed since each airport had
been operated as a cost centre with the Head Office providing a range of services that
needed to be devolved to the airports. The FAC facilitated the sales process by
undertaking the necessary reorganisation. This included a revision of the structure of the
FAC's aeronautical charges. The previous practice of setting network-wide aeronautical
charges was abandoned in favour of location and service specific charges. The new
pricing system was effected for Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide
airports on 1 January 1997. Landing fees had been held constant since April 1991 and the
new charges represented an increase of 10.8% in total aeronautical charges. In
introducing the charges, the FAC claimed that its landing fees remained low by
international standards. Further changes in tariffs for Sydney Airport were introduced in
October 1998 with the effect that costs of landing smaller, domestic jet aircraft and
freighter aircraft fell while charges rose for intemational passenger aircraft by up to 30%.
In addition, the assets vested in the FAC had to be transferred back to the Government
and appropriate legislation was drawn up in the Airports (Transitional) Act. This also
enabled the Government to grant long-term leases in airport land to "airport lessee
companies". At the same time, it was necessary for the Government to pay offthe FAC's
debts of US$441 million. An additional piece of legislation, the Airports Act established
the regulatory framework that would apply to airports after the sales were completed,
including provisions dealing with foreign ownership. In particular, the Act nominated the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) as the body responsible for
administering price-cap regulation, price surveillance and quality of service monitoring.
The ACCC also was empowered to publish information that the airport operators were
obliged to provide. The Minister for Transport also retained discretionary powers to
introduce traffic management measures.
The passage of the Bills was delayed as a result of an election which resulted in the
removal of the Australian Labor Party from power and its replacement by a
Liberal/National Party Coalition. Although the new Government had opposed certain
aspects of the airport Bills while in opposition, it moved ahead with privatisation.
Although it had an estimated worth equal to half of the total value of the other 21
airports, the decision was made to defer the sale of Sydney International Airport and the
general aviation airports in the Sydney region, Bankstown, Camden and Hoxton Park.
The remaining 17 airport leases were to be sold in two tranches. The first was to include
Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide. Subsequently, Adelaide's sale was delayed so
that negotiations could continue with the State Government about a proposal to extend
the runway _°.
Phase 1 sales
The Government initially managed the sales process through the Department of Finance,
but later passed this to a new body, the Office of Asset Sales and IT Outsourcing
ko In July 1997, the Government injected USSI6 million into the FAC to fund the runway extension.
Another USS2 million was provided at a later date.
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(OASITO). Input on transport policy and regulatory matters was provided by the
Department of Transport and Regional Development. Expressions of interest were invited
from interested parties in September of 1996 as a demanding schedule of information
gathering, evaluation, proposal and assessment commenced. A total of 170 parties
expressed initial interest, but only 60 of these participated in the first stage, and only 30
submissions were received by the due date of 10 'h October 1996. Twelve of these were
selected for further consideration and their backers were invited to tender.
To assist the bidders undertake their "due diligence" investigations, the Government's
task force had prepared relevant documentation indicating the potential value of the assets
and presenting relevant data t_. Since this involved confidential information, the
Government only provided its Information Memoranda to the shortlisted consortia and
then went to considerable length to ensure that the sales were conducted on a level
playing field. Shortlisted consortia were given access to airport sites, to the FAC's
managers, and to other key stakeholders. A data room was established and contained
financial information and relevant documents, plans and drawings. The adequacy of these
measures was criticised by the bidders and the ANAO later judged that the costs of the
sale process had been increased for both the Government and the bidders (Australian
National Audit Office 1998).
Other ground rules governing the sales were that the consortia were not permitted to use
the media in a way that would influence valuations, and no negotiations were entered into
about the tender documents themselves. The bidders had until the end of January to
formalise their bids. At that stage, 9 consortia submitted 17 bids for the 3 airports.
However, there were certain aspects of these bids that did not conform with the tender
specifications and all parties were invited to re-submit. The Government selected the 3
winning bids from the 13 revised bids and announced its decisions in May 1997.
Table 5: Milestones - Phase 1 of airport sales
Date Event
April 1994
May 1994
June 1994
March 1995
April 1995
August 1995
September 1995
December 1995
Match 1996
Government publishes a White Paper on Employment and Growth in which it announces an intention, in
principle, to sell the FAC's airports
Scoping study initiated to investigate feasibility of selling the FAC network and to report on post-sale
regulatory requirements
BZW engaged to provide business advice to the soaping study task force to advise on sale options and
strategies and the actions required to achieve the Government's timetable.
Scoping study completed
Decision to sell all 22 FAC airports in two phases in individual trade sales. First tranche to be Sydney
(including Sydney West), Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. Adelaide Airport was added later.
BZW appointed as Business Adviser to assist with marketing, due diligence, tendering and bid evaluation
and bidder contract negotiations.
Bills introduced into Parliament. The Airports Bill established the regulator) frame,york for post-
privatisation and the Airports (Transitional) Bill 1995 facilitated the sale of the leases.
Appointment of legal advisers (AGS and Clayton Ut.z.)
New Government elected, but commitment to complete the first phase of sales (Melbourne, Brisbane and
Perth) by 30 June 1997. Sydney _as excluded from the Phase 1 sales pending the resolution of noise
issues over Sydney and the completion of an environmental impact study for the proposed second
Sydney Airport at Badgerys Creek (Sydney West Airport). Adelaide also was removed from Phase 1
sales in order to resolve issues in relation to a proposal to extend the international terminal..
Airpor_ Sales Task Force within Department of Finance formed to manage and complete the sales. The
_ The preparation of the Information Memoranda occurred over a period at'twelve months
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September 1996
12 September 1996
October 1996
10 October 1996
Ig October 1996
30 October 1996
November 1996
30 January 1997
February 1997
10 April1997
3May 1997
7May 1997
1 July 1997
Department of Transport was reorganised as the Department of Transport and Regional Development.
Amended Bills passed in Parliament and effective from 9 October 1996.
Call for expressions of interest in Phase I airports.The requirements for participating in the bid process
and basis for shortlisting of consortia were issued.
Office of Asset Sales takes over the task of managing and completing the sales. The Department of
Transport and Communications' role was to develop legislation and regulations, prepare leases, and
evaluate bids from a transport policy perspective.
Invitation for expressions of interest closed. 170 parties registered an interest and 60 of these participated
in the bidding process. 30 lodged expressions of interest by the due date.
12 consortia were short-listed and were issued with a Request for Proposal.
Tender documents were issued after the signing of confidentiality agreements.
Government's paper on Pricing Policy for airports released (developed by the Department of Transpon
and Regional Development in consultation with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
and other stakeholders).
9 consortia submitted a total of 18 offers (5 for Melbourne, 6 for Brisbane and 7 for Perth)
The Office of Asset Sales and its Business Adviser evaluated the offers and concluded that a further
round of bids was necessary to improve the offers in terms of their conditionality and conformity with
tender requirements. Six of the consortia were invited to participate in this third stage..
12, revised bids were submitted by the 6 consortia (3 for Melbourne, 5 for Brisbane, 5 for Perth)
Decisions made about successful bids.
Sale Agreements were signed for the airports for a total of US$2.1 billion.
New airport operators take over control at Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth Airports and Phase I of the
airport sales process completed.
Given the initial expectation of a total net sales figure of US$1.4 billion in the budget
estimates, the first tranche of sales netted US$2.0 billion alone _2.On average, the amounts
paid implied an earnings multiple t3 of 16.8 compared to multiples of 5 to 10 times
earnings in sales of international airports in Europe (Australian National Audit Office
1998). Details about the winning bids are provided in Table 5.
_' Melboume/Tultamarine: Australia Pacific Airports Corporation (APAC) with its
bid of US$0.8 billion (price-earnings ratio -- 15.1)
_' Brisbane: Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited (BACL) for US$0.9 billion (price-
earnings ratio = 18.0)
_' Perth: Airstratia Development Group (ADG) for US$0.4 billion (price-earnings
ratio = 18.4)
Table 6: First round of airport sales
Airport Airport leasing company Amount Price X Share by category of investor
SUS Earnings Factor Operator/
millions Ratio Manager
1998/99
Local Finance
Melbourne Australia Pacific Airports Corporation 827.5 15.1 4.0% 15% 0% 85%
Brisbane Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd 883.7 18.0 4.5% 16% 47% 37%
Pet_h Airstralia Development Group 409.6 18.4 5.5% 16% 0% 84%
Total Phase 1 2,120.8 16.8
Sources: ANAO (1998), FAC Ann,al Report 1996/97, Australia Pacific Airports Corporation Ann,al Report 1997/98, Brisbane
Airport Corporation Limited Annual Report 1997/98. Westralia Airport Corporation Ann,_al Report 1997/98, and various Press
Releases issued by the Minister of Transport.
i,. The gross proceeds were US$2,121 million, against which direct sale costs of USS98 million (including a
payment to State governments in lieu of stamp duty) were incurred.
_ Defined here as the sale price divided by earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT) as
revealed in the FAC's Annual Report for 1996/97.
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The Australian National Audit Office subsequently released a report that was critical of
certain aspects of the sales process - notably the failure of the Commonwealth to indicate
how it would weight assessment criteria and its contracting procedures for advisers
during the sales process (ANAO 1998). One of the most contentious issues with the sale
process was the way in which infrastructure bonds were taken into account in assessing
the after-tax value of the bids to the Government t'. The Government's financial adviser
developed a specific model to evaluate the impact of infrastructure bonds, employing a
different methodology embodied in the Department of Treasury's own model. The
practical result of this was that the second-highest bid was awarded the sale of the lease
for Melbourne Airport.
_ The financial structures established by the various consortia all had tax implications. The ANAO
reported that the Government should have earned US$1.0 billion in company tax from the airports over a
period of 20 years. However, very high gearing levels and asset revaluations would ensure that the new
airport owners would avoid paying any of this tax, even though the owners expected to earn a return of 13-
14% before tax.
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Phase 2 sales
The Government announced on 12 June 1997 that it would sell the remaining FAC
airports with the exception of those in the Sydney region. A preliminary Information
Brochure released by the Ministers for Finance and Transport & Regional Services on 12
August revealed that 8 core airports would be sold by long-term leasehold. The airports in
this group were Adelaide, Alice Springs, Canberra, Coolangatta, Darwin, Hobart,
Launceston and Townsville. The remaining 7 regional airports were to be sold on a
freehold basis subject to agreement with State and Territory Governments.
On 10 October 1997, interested parties were invited to begin preparing their expressions
of interest. More than 80 separate bids were lodged by 30 consortia before the closing
date on 27 October. Following a review by the Office of Asset Sales and the
Government's Business Adviser, BZW, 26 groups were advised on 6 November that they
had been placed on a shortlist and that they should prepare detailed bids. The
Government indicated that all 15 of the airports were to be sold on a leasehold basis,
although it reserved the fight to offer some of the smaller airports on a freehold basis
provided the relevant State Governments introduced appropriate regulations ts.
All of the bidders were provided with relevant information on a CD-ROM package,
eliminating the need for the data room used in the Phase 1 sales. Although the "Phase 2"
airports were, in the main, much smaller than those sold previously, the task was
nonetheless another demanding one. There was greater scope for local participation in the
bidding and it was expected that there would be more inexperienced groups involved. The
larger number of airports ranging from capital city international gateways (Adelaide and
Darwin _) to airports that served only general aviation added to the dimensions of the
task.
Winning bids for 11 of the airports were announced in March 1998 while continuing
negotiations were occurring for the three airports in the Northern Territory, Darwin, Alice
Springs and Tennant Creek. Only Essendon Airport in Melbourne failed to attract an
acceptable offer. This airport was withdrawn from sale and subsequently has been set up
as a stand-alone airport company, Essendon Airport Limited, with all of the share vested
in the Australian Government. In the case of Darwin and Townsville airports, the
runways and taxiways remained under the ownership of the Department of Defence.
However, defence functions carried out at Canberra's Fairbairn Base are to be relocated
over time. Accordingly, the lease agreement with the new owner includes the runways,
the taxiways and the major part of the Fairbairn Base.
When the negotiations for the 3 airports in the Northern Territory were completed, the
Government had received an additional US$468.4 million from 9 different consortia.
Even though these sales occurred after the onset of the Asian economic crisis in July
*: The outcome, though, was that none of the airports was sold on a freehold basis.
*° Hobart. the capital of the State of Tasmania. has international sen'ices on an irregular basis.
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1997, the prices were still relatively high in terms of an average price-ea.rnings multiple
of 18.6. Details about the winning consortia are summarised in Table 7.
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Table 7: Second round of airport sales
Airport Airport leasing company Amount Price X
$US millions Earnings Factor
1998/99 Ratio
Adelaide & Patafield MSUM 232.1 20.8 4.0% I
Darwin, Alice Springs & Tennant Creek 70.6
Coolangatta 67. I
Canberra 42.6
Hobart 23.0
Launceston 11.1
Townsville & Mount Isa 10.2
Moorabbin 5.3
Jandakot 4.3
Atcherfield 2.0
Total Phase 2
Airport Development Group
Queensland Airports Ltd
Capital Airports Group
Hobart International Airports Corporation
Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston)
Pry Ltd
Australian Airports Pty Lid
Moorabbin Airport Corporation Pty Ltd
Jandalcot Airport Holdings
Archerficld Airport Corporation Pry Ltd
20.1 3.0*/,z
17.1 4.5%
15.1 1.0%
13.5 3.0*/,
8.3 2.5%
11.3 1.0% 3
18.7 0.0%
-13,6 0.0%
-28.4 0.0%
468.4 18.6 16.0%
Notes: (1) X-factor applies only to Adelaide; (2) X-factor applies only to Darwin and Alice Springs; (3) X-factor applies only to
Townsville.
Source: Joint media releases by the Minister for Finance & Administration and the Minister for Transport and Regional
Development.
Cross-ownership of airports was permitted in the Phase 2 sales and several combinations
emerged. Infratil Australia Pty Limited became the majority shareholder in Perth
International Airport in July 1997, and it took a 51% share of the Airport Development
Group in its winning bid for Darwin, Alice Springs and Tennant Creek (Northern
Territory) airports. Airport Group International also owned shares in these same airports
- 16.5% of Perth International Airport and 49% of the Northern Territory airports, and
30% of Hobart Airport.
Australia Pacific Airports Corporation, the owner of Melbourne Airport, purchased 90%
of Launceston Airport as Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Limited. The winning
consortium for Adelaide Airport also was successful in acquiring Coolangatta.
Manchester Airport Plc was involved in this consortium through a contractual agreement
to provide management services tT.
The regulatory framework
On-going objectives and regulatory provisions
The Governments on-going objectives for privatisation were to:
_" Establish sufficient diversity of ownership of the airports "in the interests of
innovation and competitive benchmarking"
Ensure that air service operators enjoy competitive access to airports on reasonable
commercial terms
_7 This common members of the consortia for Adelaide and Coolangarta airports were financial institutions,
Serco Investments Australia Limited, the Macquarie Bank, and Unisuper Limited
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_" Maintain a commitment by airport leasing companies to the provision of quality
airport services
_' Sustain investments required for development of the region through appropriate
pricing policies
Promotion of economic development of the region consistent with sound
environmental management and the interests of users.
In addition, the Government acknowledged concerns that airports had some degree of
monopoly power in relation to aeronautical services and the need to control and monitor
prices. The regulatory framework to apply after completion of the sales was set out in the
Airports Act 1996 with administration responsibilities for economic regulation falling
mostly on the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) Is. The
Department of Transport and Regional Development has appointed Airport Environment
Officers and Airport Building Controllers, at the expense of the airport operators, to
ensure compliance with environmental and development requirements.
A condition of the sales was that the new owners could not sell their shares during the
first two years without the consent of the Government and the ACCC has the necessary
authority to prevent mergers and acquisitions deemed not to be in the public's interests.
Though some cross-ownership arrangements occurred during the second phase of airport
sales, the major airports are independently-owned.
The early experience with the Phase 1 airports has been that each of the new operators
has brought new ideas to airport management based on their international experiences.
Their annual reports, for example, reflect a strong marketing orientation, particularly in
relation to non-aeronautical and property services. Emphasis also is given to
organisational structures, cost control and management teams with strong links to the
local community. The Australian approach to privatisation requires disclosure of financial
and operating information to assist the ACCC in its on-going monitoring. The annual
reports for Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports certainly have disclosed detailed
information to the public about their plans and performances.
The ACCC and the airport operators already have been active in clarifying the terms of
competitive access. Both Australia Pacific Airports Corporation (Melbourne) and
Westralia Airport Limited (Perth) sought determinations from the ACCC on terms and
conditions applying to a range of airport services and the procedures for dealing with
negotiations and disputes. The ACCC did not, in the first instance, accept these proposals
- largely on the grounds of enforceability. In the absence of a favourable determination of
access undertakings, the party seeking access to the airport can appeal to the ACCC
directly to arbitrate if a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached in the first instance with
the airport operator. The ACCC was not satisfied with the provisions relating to the
enforceability of the undertakings, pricing of services outside the price cap, the adequacy
_3Details about the ACCC's interpretation of its responsibilities and its determinations in relation to
privatised airports are available on its web site e[ http://www.accc.go_.au.
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of information supplied to access seekers, and the negotiation and dispute resolution
procedures. In addition, the ACCC has issued a draft determination in relation to rental
car services, judging them to be a "declared" airport service under the Airports Act 1996.
The ACCC's activity in these matters indicates clearly that competitive access will
continue to be monitored carefully.
The Sale Agreements tied the bidders to specific amounts of capital expenditure on
aeronautical infrastructure development for the initial ten years of the lease. Collectively,
the new airport owners are obliged to spend almost US$450 million on continued
development and major maintenance works over the next ten years. Lessees failing to live
up to these commitments incur a liability to repay the difference to the Government. The
leases also contain an undertaking on the part of the lessee to develop the airport site at its
own expense consistent with a major international airport throughout the full term of the
lease. The leases for the general aviation airports require continued operation as an
airport, but place few other obligations on the new owners.
Furthermore, the new airport operators were required to submit airport master plans and
maj or development proposals for the approval of the Minister for Transport and Regional
Development following a minimum 90 day public comment process. This ensures that
communities will be fully appraised of development proposals and that they will have a
reasonable opportunity to comment on their impacts. The new airport operators already
are active in establishing formal lines of communication with the local community and in
pursuing joint development and tourism marketing initiatives.
Price and quality of service regulation
A distinction has been made to aeronautical services where the airport operator has a high
degree of monopoly power and those services provided on airports that face competition
from off-airport sites. The details of the price oversight arrangements are described in
more detail by the ACCC (1997). The price caps apply to declared airport services for a
period of five years, by which time the ACCC is to provide advice to the Government
about the need for continuing oversight of prices.
Tables 6 and 7 specified the price cap commitments entered into by the new airport
operators within a CPI-X formula approach. That is, an airport operator is not-permitted
to increase declared aeronautical charges by more than the Consumer Price Index less a
pre-determined factor. The intent of this mechanism is to apply pressure on the airport
operator to pursue efficiency improvements and to pass the benefits on to airport users.
The particular way the price cap is applied is on a weighted average of a basket of tariffs,
using revenue shares from the previous period as weights. That is, prices are permitted to
rise above the price cap for specific items provided there are compensating reductions
elsewhere within the tariff basket. This allows the airport operator the flexibility to
modif3' pricing structures. The operators also are permitted to over- or trader-recover in
each period, provided that the pricing commitment is met over the five-year period.
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Under particular circumstances, the airport operators are permitted to increase their
charges to recoup investments in infrastructure.
Regulation of charges other than those services declared to be within the price capping
arrangements also is effected by the ACCC in its price-monitoring role. The Treasurer
issued a direction to the ACCC specifically to monitor "aeronautical-related" charges at
particular privatised airports. It is worth noting that the Government's Business Adviser
made it clear to bidding consortia that there was scope to increase revenue by varying
charges or introducing new charges outside the price cap. Levies, for example, have been
imposed on taxis and other commercial passenger vehicles at Brisbane and Perth airports.
The most contentious issue to date, though, has been in relation to aircraft refuelling.
These are not included in the price cap so that the airport operators are free to vary
charges without formally notifying the ACCC. The FAC had made provisions within its
contracts with oil companies for the introduction of a fuel throughput levy. Proposals to
introduce such charges have been raised for Brisbane and Perth airports and the ACCC
has made it clear that this is a designated aeronautical-related service that it is obliged to
monitor formally in terms of prices, costs and profits. The ACCC expressed the view that
the price reductions achieved over five years under the price cap should not be expected
to be offset by increases in other charges not related to changes in costs in provision.
In addition to the commitments made under the sale agreements for continuing
investments by the airport operators, the Airport Act 1996 provides for monitoring of
quality of services at the core airports. This monitoring is linked to pricing oversight
arrangements and is administered again by the ACCC. The approach taken will be to
analyse changes in service levels over time. The ACCC has indicated that it will use
performance indicators such as aircraft delay, availability of aircraft gates and
aerobridges, waiting times and crowding associated with passenger processing facilities,
equipment availability and the standard of facilities. Results of the monitoring exercises
will be published by the ACCC at least every two years.
Concluding comments
The new airport owners for Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports purchased just prior
to the onset of the Asian economic crisis. Although the impact of the economic downturn
in Asia was moderated by strong growth in the Australian economy and by an expansion
of the Australian outbound travel market, all of the new airport owners were affected. In
particular, the high growth rates that had been experienced previously at Brisbane and
Perth airports depended to a far greater degree on Asian tourism markets. Brisbane
Airport Corporation Limited, for example, reported that its passenger movements
declined by 10,000 in its first year. Nevertheless, the price-earnings ratios involved in the
second phase of airport sales were equally high even though the downturn in Asia had
become apparent.
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There are various reasons why the winning bids for Australia's airports had high price-
earnings ratios relative to the sales of airports in Europe. One explanation for this is that
there have, to now, been limited opportunities to purchase international airports. This is
especially the case in the Asia Pacific region where there was very strong growth in the
aviation market until the middle of 1997.
Another factor is that most of the airports enjoy a significant degree of local monopoly
power. All of the major airports are located at some distance from each other. For
example, the distance between Sydney and Melbourne is 707 kilometres 19, and Perth is
2,120 kilometres from its closest state capital city, Adelaide. Although there is some
scope for the airports to vie for a share of the international traffic, generally it is true that
the major Australian airports do not compete with each other. Also, the nature of the
airline networks does not lend itself to the type of competition seen at some airports in
North America and Europe for hub transfer business.
Another factor that influenced the sale prices was the prospect that earnings could be
improved. The Federal Airports Corporation claimed that studies proved it had low
aeronautical charges by international standards and that it was an most efficient operator.
The bidders appear to have believed that they would be able to increase earnings, if not
improve efficiency at the same time. In their first year of operation, the phase 1 airports
have demonstrated their zeal in marketing retail and property services and in improving
their yields from non-aeronautical sources.
The difficulties in privatising airports is demonstrated in two ways. That it took between
3 to 4 years to sell the airports after first making a policy decision in favour of
privatisation illustrates the complexity of the task. Even after five years have passed,
though, Australia's major airport remains on the Govemment's books despite a very
strong financial incentive to sell. Major airports are more than commercial undertakings
and, in Sydney's case, on-going regional planning and environmental issues are difficult
enough to resolve while the airport is owned by the Government.
Nevertheless, the Government has succeeded in realising higher than expected prices for
its assets and it has used the funds to retire public debt. It is too early yet to decide
whether the Government also has been successful in achieving its post-privatisation
objectives, but the regulatory framework has been established. This framework ensures
that there relevant information will be available to the regulators, airport users and the
public. Researchers assessing the merits of airport privatisation will be able to draw
useful lessons from the Australian case in years to come.
x_ Measured as a Great Circle distance (Department of Transport and Communications .qustralian Air
Distances.
_M
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Abstract
Regulating Access to Airport Facilities
Peter Forsyth
In the mid 1990s Australia privatised most of its major city airports. When
it did, it imposed a system of price-caps to regulate aeronautical charges. At
about the same time it instituted general changes in competition policy
which included explicit regulation of access to essential facilities. Where a
firm owns natural monopoly facilities, or facilities which are uneconomic to
duplicate, such as electricity transmission grids or gas pipelines, it can be
required to make these facilities available to its competitors at a regulated
price. This access regime is also being applied to airports; something which
is either unique to Australia or very rare. It may well result in extremely
detailed regulation of airports. Where airport facilities or services are
judged necessary for civil aviation and uneconomic to duplicate, they can be
made subject to access regulation. Such facilities include runways and
taxiways, aircraft parking areas, international passenger processing
facilities, land for freight operations and landside vehicle facilities.
The objective of this access regime is to promote competition in the
provision of airport services. The ways in which it applies to airports is
described in this paper. This regulatory regime poses a number of difficult
issues; these include the relationship between access regulation and price-
cap regulation, the choice of ai_ort price structures, new entry by airlines
and access to terminals, choice of access pricing principles and
measurement of costs. These are explored in the paper, which concludes
with an overall assessment of access regulation in the airport context.
Introduction
Airports typically possessconsiderable market power, and it is not unusual
for them to be subjected to price regulation. When countries such as the UK
and Australia privatised their airports, they instituted detailed systems of
regulation of the prices that airports charge their customers, primarily
airlines. Regulation has its costs, one of which is a reduction in the
incentives facing firms to keep costs at a minimum; since firms may not be
able to keep all the savings they make, they are less likely to make them. A
system of privately owned airports, subjected to a form of regulation which
is designed to be relatively positive in terms of incentives, is regarded in
several countries as likely as any to produce efficient performance. Few
countries take the regulatory approach further.
Australia has taken a further step in regulating its airports. It is applying
regulation of access to essential facilities regulation to airports. Not many
countries have explicit essential facilities regulation, and those which do, do
not extend it to airports. This regulation is normally applied to significant
natural monopolies, such as telecommunications local loops, electricity
grids, rail track and gas pipelines. Its objective is to make competition in the
final good or service, such as telephone calls or retail electricity, feasible by
enabling many firms to obtain access to the bottleneck facility on equal
terms.
Australia has created a general SYstem of essential facilities regulation, and
is applying it to airports. This means that a range of facilities and services,
which make up an airport, such as runways, taxiways, aprons, passenger
processing facilities in terminals, freight facilities and vehicle landside
facilities are individually being subjected to access regulation. Thus it is
possible for a firm which wishes to compete with the airport in providing
passenger services or to handle freight can seek access to the airport's land
and facilities, and if need be, get the competition regulator to regulate prices
and conditions of access. In some cases, this could have large implications
for the way airports are run; it may result in substantial unbundling of the
airports. It may result in exceptionally detailed regulation of airports.
Furthermore, depending on how it develops, it could have implications for
entry into the domestic airline industry.
The background to these changes is discussed in the next section, and after
this, the application of access regulation to airports is outlined. In the
following section, a range of issueswhich arise from this are analysed. In
the final section, a brief assessment is made of the new regulatory
framework.
Background: Airport Privatisation and Access Regulation
The implementation of access regulation in the context of airports in
Australia is the result of two policy shifts. Firstly there was the privatisation
of most of the main airports. Secondly, there was the creation of a whole
new system of access pricing regulation, applicable across a wide range of
industries, designed to control monopoly power in bottleneck facilities.
Most of the large city airports in Australia were privatised in 1997 and
1998. Airports such as those at Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane were sold by
the federal government to consortia, which included major airports
overseas, such as BAA which owns the London airports, and Schiphol.
There were exceptions, such as Sydney, the nation's largest airport, which
has been retained in government ownership pending decisions about future
expansion of capacity at a second airport, and because of environmental
problems. Another exception is that of Cairns airport, which remains owned
by local government authorities.
Airports in Australia are separated by large distances, and there is little
scope for them to compete except for a limited amount of business. Thus
they have considerable market power. In recognition of this, they are
subjected to price regulation (strictly speaking, this is described as price
surveillance, which is slightly less binding than regulation)(Forsyth,1997).
The general competition regulator, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), is charged with the price regulatory task.
The preferred method of regulation in Australia is that of CPI-X regulation,
or price-caps, which is also the preferred method in the United Kingdom.
Price-caps have been imposed on a defined bundle of aeronautical services,
though non aeronautical services are not price regulated. The problems
associated with this method have been recognised by the ACCC, and to
some extent addressed. For example, profit maximising firms facing price-
caps have an incentive to save on costs by lowering quality; to this end, the
ACCC monitors quality of service (ACCC, 1998a).
The system of price regulation is now well established, but some problems
have emerged. In particular, there has been a problem of fuel levies.
Airports in Australia do not have a history of charging levies on fuel
throughput, such as many European airports do. Thus such levies were not
included in the original bundle of services to be price-capped. Soon after
they were privatised, the new owners of Brisbane and Perth airports
imposed fuel levies. Such levies are very difficult for airlines to avoid, and
they constitute an effective means of circumventing the price-cap. While,
for the present, such levies are acceptedas outside the price-cap, the ACCC
hasargued for legislation to include them (ACCC, 1998c).
Price regulation of the final outputs of private airports is not unusual, and it
would normally be expected that it would be sufficient to limit the use of
market power. However, in Australia, airports are also subject to access
regulation which applies to any bottleneck facilities they own. Airport
privatisation took place in the context of privatisation and restructuring of
the utility and transport industries and an extensive review of competition
policy.
It was recognised that many of these industries were not likely to be
competitive as a whole, but that there was scope for competition in parts of
them. An industry such as rail is constituted of natural monopoly sectors,
such as the track system, and potentially competitive sectors, such as train
operation. If the track owner also operates its own trains, it can discourage
potential competitors in operating trains by refusing them access to its
tracks, or by charging prohibitively high prices for access. Even if it is
willing to allow them to use its tracks, it will at least charge them a price
which preserves its monopoly profit. Since the objective of the reforms is to
promote competition, this will be a less than satisfactory outcome.
The objective of access regulation is to ensure that competitors have access
to the natural monopoly or bottleneck sectors on a basis which enables them
to compete effectively. Sometimes this access regulation is applied to a
vertically integrated firm which possesses both bottleneck and non
bottleneck sectors (such as integrated rail systems) and at other times it is
applied to specialist owners of the bottleneck facilities (such as rail track
corporations). Access regulation involves both mandating that competitors
have accessto the facility, and setting prices at which this access is to take
place.
Australia is now implementing a general system of access regulation (for a
description, see King and Maddock, 1996), but there are specific provisions
for particular industries, such as airports. The legal structure of the access
arrangements is complex (see ACCC, 1998b). It seeks to ensure access, but
to give the access seeker and the facility owner scope to negotiate terms and
prices of access. However, it contains provisions for arbitration of access
prices by the ACCC, should negotiations fail. Clearly, in such an
environment, the policies of the ACCC will be critical; sometimes it will
directly regulate access prices, but even where it does not, its likely
decisions will condition the prices at which the parties negotiate access. The
ACCC has indicated, in other industries, that it prefers a cost based access
price, to have the effect of promoting competition as much as possible,
consistent with cost recovery by the facility owner. Thus, in the
telecommunications industry, it has opted for total service long run
incremental cost (TSLRIC), which it considers will be close to marginal
cost but consistent with cost recovery.
This access regulation environment extends to airports. It makes a range of
airport services potentially subject to price regulation. The only airport
services left out are those which are not essential to operate air transport
services, or which can be provided competitively. Runway services,
passenger gates, land for refueling services, road access for car hire firms
and land for freight handling services are all subject to access provisions,
though retail facilities, sites for cargo terminals and flight catering facilities
are not. A wide range of individual services, which together make up what
an airport is, could be subject tO regulation or to the threat of it. All in all,
this constitutes a considerable unbundling of airports for regulatory
purposes.
Applying Access Regulation to Airports
The access regulation framework determines what services or facilities are
to be subjected to regulation, and then sets out procedures for terms of
access to be determined. The system as it applies to airports is a distinctly
complex one. There are two separate sources of legislation, a general one
and one specific to privatised airports; these sources overlap in their
application. Furthermore, within both of these pathways there are
complicated procedures to be followed in formulating the access
arrangements to be applied to a specific airport.
The general approach to accessregulation is encapsulated in Part IIIA of the
Trade Practices Act, which was included when competition policy was
extensively revised in 1995. It sets out several pathways to access
regulation. A competition policy advisor, the National Competition Council
(NCC) has the task of defining the accessarrangements. If it considers that
an effective access framework is in place, for example, because of
regulation by a state government, it can approve that framework. This has
not been relevant to airports so far. Alternatively, a facility owner, such as
an airport can lodge an undertaking with the NCC, setting out terms and
conditions under which it would grant access. If the NCC accepts this
undertaking, it becomes enforceable, and no further regulation is imposed.
Finally, if no undertaking has been accepted,an access seeker can apply to
have the facility "declared" for access.The NCC evaluates the application
in terms of various criteria, including whether the facility is uneconomic to
duplicate, and may declare the facility. If it does, the owner is obliged to
negotiate terms of accesswith the seeker, and if negotiations fail, the ACCC
is called upon to arbitrate. Effectively this means that the ACCC regulates
accessprices and conditions.
This pathway was used by one accessseeker in 1997. A freight handling
company sought access to facilities at Melbourne and Sydney airports. The
NCC concluded that the criteria were satisfied, and declared the facilities
(NCC,1997).
The other pathway arises from the Airports Act, and applies specifically to
the privatised airports. As is to be expected, it is a provision which is more
specific to airports. Section 192 of this act gives the airports one year from
time of privatisation to develop an access undertaking. Should such an
undertaking be accepted by the ACCC, it becomes enforceable, and the
facilities of the airport cannot be declared. If the undertaking is not
accepted, the ACCC may declare certain services for access; if so it then
regulates prices and conditions. The Act sets out two main criteria for the
ACCC to be used: whether the services are "necessary for the purposes of
operating and/or maintaining civil aviation services at the airport" and are
"provided by means of significant facilities at the airport, being facilities
that cannot be economically duplicated". The latter condition is similar to,
though not identical to, one of whether the facility is a natural monopoly or
not.
The major privatised airports, such as Melboume and Perth produced
undertakings for the ACCC to approve. It did not, mainly on grounds of the
undertakings being too vague especially on issues such as price of access,
arbitration arrangements, and becauseof the scope for the facility owner to
delay providing access.On expire of the year since privatisation, a range of
services were automatically declared. The list of services the ACC regards
as declared is given in Table 1.
Some services were not declared because they arenot necessary to operate
aviation services- thus retail facilities were not judged essential. Other
facilities were judged as essential but were not declared because it is
possible to duplicate them economically- sites for cargo terminals and
heavy maintenance are in this category. Finally, some services were
determined as essential and uneconomic to duplicate- not surprisingly,
runways fall into this category, as do international passenger processing
areasand land for refueling.
These decisions set out the access regulation framework for airports in
considerable detail, though there is still scope for refinement. For example,
in late 1998, a car hire firm requested the ACCC to declare landside roads
associated with passenger pick up to be declared. In 1999 the ACCC
determined that the requested facilities, with somemodification, be declared
(ACCC,1999).
Declaration does not necessarily mean that facilities will be directly
regulated by the ACCC. No accessseekersmay come along, and the ACCC
will have not dispute to arbitrate. Alternatively, the airport and the access
seeker may negotiate terms themselves, and the ACCC may not be called in.
This is to be expected in several cases,especially when the parties have a
clear idea of how the ACCC would go about regulating the facility.
However, whether the ACCC hasa direct role or not, it will have a critical
impact on accessprices, since the parties will negotiate prices close to those
which they anticipate the ACCC will impose. Hence the ACCC's approach
to access regulation will be a critical factor affecting the operation of the
declared airports.
Issues in Access Price Regulation
Imposing access regulation on airports which are already subject to price-
cap regulation creates a number of issues to be resolved. In this section a
range of these are considered:
(a) The expected benefits and costs of access regulation,
(b) The interaction between access and price-cap regulation,
(c) The bundling of prices,
(d) Access to terminal gates,
(e) Access pricing principles,
(f) Measuring costs, and
(g) Quality problems.
These are considered in turn.
Expected Benefits and Costs
The objective of access regulation is to promote competition in downstream
services. An airport may own a bottleneck facility, such as land required for
a freight service, and competition in the service depends on competitors
being able to obtain access to the land at a price which is consistent with
them competing. Left to itself, the airport would not offer access to its
competitors at prices close to the cost of the land. If access regulation is in
place, the market power that the airport possesses in the service will be
constrained. Thus prices will be kept down, and it will be feasible for
competitors which are productively efficient to operate. Access price
regulation has the potential to increase allocative and productive efficiency.
The extent to which this is the case depends on the nature of the bottleneck
and service being considered. Some services may be essential inputs for
very important products; for example, access to terminals and gates is
critical for new competitor airlines. Other facilities may be of considerable
significance to products which are not significant in the overall scheme of
things, but which might as well be supplied efficiently; for example, drop
off facilities for car hire firms.
Access regulation has its costs, as well. All forms of regulation have costs in
terms of reduced incentives for efficiency- there are no first best regulatory
systems. Regulated prices can give wrong signals, and induce overuse of
facilities or underinvestment.
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Another possible cost, specific to access regulation, is that it leads to
unbundling of integrated firms, leading to a possible loss of economies of
vertical integration. There may be costs to a firm from making facilities
available to competitors which the regulator is unaware of. There could be
good reasons why a single firm should sell a range of services and have
control of upstream and downstream production. Having several users of a
single facility can result in higher costs, for example as competitors get in
each other's way. The costs of vertical disaggregation, forced by access
regulation, could be significant, but they will not be obvious.
Price-Caps and Access Regulation
Access regulation in Australian airports involves superimposing one
regulatory framework on another which is already in place. The airports are
subject to overall price-caps on aeronautical services. The private airports
are regulated by CPI-X regulation, and services such as aircraft landing
fees, international terminal use (domestic terminals are normally leased on a
long term basis by the airlines), aircraft parking charges and security
services are included in the basket covered by the cap. The price index is a
revenue weighted one.
This regulation is in place to limit the use of market power by the airports. It
does not cover non aeronautical services, such as retail, even though there
may be some market power present with these. While this regulation is not
explicitly cost plus regulation, there was the intention in setting the price-
caps that revenue would be close to overall costs. Within the price-cap,
there is the scope for the airport to charge very high prices for a specific
service, though if it does, it will be forced to charge low prices for other
services.
The obvious question which arises is that of if price-cap regulation is in
place, is detailed access price regulation really necessary? The airport may
be able to exercise market power in selling a specific service, but its overall
use of market power is tightly constrained. The answer to this question
depends on how the firm behaves, and on how the two forms of regulation
interact.
Consider first a profit maximising firm; privatisation can be expected to
result in airports which are keenly interested in profits. Such firms will have
an incentive to minimise costs, and where they are not capable of achieving
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minimum costs by production in-house, they will be willing to contract out
to those firms which can. One possibility is that they will make bottleneck
facilities available to those which can use them most efficiently, and they
may allow such firms to sell the final output to the users; for example an
airport may make land available for freight operators, rather than undertake
all freight handling itself. In setting the price for access, it would be
constrained by its own price-capped services.
Suppose that an airport is selling a service to users at $20. This service is
included within the capped basket. Suppose further that the cost of using the
bottleneck facility is $8 and that the cost of the add on services, which could
be provided by competitors, is $12. If the airport charged more than $8 for
the use of the bottleneck, competitors would only be able to compete if they
had costs less than $12. If, for example, competitors were able to supply the
downstream service for $11, the airport could charge them slightly less than
$9 for the use of its facility, and it would increase its profits. Productive
efficiency would be enhanced through more efficient competitors replacing
the airport's in-house production, and prices would be no higher. As long as
the overall price-cap limits the price of the service to $20, there would be no
additional advantage from access regulation.
Whether price-caps really constrain access prices in this way depends on
how the price-cap basket is constructed. Suppose that revenue weights are
used in the price index of the airport's output (as is the case). Suppose there
is a service which the airport could either supply directly, or allow other
firms, accessing its facilities, tO sell directly to users. It could set a high
price for its own service, and also set a high access price for its facilities;
however it could set this price such that the other firms could undercut its
own prices. If it did this it would lose all its market to these other firms, and
the weight in the price-cap basket would fall to zero. It would not be
constrained by the price-cap to reduce prices of other services it supplies,
but it would be able to exercise its market power at the access price level. In
short, it would be able to circumvent the price-cap.
Short of moving to a fixed weight index, which creates its own problems,
this problem can be corrected in two ways. One would be to include access
prices within the price-cap. While this could be done, it would make the
construction of the price-cap a good deal more complex. The basket of
capped services would need to include all the facilities which other firms
might seek access to in order to produce final services. Many or most of
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these facilities have not been opened up for access, and no prices for their
use have been established. The regulator would need to set a whole range of
prices for services which might never be used. Alternatively, the regulator
could include facilities in the capped basket once their services began to be
traded; this would be cumbersome and would involve ad hoc revisions of
the price-cap basket.
The altemative is to have access price regulation. This would prevent
airports from circumventing the price-cap in they way discussed above, and
it would ensure that both the service itself, and the facility used in
producing it, would be priced close to cost. Granted the Australian approach
to access regulation, whereby the regulator only has to set a price if the
access seeker and facility owner fail to agree on a price, this should be
informationally efficient in that it does not involve the regulator setting a
large range of prices for trades that may never take place.
Some airports may not be profit maximisers. (Even the private airports are
subject to price regulation, which can lessen the incentives for cost
minimisation). If access prices are not in the cap, and there is no access
price regulation, such airports may discourage other suppliers fi'om selling
services even when they can produce at lower cost than the airport itself.
They will set high access prices to lock out alternative suppliers, and may
not contract out services when they could reduce costs by doing so. Access
price regulation will ensure that efficient competitors can gain access to the
facilities they need to offer their services. Some airports, such as Sydney,
are not privately owned, and they cannot be assumed to be profit
maximisers. These airports are subject to the general provisions on access in
the Trade Practices Act, Part IIIA. Even privately owned airports seem to
take a strongly negative view of allowing access to their facilities- the draft
access undertakings, which the private airports submitted, seemed to be
more designed to keep competitors out than to make profits out of them.
This could be because the airports believe that economies of vertical
integration are great, and that granting access, even at high prices, will
detract from their profits.
An airport's behaviour with respect to non-capped services will be more
straightforward. Where it possesses market power, it will use it. The market
power an airport possesses in these services should be relatively small in
most cases, since the price-cap is intended to cover all cases of market
power in aeronautical services. The airport could use its market power at
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both the final service and access stages. Where the airport offers access at
profit maximising prices it will be feasible for efficient suppliers to
compete, and where these have lower costs than the airport itself, it will be
in its interest to let them supply the market, but to cream off profits at the
access stage. Thus, if the airport is a profit maximiser, productive efficiency
will be guaranteed even if there is no access price regulation. There will be
some cost in terms of allocative efficiency since there will be no way in
which the competitors can put downward pressure on prices. Here, the case
for access price regulation depends on its ability to assist competition and
lead to lower prices. Were the airport is not a profit maximiser, it may not
allow efficient competitors access, and thus productive efficiency could
suffer. In such situations the case for access price regulation is stronger.
Price Bundling
It is common in Australia for airports to offer a package deal of bundled
services to users. Individual services, such as runway use, taxiway use,
apron use and some passenger facilities are not priced separately. When this
is so, it is very difficult for other firms to compete in selling these services.
Suppose a firm wished to compete in offering baggage handling at a
terminal. It could gain access to the facilities it requires, and it would be
able to offer a product at a price. However, if the airport is offering only a
package deal of all the services an airline needs from a terminal, the firm
would be unable to compete. A user would need to buy some services
directly from the airport, and baggage services would be included in the all
up price. Using the new competitor would add to its costs. Bundled pricing
makes it difficult for competitors; access price regulation would not prove
effective.
The price structure which is being implemented dates back many years,
during which the private airports were operated by government departments
and by public enterprise. In these days they did not have an imperative to
maximise profits. In general, unbundling prices helps to achieve maximum
profits, since prices for each service can be tailored to demand conditions
and improves overall efficiency (though an airport may still offer a bundle
of services for the users who prefer to buy on this basis). Thus, under
private ownership, there may be a move towards unbundling services.
However, the incentives for unbundling under price-caps are not very
strong. While price-caps are consistent with price rebalancing and
unbundling, the airport will not gain much by doing so. Every time it
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increases one price, it must lower another, to keep within the cap. Well
designed price structures will maximise profits, but the difference in profits
between a well designed and an average structure is not likely to be great.
A further difficulty is that access price regulation gives the private airport
an incentive to bundle rather than unbundle prices. If it can escape the
effects of access regulation by bundling its prices it may do so. Thus access
regulation may hold up a move towards more efficient price structures at
airports.
Access to Terminal Gates
The Australian domestic airline industry was deregulated in 1990. At the
time there were two major airlines. In 1999, there are the same two airlines,
and no independent competitors for them. In the early 1990s there were two
attempts at entry. Both failed, for a variety of reasons (See Nyathi, Hooper
and Hensher, 1993 and Trade Practices Commission, 1992). Prominent
amongst the reasons was the inability to get access to terminal facilities on
favourable terms.
Domestic terminals are leased to the two major airlines, Ansett and Qantas
for very long periods. These airlines have little incentive to provide terminal
facilities to their competitors, who will seek to compete their profits away.
They will only willingly supply facilities when they can profit by doing so-
as they might when allowing access to partner airlines which serve
complementary rather than competitive routes. At the time of deregulation,
the govemment imposed a requirement that these airlines make terminal
facilities available to new entrants. However, this requirement was very
vague and unenforceable. New entrant airlines did not always succeed in
obtaining access to terminals. In some cases they had to operate from sheds
outside the terminal, and when they did obtain gates in terminals these were
inconvenient ones. Problems in obtaining access to terminal facilities have
been a disincentive to those contemplating entry to the domestic market,
which, with only two competitors, is less competitive than it might be.
New access arrangements could contribute significantly towards resolving
this problem. Access seekers can seek for gates or terminal facilities to be
declared, and if they were, they could negotiate with the incumbent airlines.
If negotiations fail, the ACCC would arbitrate. It is likely that the ACCC,
which seeks to promote competition, would set access prices which are as
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close to (its estimate of) cost as is possible. If so, new airlines would be
obtaining terminal facilities on as close as feasible to equal terms to the
incumbents, and a significant barrier to entry would be eliminated.
It is unclear at this stage whether this scenario will come about. Airport
services have been declared for access, but precisely which services are
declared is still being resolved, and domestic passenger handling facilities
have been set aside for further consideration on a case by case basis. To be
declared, services must met two criteria, discussed in the section above.
Terminal facilities clearly meet the first criterion, of being essential for the
operation of aviation services. However there are questions surrounding
whether they are "uneconomic to duplicate'.
There are different ways in which this criterion can be interpreted. On one
interpretation, they can be said to be not uneconomic to duplicate. They are
not a natural monopoly, and in fact there are at least two domestic terminals
at most airports in Australia- both Ansett and Qantas have their own
terminals. In the past, it has been economically feasible to "duplicate" them.
Another interpretation of the criterion stresses whether it would be
economically feasible for them to be duplicated in the sense of another
airline building a new facility. If existing facilities have some excess
capacity, it may be uneconomic for additional capacity to be added. The
ACCC has indicated that it accepts the latter interpretation. Thus there is the
possibility that domestic terminals could be declared. The ACCC has
already declared international Passenger processing facilities, and these are
similar, though not identical, to domestic facilities. The ACCC has reserved
its decision and states that it will consider applications for declaration on a
case by case basis (ACCC,1998b). (Domestic airport terminals are not
affected by price caps, since they are operated by the amines, not the
airports).
The application of access regulation to terminals and passenger processing
facilities is potentially the most significant application of access regulation
in the airport context. This is because terminals are an essential input into a
much larger industry, the domestic passenger industry. This industry is of
far greater economic significance than, say, freight handling or off airport
car hire. If access regulation is applied to terminals, it could remove one of
the most serious obstacles to entry to domestic aviation. In turn, granted that
there are only two major airlines, a few additional competitors could make a
large difference to the performance of the industry.
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Access Pricing Principles
In setting access prices, the regulator will need to rely on pricing principles.
Three options are usually suggested. The regulator could
(a) set prices at marginal cost,
(b) set prices at the minimum consistent with cost recovery (average cost in
the single product case), or
(c) set prices which do not impose a loss on the incumbent (the efficient
components pricing rule (ECPR), or the Baumol Willig rule).
The first of these may seem appealing on efficiency grounds, but it will
normally be inconsistent with long run cost recovery. The purpose of access
regulation is to impose limits on pricing of facilities which cannot be
economically duplicated; effectively, involve a natural monopoly element.
Marginal cost pricing where there are economies of scale or scope yield
losses for the facility owner, and thus it poses problems for privately owned
facilities.
The lowest possible price consistent with cost recovery in the single product
case is average cost. Such a price, if regulated, will maximise the chance of
competition from new firms accessing the facility and selling in the
downstream market. It will, however, give rise to the possibility of
inefficient entry, for example if the downstream market is an oligopolistic
one.
This approach becomes more complex when the firm sells multiple outputs,
as airports do. Average cost is undefined, since total cost is spread amongst
several outputs. However, if efficiency maximisation is the criterion, a
Ramsey price structure will ensure cost recovery at minimum cost in terms
of efficiency. Ramsey prices involve a mark-up above marginal cost which
is in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand for each product. This
approach is well known in the context of final products, however it can also
be applied to access pricing (Laffont and Tirole,1996). Mark-ups are
charged for each facility such that, when additional costs of production are
added, the resultant price for the final product is the Ramsey price.
(Alternatively, the access price for the facility equals marginal cost plus the
implicit Ramsey mark-up).
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While straightforward in theory, implementing this would be difficult in
practice. Effectively it requires information about derived demand
elasticities for the facilities- such information would rarely be available.
There are many patterns of prices which would be consistent with cost
recovery, but it would be impossible to distinguish between then on
efficiency grounds. Prices should be above marginal cost, perhaps
significantly so if scale economies are large and there are many joint and
common costs. How high they should be would be difficult for the regulator
to determine. Granted this, the regulator has considerable discretion over the
access price it chooses, and when the airport is price capped, it is unlikely to
be forced into deficit, since lower prices for one service can be made up for
by higher prices elsewhere. The precise choice of access price probably
does not make a lot of difference so far as efficiency and viability are
concerned.
The third approach would be to opt for the ECPR (Baumol and Sidak,
1994). The facility owner would not lose from this price as an access price,
and it will be either equal to, or close to, the price that the owner would
negotiate itself. Its advantage is that it eliminates the possibility of
inefficient entry- only efficient entrants can compete with the owner given
the high access price. It can also be approximated by free negotiation,
obverting the need for explicit regulation. Its disadvantage is that it
preserves the market power that the facility owner possesses, and it gives
minimal scope for competition to bring prices down. It also risks the
inefficient duplication of the facility by entrants who cannot obtain cheap
access to a facility with spare capacity.
If the final product market is contestable (very unlikely in the airport case)
or effectively regulated, the ECPR access prices will equal or approximate
average cost (in the single product case) or Ramsey prices. If the form of
regulation effectively constrains revenues to be equal to costs, and
effectively constrains each price to no more than the Ramsey price, it will
result in the firm negotiating prices which are equal to the Ramsey access
prices. In this situation, it would be sufficient to allow a profit maximising
airport to negotiate its own access prices, since final product prices
constrain access prices. However, as has been noted earlier, the regulation
actually imposed on Australian airports is not as perfect as this supposes,
and there is scope for airports to circumvent the price-cap through their
access pricing strategies.
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Overall, access pricing principles give the regulator guidance, but they do
not give precise measures of the access prices which are the best feasible.
At best, the regulator will have information about marginal costs (though
see below), and the total costs to be recovered (plus, perhaps some
information about the cost structure). It must convert these into a structure
of access prices. It has considerable discretion over the level of prices for
individual facilities, and it will be difficult to determine which price is most
efficient. With efficient final product regulation it may be able to leave the
setting of prices to the airport, at least for facilities which are used in the
production of services whose prices are regulated. If it sets prices different
from the (unknown) optimum prices, the efficiency losses are likely to be
small since demand elasticities are likely to be low, and there is not too
much danger of imposing deficits on the airport, since it can rebalance its
charges.
Measuring Costs
Access pricing presupposes that the regulator has good information about
costs. This is unlikely to be so in the airport situation. Firstly, cost
information about parts of the airport system is likely to be difficult to
obtain. Secondly, marginal costs, or opportunity costs, of capital intensive
facilities are likely to vary considerably over short periods of time.
The regulator is likely to have information about the overall costs of the
airport, but for access regulation, it needs information about marginal costs
of the various facilities or services that it is attempting to regulate. It will
need to know the marginal cost of using a particular piece of land, or of
some specific terminal facilities. Even the airport itself, which has the task
of setting prices for final services, may not have good cost information
about the intermediate inputs which go into these services. There is no
market price which it can rely on. There is some risk that the regulator
could, for example, seriously underestimate the marginal cost of a service
and set an access price which imposes a loss on the airport and forces it to
subsidise its competitors.
The problem is compounded by the variability of costs. For many facilities
in airports, costs, and especially marginal costs, vary considerably over
short periods of time. Facilities have fixed capacities, and for part of the day
or hour they can be in excess supply, and the marginal cost of using them
can be quite low. At other times they can be in excess demand, and perhaps
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subject to severe congestion, and the opportunity cost of using them can be
high. Efficient pricing should take these cost variations into account, setting
low prices in the off-peak, and high prices in the peak. There can be other
sources of variation in cost which should be taken into account, such as the
location of facilities.
This variation in cost poses a major problem for a regulator, because
regulation tends to be inflexible. It is unlikely to be feasible to have
different regulated prices at different times of the day or hour. The regulator
could set access prices which are constant over time; prices which are, on
average, right. However this is not good enough, since prices which are on
average right will be too high sometimes and too low at other times. A
single price will result in the facility being overused when it is most
congested. At a time when it would most like to use its own facility, the
airport will be forced to make it available at a low price to its competitors.
In principle it might be possible to get around this problem by setting a
price cap rather than specifying each price. Thus the airport could set
different prices for a facility at different times of the day subject to the
average of these prices not exceeding the cap. For some larger facilities,
such as terminals or gates, this may be feasible, though it would require
considerable monitoring on the part of the regulator, and it would probably
require that the facility be used widely throughout the time period.
The reality of costs which are both difficult to estimate, and which vary
considerably over time, means that price regulation must be inaccurate. To
the extent that it is inaccurate, it can be inefficient.
Quality Problems
It is becoming increasingly recognised that when firms are subjected to
regulation of the price-cap form they have an incentive to downgrade the
quality of the product they are selling. Quality reductions can usually lead
to cost reductions, and as long as these do not lead to big falls in demand,
the firm can gain additional profit, since the price allowed by the regulator
remains unchanged. For this reason, price regulators such as the ACCC are
now monitoring quality of service in the industries they regulate.
The same sorts of incentives are present when access prices for facilities are
regulated. However, in this context, there is an additional incentive to
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reduce quality. This occurs because the firm that is purchasing the access is
also the firm with which the regulated firm is competing. By reducing the
quality of the service it provides, it can lessen the effectiveness of its
competitor. This could happen to the extent that access regulation is
ineffective as a means of promoting competition. The regulator can seek to
monitor quality, though in doing so it will need very detailed information
about the ways the firm operates its facilities. Most of ways in which a firm
may hobble its competitor are less than transparent, and unsuitable for
measurement according to standard indices of performance. The regulator
may be drawn into the detail of the relationships between the firms and be
unable to rely on established rules.
Assessment and Conclusions
This review has examined a number of issues which arise from applying
access regulation to airports. Overall, the objective of access regulation is to
promote competition in a range of airport services, with the potential to
increase allocative and productive efficiency. A number of problems have
been highlighted, and one can question how effective this regulation will be,
and whether it will increase efficiency. The answers to a number of
questions can be suggested.
Is Access Regulation Necessary?
If there is an efficient and effective system of regulation of final product
prices, or these products are sold in competitive markets, access regulation
of services and facilities used in producing the final products would be
superfluous. As it is, this is not the case, for several reasons:
(a) The effectiveness of price regulation of airports is limited, and there may
be ways of circumventing it,
(b) Not all airports will behave as profit maximisers, and
(c) Not all final services are price regulated- an important exception would
be domestic passenger terminal services.
Are the Potential Gains Significant?
Many airport services are, in themselves, not very significant, though it is
desirable that they be produced and priced efficiently. If simple regulation
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can improve things, at little cost, it will be desirable. Some services,
especially domestic passenger processing services, are potentially very
important, because of the impact they can have on competition in the
domestic airline industry. It has yet to be seen whether the access regime
being implemented will address this problem area. Final product regulation,
albeit imperfect, along with private ownership and profit oriented
behaviour, may be sufficient to achieve a feasibly high level of efficiency
for most airport services.
Will the Access Regime prove Effective?
Some factors will work to diminish the effectiveness of the access regime.
Current price bundling will limit its effectiveness, since competitors will not
be able to match the airport's mix of services and will not be able to sell
individual services. Furthermore, the implementation of the access regime
could have a cost in creating a disincentive for airports to reform their price
structures. Another factor which will reduce access regulation's
effectiveness is the reduction of quality. Facility owners can reduce the
quality of price regulated facilities supplied to their competitors, thus
weakening them; it would be very difficult for the regulator to control this.
Will Regulation be Implemented Efficiently?
The Australian access regulation system is quite cumbersome, however its
mix of negotiation followed by possible arbitration may result in reducing
direct and costly intervention by the regulator. For this to be so, ideally
negotiators need to know what the ACCC will do, and at what level it is
likely to set prices. Given the difficulties of choosing efficient access prices,
the ACCC's choice of prices may be unpredictable, and parties may gamble
on arbitration.
Can the ACCC set Efficient Prices?
There is a considerable risk of prices being set at inefficient levels. Given
that there are scale economies and cost recovery problems, joint and
common costs, cost variability and information about the costs of individual
services is difficult to obtain, one cannot presume that regulated prices will
be efficient. It is quite possible that efficiency is not very sensitive to the
actual precise price set, but if this is so, it would also be true that the
benefits of access price regulation would be small anyway.
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Where to from Here?
As access prices are implemented, the answers to some of the questions
raised here will become evident. It may well be that access price regulation
of services or facilities that are indirectly regulated through final product
regulation will prove superfluous (especially if the design of this regulation
is improved). Access regulation can then concentrate on making regulation
of a few services, such as domestic passenger processing services, which
can really matter, more effective and efficient. It can also be directed to
some less important services, for which efficiency gains are possible, but
which can be handled with minimal direct intervention by the regulator.
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TABLE 1
DECLARATION OF AIRPORT SERVICES
Service Necessary for Aviation
Services?
YesAirside Facilities (runways,
Taxiways etc)
International Passenger Processing
Areas (gates etc)
Domestic Passenger Processing
areas (gates etc)
Administrative Office Space
Commercial/Retail Facilities
Flight Catering Facilities
Refueling facilities
Land for Refueling services
Land for Freight services
Ground Handling and Freight
Handling Equipment Storage
Sites for Cargo Terminals
Sites for Emergency Maintenance
Sites for Heaw/Maintenance
Landside Vehicle Facilities
Waste Disposal Facilities
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Case by Case
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Uneconomic to
duplicate?
Yes
Likely to be
declared?
Yes
Yes Yes
Case by Case Case by Case
No No
No No
No No
Case by Case
Yes
Yes
Case by Case
Yes
Yes
Case by Case Case by Case
No No
No No
Yes Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Source: ACCC, 1998b, p. ix
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The Impacts of the Asian Economic Crises on Asian Airlines:
Short-run Responses and Long-run Effects
Introduction
Throughout the 1980's and 1990's, rising per capita incomes in Asia Pacific resulted in
an expansion in intra-regional trade and the emergence of a sizeable "middle income"
class with the resources to travel. As a result, the demand for air travel sustained annual
growth rates in excess of 10% and there were expectations that Asia Pacific would be the
engine of growth for the world's travel industry well into the 21" Century. The Air
Transport Action Group (1997), for example, predicted that the demand for air travel in
Asia Pacific would grow by 7.4% per annum between 1995 and 2010, twice the rate it
forecast for the rest of the world. This optimism was shared by IATA with its prediction
that over half of all passenger movements by air by the year 2014 would be associated
with travel to, from or within Asia.
In 1992-93, 8 of the world's 15 most profitable airlines were from the Asia Pacific and
their low input prices, especially for labour and "materials", gave them a competitive
advantage. The prospects for the aviation sector appeared to be excellent and confident
airlines and airports embarked on expansion plans. "Growth" was the driving force
setting the agenda for policy makers and governments allowed the private sector broader
scope to participate in aviation through privatisation and the formation of new airlines.
Nevertheless, there were some emerging problems for the airlines. Yields were falling in
highly competitive markets where capacity grew more quickly than demand and profits
were being squeezed by rising costs. Currency appreciations eroded competitive
advantage, especially for Japan, but a host of new challenges emerged early in 1997. The
predicted "bubble" in the demand for travel to Hong Kong prior to the handover did not
eventuate. Concerns about the arrival of the Peoples Liberation Army in Hong Kong and
possible changes to freedoms and liberties once under Chinese rule were beginning to
have an impact. The bird flu scare, in particular, deterred tourists and the Hong Kong
travel market began to decline from June 1997. Smog from the forest fires in Indonesia
affected tourism demand throughout South East Asia, but the main factor affecting
demand was that the Japanese market had lost its momentum.
Then came the events of the second half of 1997 that led to the currency crises and the
need for IMF assistance in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. Collectively, the Asian
economies had accumulated over US$240 billion in short-term debts. When the
Government of Thailand could no longer afford to support its currency against the attacks
of speculators it floated the Baht on 2 July 1997. The ensuing crash reverberated through
the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Confidence was undermined as the extent of
non-performing loans became clear. Within a very short period of time, capital flowed
out of the region, and Asia's wealth fell sharply.
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The IMF provided US$1 billion in assistance to Thailand on 19 July and followed this up
with another US$17.2 billion on I 1 August, but the contagion continued to spread and
there were sharp falls on stock exchanges late in October. The IMF offered US$40
billion in a bail-out package to Indonesia on 31 October and then negotiated a record
amount of assistance (US$58 billion) with South Korea on 3 December. Some major
corporations were in serious financial difficulty, governments were adopting austere
economic measures, unemployment was rising and job security was threatened. Even a
fiscal stimulus of US$128 billion introduced by the Government of Japan to its own
economy failed to satisfy financial markets and downward pressure on the Yen
continued.
With the resulting drop in consumer confidence and fall in intemational purchasing
power, Asia's travel markets slumped. In Japan, young office workers who previously
made up an important segment of the travel market now were the target of plans of
corporations to reduce their labour costs. The crisis of confidence in South Korea was
sudden and deep and airline traffic fell by as much as 80% on some routes in the month
following the IMF bail-out package. As a result some important players in the travel
sales and distribution system have gone out of business and it will take time and
resources to rebuild these systems.
The airlines were highly exposed with commitments to purchase aircraft and spares in
hard currency. The value of their debt escalated rapidly, interest rates and fuel costs
(expressed in domestic currencies) increased, and traffic fell sharply. Profit projections
for the region's carriers were written down immediately and some made losses of several
hundreds of millions of dollars (US) during 1997/98. The newer carriers that relied on
domestic and intra-Asian business have been the worst affected. Some airlines have gone
out of business or have suspended their operations. Other responses have included selling
aircraft, partly to reduce capacity and partly to finance deliveries of new aircraft. Sale-
and-leaseback deals have been common and aircraft orders are being deferred where
possible. Airlines are reallocating capacity to stronger routes connecting Asia with
Europe and North America.
The currency devaluations ultimately should help to stimulate travel demand and there
will be wirmers and losers as destinations compete for their share of a smaller market.
Also, as some airlines pull out of routes the remaining carriers have opportunities to
increase their revenue. Depending on the ability of the airlines to maintain their yields,
Asia's carriers will keep their attention firmly on reducing their costs and on re-financing
their fleets. However, the restructuring process has been and ,,vill continue to be painful
even under the most optimistic scenarios. There is speculation that some airlines will
merge in order to create one or more mega carriers in Asia and that major European and
North American carriers may become part-owners of Asian carriers.
This paper examines the impacts of the economic crises on the airlines and the responses
being pursued by management and governments. Given the trend towards liberalization,
an important question is whether the current circumstances are likely to lead to a return to
more protectionist attitudes. The temptation to shield carriers from competition are being
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balanced against the need to open up markets, to forge alliances and to attract investment.
Though we illustrate the impact of the economic crisis with examples of recent
developments, our focus is on long-term impacts of the Asian economic crises on cost
competitiveness of Asian carriers and on the regulatory environment.
Asia's airlines and the competitive environment in the early 1990's
For the present purposes, Asia's airlines can be categorised broadly into two groups. The
first set began to make its presence felt in international markets in the 1970's as wide-
bodied aircraft were reducing the costs of long-haul travel. Traffic between Japan and
North America had grown because of the USA's military presence during and after the
conflict in Korea. At the same time, growth on the Kangaroo Route from Australasia to
Europe was creating opportunities for aggressive airlines based in South East Asia
(Rimmer, 1996). Singapore Airlines and Thai Airways, for example, are located
advantageously at interchange points and are convenient and attractive stopover airports.
Furthermore, Asia's emerging airlines of the 1970's possessed a significant competitive
advantage through their low input prices (Findlay, 1985) and they were able to capture agrowing share of the market.
As the Asian economies began to prosper during the 1980's, these carriers expanded and
the network of intra-Asian airline services entered into a period of rapid development
(Rimmer, 1996). In aggregate, traffic in Asia was averaging growth of more than 10%
each year while some routes were sustaining growth rates of over 20% for several years
in succession (Air Transport Action Group, 1997). For various reasons, the established
Asian airlines were having difficulty coping with this growth and governments began to
relax their regulations to permit new, private-sector airlines to emerge (Nuutinen, 1991;
Bailey, 1993; Bowen & Leinbach, 1995). This accelerated the liberalisation of airline
competition through multiple designation and the development of new intra-Asian routes
as the new entrants pursued international ambitions (Bowen, 1997; Hooper, 1997).
In developed airline markets, the most successful entry strategy for new airlines has been
based to a large extent on cost leadership. The source of the cost advantage can come
from high productivity levels, say, through high aircraft and manpower utilisation (eg.
Southwest Airlines in the USA) or through low input prices (eg. by paying less to
employees and for "materials and services" and by operating older aircraft). The first
group of Asian airlines did enjoy a significant advantage in terms of input prices. For
example, in 1976 Pakistan, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia and Thailand all had input costs
that were less than half those for the US carriers (Brunker et. al., 1989). Though the
Asian carriers had relatively low productivity levels, their unit costs remained
competitive.
The situation was different for the emerging Asian carriers of the 1990's because they
operated new aircraft and offered high levels of service. In addition, they often had to
pay premium rates to attract staff. They did not have the scale of their established
opponents, but a more important problem was that many of the opportunities for them
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were on thin, developmental routes. In short, Asia's new international airlines were
unable to reap economies of traffic density and they lacked a strong cost advantage while
operating in highly competitive and price-sensitive markets (Oum & Taylor, 1995). In
some cases, governments believed that, by allowing new airlines to enter international
service, they would be able to cross-subsidise unprofitable domestic services (Hooper,
1997).
The common factor creating the opportunities for the new airlines was the rapid rate of
growth in the region's air traffic. Forecasting groups looked at the high economic growth
rates in Asia and believed these were sustainable for several reasons. In particular, Asia
has a large workforce that has been improving its skill levels while industries can
continue to adapt proven technologies (McDonnell Douglas, 1995). Governments had
provided necessary infrastructure and had pursued economic policies promoting exports.
Foreign investment was available, especially from North East Asia, and this was
facilitating technology transfers. Rising per capita incomes, the emergence of a large
middle class and the continuous microeconomic, institutional, social and political reform
(Bowen & Leinbach, 1995; Chin, 1997) were considered likely to stimulate continued
growth of air travel demand in the long run.
The rapid expansion in traffic provided ample opportunities for Asia's airlines to enter
new routes and add capacity, but the imperative to increase efficiency levels was
becoming stronger. Windle (1991) estimated that Asian carriers had a 21% cost
advantage over airlines from the USA in 1983. However, some of this was attributable to
factors beyond the control of management and was not a source of competitive
advantage. For example, the longer stage lengths of the Asian airlines reduced relative
costs by 10%, but the lower input price for labour was the key reason why costs were
lower in Asia.
Maintaining a competitive position based on geographic differences in input r,nces is
difficult because international airlines practice global sourcing. Also, rising GDP per
capita levels in Asia have been associated with higher labour prices. For example, wages
in South Korea in 1992 were 12.8 times higher than they were in 1975 when expressed ir
US dollar terms while the corresponding ratio in Japan was 5.3 (Forsyth, 1996). A_ the
same time, trade surpluses led to currency appreciations, especially for Japan, further
undermining cost competitiveness 1. Japan Airlines would have had an 8% higherur_it cost
than American Airlines in 1993 had the Yen maintained parity with the US dollar _ .s
1986 level (Oum and Yu, 1997). In fact, the actual level of cost disadvantage was: ._._;o.
Singapore Airlines, Korean Air, Cathay Pacific and Thai Airways were cost competinve
compared to American by factors of 16%, 23%, 4% and 9%, respectively, pr-!._,arily as a
result of lower input prices. These Asian carriers' unit cost advantages wot: :_ave been
higher had they achieved same level of efficiency as the U.S. mega carrier'.
In summary, the challenges facing Asia's airlines in the mid-1990's were ', _ance their
growth ambitions while improving productivity levels and controlling inpt. ,aces
' Cost competitiveness is defined as lower costs resulting from input prices and productive efficiency after
removing the effects of stage length and output mix.
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through global sourcing. Access to markets and membership of alliances also were key
issues and governments liberalised competition in domestic markets and gave new
airlines access to some international routes (Hooper, 1997), although the approach was
cautious and pragmatic (Bowen & Leinbach, 1995). In addition, there were pressures
from outside the region to increase the level of competition. In particular, the US
Government was turning its attention to Asia after its successful negotiation of"open
skies" air services agreements in Europe and Latin America (Jennings, 1996; Ballantyne,
1997; Chin, 1997). Subsequently, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea
all signed open skies air services agreements.
As the Asian economies need to rely more on the IMF and the U.S. in order to get their
economies back on track, it is likely that the U.S open skies effort will gain momentum.
In addition, Asian nations have considered various regional initiatives to promote more
competitive markets for air services, but generally the approach to regulatory reform has
been cautious. This has been especially the case for the exchange of filch freedom rights
with the result that the Asian airline industry remains relatively fragmented.
The impact of the economic crisis on traffic levels
Informal business networks, close relationships between financial institutions and their
borrowers were mechanisms that facilitated rapid growth in Asia, but the financial sector
became exposed to risky investments. A lack of control over lending practices and
inadequate disclosure and reporting requirements have been pin-pointed as fundamental
weaknesses of the Asian economies. When the weaknesses of the financial sector began
to emerge, currencies began to enter a free-fall. Table 1 shows that the Thai Baht fell to
almost half of its value against the US dollar in the second half of 1997, although it has
improved during 1998.
Were the price of an overseas holiday to be set in US dollars, the Thai consumer now
would have to pay 44% more in terms of Bahts. The Indonesian Rupiah became so
unstable that trade in it was suspended and the Indonesian consumer has to offer almost
4.5 times as many Rupiah now to purchase goods and services sold in US dollars
compared to one year ago. Clearly, the affordability of overseas travel outside of Asia has
.suffered.
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Table 1: Changes in exchange rates for selected Asian economies
(local currency per U.S. dollar)
Economy Currency June 97 Dec. 97 June 98 Dec.98 %devalue
China Yuan 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 0%
Hong Kong Dollar 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 0%
Indonesia Rupiah 2,600 5,450 9,800 11,000 76%
Japan Yen 114 139 146 116 2%
Malaysia Ringgit 2.5 3.9 3.9 3.8 34%
Philippines Peso 26.4 39.5 38.4 38.8 32%
Singapore Dollar 1.43 1.65 1.69 1.66 14%
South Korea Won 881 1,695 1,383 1,206 27%
Taiwan Dollar 27.8 32.2 34.5 32.2 14%
Thailand Baht 25 47 40 36 31%
To make matters worse, Asia's wealth devalued overnight through sharp falls in property
prices and share values. Table 2 illustrates the extent of this effect. A consumer in
Malaysia, South Korea or Thailand who had invested in shares in June 1997 would be
able to sell them for less than half of their previous value in June 1998. Coupled with
this, the list of business failures includes merchant banks through to steel producers. All
businesses are seeking to reduce their labour costs and consumer confidence has slumped
with the loss of job security.
Table 2: Changes in share price indexes for selected Asian economies - June 1997,
December 1997 and June 1998
Economy Share Price Index Loss in value relative
to period 6 months
before (%)
Jun 97 Dec 97 Jun 98 Dec 97 Jun 98
China - Shanghai 2,743 2.,971 3,220 -8% - 17%
China - Shenzhen 4,550 3,963 3,864 13% 15%
Hong Kong 15,,056 10,723 8,543 29% 43%
Indonesia 732 402 446 45% 39%
Japan 20,176 15,259 15,830 24% 22%
Malaysia 1,079 594 456 45% 58%
Philippines 2,816 1869 1,760 34% 38%
South Korea 758 376 298 50% 61%
Taiwan 8,997 8187 7,549 9% 16%
Thailand 569 373 267 34% 53%
Domestic demand and imports fell by more than 20% in real terms in 1998 in Indonesia,
Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand (Camdessus, 1999). The lower exchange rates
improved international competitiveness and the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand all
succeeded in selling more exports. Indonesia fared the worst overall with its GDP
declining by 15% in real terms in 1998 (IMF estimate). In the same year, the economies
of Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand contracted by 7-8%.
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Consumers in those economies that remained relatively strong, or those in countries with
fixed exchange rates, were able to afford more travel. For example, the number of
visitors to Singapore from Australia, China and India was up by 10.6%, 7.2% and 2.6%,
respectively, in the first quarter of 1998. However, the general pattern was one of decline.
The number of arrivals in Singapore from Japan was 31% lower in the first quarter of
1998 compared to the same period one year before and the total number of visitors to
Singapore declined by 20%.
In June of 1998, Airports Council International reported that the overall number of
passenger movements for all of Asia's main airports fell by 5.1% compared to the same
month in the previous year. Nevertheless, there are signs that the market might be about
to enter the recovery phase. Thai Airlines and Singapore Airlines both increased
passengers carried marginally in the first three quarters of 1998. The Association of Asia
Pacific Airlines reported that its members had a 2.3% growth in passengers for the month
of September in 1998 and that the average load factor increased from 68% to 72%.
Notably, revenue passenger kilometres increased by 4.3%, reflecting the greater
importance to the airlines of long-haul, international flights. Thailand, for example, has
succeeded in attracting more tourists from outside the region, especially Europe. It
appears, though, that yields are suffering and that the market growth is driven largely by
low prices.
Prior to the financial crises, IATA predicted that air traffic in the Asian region would
grow by 7.7% a year to 2001, but it has revised this to 4.4% per annum and 5-6% on
international routes. Boeing, in its most recent issue of Current Market Outlook, argues
that economic growth in Asia will resume and, over the next ten years, will average
between 2% and 3%. As consumer confidence returns, and as economic growth
strengthens, the prospect is that Asia will again be one of the main driving forces of air
traffic growth globally. Over the period between 1998 and 2007, Boeing predicts the
growth in revenue passenger kilometres will average 5% across all markets. However,
annual growth rates in Asia will be 8.4% for China, 6.9% for Southwest Asia and
Northeast Asia and 6.1% for Southeast Asia. Airbus is similarly optimistic that growth
will re-emerge in Asia's travel markets after a 2-3 year period.
Uncertainty about the future of Asian travel markets reflects underlying questions about
the prospects for an economic recovery. Some economists point out that the fundamental
strengths of Asia are its plentiful supply of labour with increasingly high skill levels, the
capability to leverage growth with proven technology, government policies that supported
export activity and that provided necessary infrastructure. A less optimistic view is that
there are major political and institutional barriers in Asia inhibiting further development
and that it will take time to resolve these problems (Walton, 1997).
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Airline responses to the economic crisis
The scope for action by airline managers
The economic crisis immediately placed Asia's airlines under severe financial stress.
Airlines that relied on domestic and intra-regional traffic were the most exposed, but
several carriers were making losses even before July 1997. Garuda Indonesia and Korean
Air, for example, had accumulated large operating losses. Korean's net loss for 1996/97
was US$280.7 million while Asiana Airlines recorded a loss of US$281.4 million. The
costs of servicing loans and leases mostly were in hard currencies so that the devaluations
escalated debt levels. Korean Air had more than 90% of its debt in foreign currencies and
it debt rose to US$5.5 billion, more than six times its equity. Korean Air revealed in
February 1998 that it had a "paper" loss of US$900 million as a result of the devaluation
of the Won, although subsequent strengthening of the Won improved the situation.
Philippine Airlines had embarked upon a fleet renewal and expansion programme prior to
the onset ofthe economic crisis and found itself committed to financing costs of US$29
million each month. By the middle of 1998, the airline's management had decided to
down-size, triggering a costly dispute with its pilots that led to 5,000 employees being
sacked or laid-off. In September, 1998, Philippine Airlines went into "protected
bankruptcy" after making a loss of US$157 million in the previous six months. In its
attempts to restructure its finances, PAL attracted the interests of Northwest Airlines,
Lufthansa and EVA. The most serious proposal was for Cathay Pacific to take a 40%
stake in PAL, but this floundered on the issue of control. In January 1999, PAL claimed
it would be able to attract sufficient capital to continue operating
Sempati Air, a new entrant in Indonesia, went into liquidation in June of 1998. One
month later, Merpati Nusantara suspended its services. In total, 9 airlines went out of
business across Asia (including South Asia) in the first twelve months of the economic
crisis (Bonassies 1998). Several more carriers continue to operate with large debt
burdens, but the IMF's guidelines make it difficult for governments to rescue their
airlines within the strict budgetary conditions of the bail-out packages.
Few airline managers in Asia have had to deal with falling traffic levels let alone
financial problems of this magnitude. The airlines clearly needed to restructure their
finances and rid themselves of excess capacity, but they also needed to develop broader
strategies to take them through the remainder of this deep recession. It is to these
strategies that we now turn.
Capacity decisions
One of the first actions in any industry suffering a downturn in demand is to reduce
capacity. This response is difficult in the airline business because canceling flights can
damage long-term marketing prospects while not resulting in significant savings. Much
depends on whether capacity can be allocated elsewhere on the airline's network or
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whether aircraft can be leased or sold to other airlines. In any case, labour costs are
difficult to adjust in the short-run and airlines have to be ready to resume services once
the market improves. If the service involves a congested airport, airlines also are
concerned about losing access to valuable slots.
Most airline costs cannot be avoided once the schedule is set and, since this tends to
occur twice a year, the scope for managerial action is limited for a period of up to six
months. Under "normal" circumstances, the typical response to a temporary fall in traffic
is to increase marketing expenditure and to use promotional prices more aggressively.
For example, Qantas and British Airways have offered deep discounts of up to two-thirds
off their fares to London, Frankfurt or Rome. Qantas provided an additional bonus of a
free domestic round-trip to any one of 10 Australian cities. Singapore Airlines gave its
passengers the first night's accommodation on a stopover in Singapore for US$1 and
additional nights have been priced as low as US$30.
In the current situation, though, demand has fallen by as much as 80% in some markets
and the prospects of a quick recovery are poor. The airlines have no alternative but to
reduce their services on the worst-affected routes and to pull out of some routes
completely, relying on code-share partnerships to maintain a presence. Where possible,
the capacity is being diverted to other routes, but those airlines that are most exposed to
intra-Asian routes recognised that they needed to reduce the size of their fleets.
The most immediate decision has been to cancel orders for new aircraft or to defer
deliveries. In March 1998, the airlines in Asia Pacific had orders for 179 narrow-bodied
aircraft valued at US$7.5 billion and 254 wide-bodied aircraft valued at US$33 billion.
Korean Air and Asiana alone had orders for 76 new aircraft. Taking account of the orders
placed by leasing companies that are attributable to Asia, it was estimated that the Asian
carriers were accountable for one-quarter of all orders for wide-bodied aircraft in 1998
(Williamson 1998). Close to half of all orders for B747-400 and B777 aircraft have been
made by Asia's carriers. Boeing indicated that the Asian economic crisis will have an
impact on deliveries of 150 aircraft, including 60 wide-bodied aircraft.
Those airlines in the most difficult situations have put aircraft up for sale either to reduce
capacity or to make way for deliveries of new aircraft. In many cases, the sale of older
aircraft has helped to provide the necessary finance to pay for new aircraft, while in
others the sale-and-leaseback option has been necessary to reduce debt levels. In total, 91
aircraft were sold or leased by Asia's airlines to outside Asia during 1998, but seat
capacity increased by 1.3% overall as 140 new aircraft were delivered (Air Transport
World, December 1998 issue, page 14). The prediction is that net capacity will increase
by another 1% in 1999. Even with the depressed market conditions it seems likely that
capacity growth will fall behind demand. Since load factors are already high on many
routes, this will give airlines the opportunity to improve their yield.
The Asian economic crisis and cost competitiveness of Asian carriers
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What impact does the current economic crisis have on the Asian airlines' cost
competitiveness? In order to answer this question properly, it is necessary to discuss the
factors determining cost competitiveness. Airline cost competitiveness depends on input
price levels and productive efficiency - lower input prices and/or improved efficiency
enhance cost competitiveness. Oum and Yu (1998) found that except for the Japanese
carriers, other Asian airlines have unit cost advantage relative to their North American or
European competitors mainly because of their lower input prices.
In particular, before the Asian economic crisis, Singapore Airlines and Korean Air had
unit cost advantage relative to American Airlines by about 16% and 23%, respectively,
although both of these Asian carriers have slightly lower productive efficiency than
American Airlines. Most of the Asian carriers' unit cost advantage come from the lower
labour and other purchased materials and services input prices in terms of international
currency. Thai Airways had only about a 9% unit cost advantage relative to American
Airlines although they enjoy extremely low input prices. This is because Thai Airways'
productive efficiency is very low. Cathay Pacific has lost unit cost advantage relative to
American Airlines because it no longer enjoys any input price advantage relative to those
in the U.S.
As shown in Table 1, since June 1997 Asian currencies were subject to varying degree of
devaluation. For example, between June, 1997 and December, 1998 the currencies of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Korea are devalued by 76%, 34%, 32%,
31% and 27%, respectively. The immediate effect of these currency devaluations is to
increase unit cost advantages of the Asian carriers. Although aircraft financing cost and
fuel prices are not likely to change in U.S. dollar terms, labour and purchased materials
and services prices in terms of U.S. dollar are likely to decrease due to the currency
devaluation. As stated earlier, because of the currency devaluation and the depressed
travel demands in Asia, the Asian carriers have lowered their air fares substantially in
terms of U.S. currency. In the medium to long term it is clear that currencies of these
Asian countries are likely to be revalued to their previous levels while inflationary
pressure which will follow their economic recovery will increase labour and other input
prices in those countries. This implies that, unless the carriers improve productivity, cost
competitiveness in the medium to long term for these carriers are not likely to improve
beyond the levels they enjoyed prior to the economic crisis.
However, the current economic crisis has been and will continue to force Asian airlines to
restructure their networks and operations for improved efficiency while forcing their
governments to open up markets for competition. These changes are likely to bring two
positive outcomes to the Asia's air transport industry. First, the procompetitive changes
are likely to induce Asian carriers to improve productive efficiency to the level the major
carriers in North America enjoy. Second, in the process of restructuring the industry, one
or two mega carriers may emerge in Asia. For example, Singapore Airlines may be able
to participate in the ownership of one or more major Asian carriers (Thai Airlines and/or
China Airlines).
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JAL, ANA or Cathay Pacific may use this opportunity to expand their markets into one
of multiple hub networks by acquiring equity stakes in other Asian carriers. Because of
these positive changes anticipated in the industry (and not because of their currency
devaluation), in the medium to long term the Asian economic crisis is likely to help
Asia's air transport industry. In the very short run, the sudden collapse of tourism air
travel demand in the region has harmed severely the bottom line of all Asian airlines. In
the short run, the devalued Asian currencies will prolong the period in which Asian
carriers enjoy unit cost competitiveness relative to the North American or European
carriers. Although it will take several years for getting their economies back to the pre-
crisis level, air travel demands are expected to increase very rapidly as the economic
recovery begins in earnest (see Boeing, 1998).
As Asian carriers cope with the sudden reduction of air travel demand, the average prices
(yield per passenger mile) decreased substantially even in domestic currencies. For
example, Singapore Airlines' average yield per passenger miles (in Singapore dollars)
during the six months period ending September 30, 1998 decreased by 9.1% as compared
to the same period a year ago. Cathay's average yield per passenger mile decreased by
5.9% during the six months ending June 30, 1998 as compared to the same period in the
previous year. The passenger load factors of Asian carriers were also reduced
substantially after the Asian economic crises. Obviously, the lower load factor has
significant negative effects on the productivity of Asian carriers. For example, Singapore
Airlines' labour productivity was reduced by 3.5% in the six months ending September
30, 1998 as compared to the same period a year ago.
Alliances
Alliance formation can be a tactical response or it can be part of a longer-term strategy.
Since the onset of the Asian economic crisis, there has been widespread alliance activity.
For example, when Qantas Airways ceased operation to Seoul, it turned to its code-share
partner, Asiana Airlines, to carry its passengers. As Qantas enters the Australia-
Argentina market, it intends to use its own aircraft while benefiting by making use of the
code-share agreement with Aerolineas Argentinas. This provides Qantas with an
opportunity to use its capacity while also benefiting Aerolineas Argentinas as the latter
can use the aircraft released from the Australian market to meet a growing demand for the
Argentina-Europe services.
While the economic crises in Asia have placed the carriers based in the region under
financial stress, the process of globalisation of the airline industry has taken a major step
forward. The Star Alliance built around United Airlines and Lufthansa has gained
momentum with the addition of Air Canada, Varig, Thai Airways, Air New Zealand, All
Nippon, and Ansett Airlines with a likelihood that Singapore Airlines will become a
member during 1999.
The formation of oneworld between American Airlines, British Ai_vays, Cathay Pacific,
Canadian Airlines, Iberia and Qantas in September of 1998 was presented as a brand
name for a global network. Among other measures, the partners have code share
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agreements with each other and share frequent flier plans. Cathay's dominance at the
new Chek Lap Kok Airport in Hong Kong gives that "alliance" a strong position in Asia.
Asiana code shares with Qantas to Cairns and with American to Los Angeles, New York,
San Francisco and Seattle.
A third major global group has coalesced around KLM, Northwest Airlines and
Continental Airlines and includes Malaysian Airlines. Key members of these global
groups have been active in signing up partners in Asia. Korean Air is linked to Delta Air
Lines, which in turn is allied with Air France, Austrian, Sabena and Swissair.
Some of these alliances will help the Asian carriers in the short-term, in some cases, with
injections of capital, through sharing the use of resources, by consolidating traffic and
improving utilisation of aircraft and by strengthening market positions. However, they
clearly have long-term significance. For example, Thai Airways is a member of the Star
Alliance, but Singapore Airlines' realignment with Star led to an announcement by
Lufthansa that it would shift its South East Asian focus from Bangkok to Singapore. The
subsequent decision by the Government of Thailand to privatise Thai Airways has
attracted major world airlines as potential bidders. The current wave of alliance formation
in Asia will help the region's airlines rationalise services, to consolidate traffic and to
improve their finances, but they also will play a role in deciding the competitive strength
of the major global alliances at key Asian hubs.
Service decisions
The key service decisions that managers have taken are to change frequencies, to suspend
services and to withdraw from mutes. Other dimensions of service are difficult to target
at particular routes in the short and medium term. For example, Indonesia's airlines made
an application to increase domestic fares from 11 to 16 cents (US) per seat kilometre.
When the Minister for Transport and Communications refused to grant permission,
Sempati Air immediately cancelled services on 10 domestic and 4 regional routes
(including to Taiwan). The Minister intervened to stop Merpati Nusantara, one of the
Government's airlines, taking similar actions on 80 of its routes. Instead, the Minister
agreed it could phase out routes with load factors under 30%. Garuda Indonesia then cut
its international flights by 30% and domestic flights by 26%.
Qantas Airways, Ansett International and Air New Zealand were among a number of
airlines to suspend services to South Korea early in 1998 when the number of Korean
residents travelling abroad fell sharply. Asiana Airlines ceased 15 flights on 6
international routes and Korean Air dropped 48 flights on 21 international routes.
Airlines also have been seeking opportunities to re-deploy their capacity. Singapore
Airlines and Cathay Pacific Airways both implemented plans to increase the frequency of
flights to Australia. All Nippon Airways was quick to take advantage of its improved
access to the USA market under the new air services a_eement concluded between the
USA and Japan early in 1998. After South Korea entered an open skies ageement with
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the USA, Korean Air was able to increase its frequency to San Francisco, Chicago and
Los Angeles.
Regulatory responses to the economic crisis
The airlines clearly are realigning their capacity while setting themselves up to take best
advantage of global airline groups and to pursue sustainable productivity improvements.
Nevertheless, the impacts of the economic crisis are so great there will be a temptation for
at least some governments to provide their airlines with direct financial support and to
protect them from competition. It seems likely that some of the financiers backing the
airlines in their sale-and-leaseback deals believe that, ultimately, the governments of Asia
will ensure their airlines remain solvent (Williamson, 1998). In addition, equipment
suppliers and their governments will be supportive of distressed airlines as appears
evident with the success Korean Air has had in securing a low interest loan ofUS$254
million (Mann, 1998). The Govemment of Indonesia already has given sovereign
guarantees in order for Garuda Indonesia to complete purchases of aircraft.
Governments also could step in to protect their airlines from competition, setting back the
pace of liberalisation in Asia. However, there are good reasons to believe these options
will not be favoured in general and that the pressure to liberalise will grow even stronger.
One force working in this direction is that the governments of Asia have larger problems
to solve and their ability to support airlines making large, on-going losses is limited. For
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, the International Monetary Fund has imposed
conditions on its support programmes that further constrain actions of these types. The
IMF's prescription is to open up markets, to allow foreign investment and to privatise
government business undertakings. Furthermore, airlines are eager to gain access to
stronger markets in Europe and North America, they need injections of funds, and they
want to take part in global alliances.
Table 3 documents recent regulatory responses. Though the airlines continue to suffer
financial stress, the picture that is emerging is that the governments of Asia are
accelerating regulatory reform in the direction of liberalisation. For example, South
Korea signed an open skies agreement with the USA in June, 1998. The Japan's new
liberalized agreement with the USA is restricted to incumbent airlines and is constrained
because of slot restrictions. South Korea was looking to expand access for its airlines in
the USA-Korea market, but it also valued the greater access to beyond flights to Latin
America. The USA-Korea agreement also will place pressure on Japan to proceed further
down the liberalisation path.
At the same time, the Government of Thailand decided to allow private airlines to fly on
domestic routes without limitations and to liberalise its international markets
progressively. In addition, there have been renewed attempts to privatise Thai Airways,
prompting several large international airlines to express interest in taking an equity
position. In June 1998, the Government of Thailand amended the 1954 Aviation Act to
allow for up to 49% ownership of Thai carriers by foreig-n investors. The Government of
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South Korea also lifted the restriction on foreign ownership of its airlines to 50%. Many
other countries in Asia have been active renegotiating air services agreements in order to
give their airlines flexibility to adjust their networks.
Governments in Taiwan and the Philippines have become concemed about safety
standards in the wake of the economic crises. In June 1997, a Boeing 737 operated by
China Southern Airlines crashed at Shenzhen killing 35 passengers. Sempati Air had a
crash in the next month with 30 fatalities. In August, a Korean Air B747 crashed into a
mountain-side in Guam with 228 people losing their lives and, in the next month, a
Garuda Indonesia A300 crashed at Medan during poor visibility associated with forest
fires. In that case, 234 people died, but this was followed in December by another 104
fatalities with another airline crash in Sumatra. This time it was Silk Air. February was a
difficult period with crashes involving Cebu Pacific (104 dead) and China Airlines (205
dead).
Two more airline crashes in Taiwan prompted the government of that country to
encourage its airlines to merge to improve their economic and safety position. The
situation reached the stage in the Philippines where the Government suspended Grand
Air's operating licence after repeated violations of the regulations and indicated it was
increasing its surveillance of all carriers, including Philippine Airlines. The exact causes
of some of these crashes still are not known and it would be unreasonable to attribute
them all to economic factors, but the publicity given to safety has posed further
challenges for the airlines and regulators alike.
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Table 3: Regulatory responses in Asia Pacific 1997-98
Economy Decision
China Considering raising the limit on foreign ownership of airlines
China & Malaysia
China & the
Philippines
China & Rep. Korea
Japan & Taiwan
Japan & USA
Japan
New Zealand &
Singapore
Pakistan
Rep. Korea
Rep. Korea & USA
Taiwan
Taiwan & USA
Thailand
to 40% from 35% equity and 25% voting rights in an attempt
to attract more capital
Memorandum of Understanding to allow Malaysian Airlines
and any other Malaysian carriers to operate 64 flights each
week to six cities in China and Chinese airlines can fly 64
flights a week to 3 Malaysian cities
Memorandum of Understanding to allow airlines from
Philippines to fly to Guanghzhou and Shenzhen in addition to
Beijing, Shanghai and Xiarnen. China's airlines now
permitted to fly to Manila and one other airport
Agreement for increase from 42 flights each week on 11
routes to 111 flights on 27 routes to take effect in first half of
1998
Agreement on increased airline services after 10 years of
negotiation, increasing capacity and access to Osaka for EVA
Airways.
Agrees to limited open skies agreement with USA to give
ANA greater access to USA
Continues to deregulate its domestic airline industry in the
first half of 1998. Restrictions on pricing removed and new
entrants given slots at Haneda Airport
Enter a liberal open skies agreement with no foreign
ownership restrictions and free capacity on fifth freedom
Announces a new limited open skies policy and a
restructuring of Pakistan International Airlines
5th freedom flights beyond Seoul provided they originate in or
terminate in the USA. Gives Korea's airlines access to Latin
America via the USA;
Korea increases the foreign ownership of airlines to 50%.
Open skies agreement allows airlines from the USA to change
gauge
Civil Aeronautics Administration puts pressure on airlines to
merge to achieve greater stability and improvement in safety
Open skies agreement gives greater access to USA and
beyond for China Airlines and EVA and alliances emerging
with American and Continental
Transport and Communications Minister announces new
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Thailand
policy to deregulate domestic market and to allow multiple
designation on international routes, commencing with regional
services (eg Indonesia). Restrictions on charter flights by Thai
and foreign airlines to be lit_ed.
Govemment increases foreign ownership limit in Thai by 10%
to 30°/'o and announces intention to reduce its own stake in
Thai Airways from 79.5% to 49% or lower (pressures from
nvrF)
Conclusions
The Asian economic crisis has generated a considerable amount of pessimism about the
prospects for the region's airlines. The carriers were highly exposed to currency risks and
to a slowdown in traffic growth. While the economic crisis is reducing the amount of
intra-regional traffic, the currency devaluations will stimulate more trips to Asia from
North America and Europe. By virtue of the reduced costs of employing labour and other
local inputs, the cost competitiveness of Asia's airlines has improved. The immediate
problem facing the carriers is to refinance their debt, to realign their services and to match
capacity to the weaker demand conditions. As this adjustment process continues, the
world's mega-alliances are consolidating their position so that Asia's airlines are faced
with difficult choices from a weakened position.
It seems likely that the end result will be fundamental changes in the way Asia Pacific
aviation markets operate in terms of alliances, hubs, ownership, and regulation. Given
the depth of the economic crisis in some Asian economies, a desire to protect national
airlines would be understandable. However, the longer-term challenge for the Asian
carriers is to turn the economic crisis into an opportunity to develop strategies that give
them a sustainable competitive advantage. This will come about through productivity
improvements that would be pursued most aggressively under competitive conditions. At
the same time, competitive airlines need access to markets. Attempts to protect airlines
could have negative consequences including pressure from the IMF and international
financial community
The evidence is mounting that the airlines themselves want the flexibility to adjust
capacity, to enter new routes, to enter into alliances and to attract investment from the
world's major carriers. Some governments have shown a willingness to liberalise
competition, to privatise and to relax foreign ownership restrictions. Far from being a
flight back to protection, the Asian economic crisis appears to have shifted air transport
policies of Asian governments far more in the direction of liberalisation.
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Abstract
The Asian economic crisis started in July 1997 and has since affected most
businesses in the region, including airline companies. The aim of this report is to
identify the major influences of the crisis on the financial and operating performances
of key airlines in the Asia-Pacific regions. We will cover 11 carriers in Asia-Pacific
region, together with British Airways as a benchm_k carrier for the period of 5 years
from 1994 to 1998. Five financial measures and five operating measures are used to
uncover the source of pain. We find that high exchange losses, inflated operating and
financing costs and an overall drop in traffic are the main causes for the financial
stresses experienced by several Asian carriers.
(" I want to thank Ho Hean Chan, Quek Sze Quan and Chris Tan Seng Kita for their assistance in data
collection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Asian economic crisis sparked in Thailand in July 1997 and had since spread
throughout the region. Prior to that, Asia had been enjoying high economic growths.
The crisis came as an unpleasant surprise and many were caught off-guard. Serious
currency devaluation in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine and Thailand has
greatly pushed up currency-related costs, forcing many companies to undertake cost-
saving measures. Asian airlines are no exception. Debt costs, lease costs as well as
operating costs have increased, causing serious financial problems. Due to high
operating leverage, profits for airlines are more sensitive to economic and market
conditions. In general, due to pro-cyclical nature of the airline businesses, the airline
industry will most likely experience a greater pain during economic recessions as
compared to other industries. On the other hand, during the boom times, airlines tend to
reap relatively greater rewards.
Thc nature of this study is explorative. Its main purpose is to analyse the impact of
Asia's economic crisis on major airlines in the Asia-Pacific region. Various
performance indicators will be used to highlight the nature and magnitude of impact on
different airlines. Their performances, inferred from relevant financial data and traffic
statistics, will be analyzed over a period of five years from the year 1994 to 1998.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II uses ten commonly used
comparative measures to highlight overall impact of the crisis to various carriers.
Section III uses statistical methods to analyze the impact of crisis and the relationships
among the measures. Section IV attempts to pinpoint each airline's problems relating to
the recession. The last section presents a summary with a few recommendations.
II. PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND COMPARISONS
The financial crisis may influence different carriers in different areas. In this
section, we will use 10 commonly used performance and exposure measures to find the
source of the pain. It aims to provide a broad and general descriptive view of the
economic turmoil's effect on 11 key airlines in Asia-Pacific, together with British
Airways (BA) that serves as a benchmark carrier. The choice of BA is in part due to its
reputation and strength as a market player and in part due to data availability. Table 1
summaries the inclusion of these carries.
Time-series data used in the research were collected from 1994 to 1998. Data before
1994 is excluded, as the purpose of this study is to investigate the short-term impact of
the economic crisis. The 1998 data, as of the period this research is conducted, is the
most up-to-date data available. The bulk of the operation statistics is taken from the
Digest of Statistics series published by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Data in the annual reports of airline companies, whenever possible, are used to
cross-examine the data or fulfil the missing records. For the same purpose, relevant
reports and databases published by various investment organisations, such as Moody's
As Garuda Indonesia and Philippine Airlines, t_vo key carriers in ASEAN, are not listed companies,
relevant data are limited. Bearing this limitation m mind. they will be covered, whenever enough
information is available, only in the later part of this report
and Goldman Sachs, are also used. All data are standardised in order to achieve a
uniform basis for comparison.
Table 1: Carriers Selected in This Study
Carrier Economy Year-end
Air New Zealand (ANZ) New Zealand June 30
British Airways (BA)
Cathay Pacific (CX)
China Airlines (CAL)
Garuda Indonesia (Garuda)
Japan Airlines (JAL)
Korean Aidines (KAL)
Malaysian Airlines (MAS)
Qantas Airways (QAN)
Philippine Airlines (PAL)
Singapore Airlines (SIA)
That Airways Int'l (THAI)
UK March 31
Hong Kong December 31
Taiwan December 31
Indonesia N/A
Japan March 31
Korea December 31
Malaysia March 31
Australia June 30
Philippine N/A
Singapore March 31
Thailand 30 September
When monetary figures need to be converted into US dollars, we will use the US
dollar interbank exchange rates as at the respective balance sheet dates. Since not all
airlines disclose the rates employed in translating foreign currency, the interbank
exchange rates will act as surrogates to facilitate comparison. These exchange rates,
consistent with the year-end month of the carrier in each economy, are summarized in
Table 2.
Table 2: Historical USD Interbank Rates
Currency Month 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Australian Dollar Jun 0.729500 0.703000 0.787000 0.746700 0.615500
British Pound Mar 1.483400 1.614100 1.525400 1.638600 1.676500
Hong Kong Dollar Dec 0.129200 0.129300 0.129300 0.129100 0.129100
Japanese Yen Jun 0.009728 0.011330 0.009308 0.008076 0.007519
Korean Won Dec 0.001268 0.001289 0.001183 0.000619 0.000837
Malaysian Ringgit Mar 0.373500 0.394400 0.394400 0.403400 0.273200
NewZealand Dollar Jun 0.594800 0.667900 0.684400 0.677900 0.514500
Singapore Dollar Mar 0.637100 0.705000 0.709500 0.691900 0.619600
Taiwan Dollar Dec 0.038090 0.036650 0.036360 0.030660 0.030990
THAI Baht Sep 0.040030 0.039900 0.039340 0.027700 0.025410
FINANCIAL MEASURES
1. PROFIT BEFORE TAX. The profit before tax (PBT) margin is profit before tax
expressed as a percentage of total revenue. It is commonly used to measure the
profitability of a business organisation. By comparing the margin over the years, we
will be able to assess how well the company is doing. For instance, the margin might
have increased while the revenue and profit decreased in dollar terms. This would
indicate that the airline was managed more efficiently. Conversely, if the margin was
on a downward trend, it would indicate that costs are rising faster than revenue, and the
causes should be looked into.
Table 3: PBT Margin (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ANZ 7.66 9.91 8.46 5.87 4.20
BA 4.24 4.56 7.54 7.66 6.71
CAL* 0.62 2.71 3.68 6.17 3.46
CX* 10.95 11.66 11.94 7.74 6.40
JAL* -3.45 -1.43 -0.59 -1.22 -1.56
KAL* 0.68 4.29 -6.21 -9.26 2.02
MAS 0.40 1.49 4.39 5.40 -3.20
QAN 3.63 4.47 5.28 5.16 5.88
SIA 13.97 14.61 15.70 14.90 15.17
THAI* 6.15 6.31 6.26 -35.27 -20.76
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
From Table 3, it is evident that SIA has seen constantly outperforming the rest. JAL
has been making before-tax losses since 1994. THAI seems to have taken a hard blow
from the crisis - it took a deep plunge in its 1997 fiscal year even though it had stable
PBT margins prior to 1997. KAL, too, has suffered losses since 1996 but is expected to
recover in 1998. MAS has been improving over the years but may fall into the red at the
end of its 1998 fiscal year. The other airlines are experiencing a falling margin from
1996 onwards, except for the improving CAL before it dipped in 1998. The main
factors for the weakening PBT are the depressing airfares and the substantial reduction
in air travel demand, a typical symptom of economic recessions.
2. EBITDA MARGIN. EBITDA refers to earnings before interest charges, tax,
depreciation and amortization expenses. The margin is obtained by dividing EBITDA
with total revenue, which are summarized in Table 4. This measure eliminates two
major non-cash expenses - depreciation and amortization. Firstly, the treatment of
depreciation and amortization is subjective due to different accounting policies adopted
by the airlines. For example, JAL recently switched its depreciation life assumptions
from a declining balance basis to a straight-line basis. Secondly, interest expenses
include charges to be paid in US dollars and are vulnerable to exchange rate risk, which
varies from country to country. Therefore, the absence of these expenses will result in a
better comparison of each airline's operating performance.
From Table 4, it is evident that BA does not seem to do well in this area compared
to the rest. THAI's margin has been in declining since 1994. Both CX and ANZ are
generally moving downwards while the margins of other airlines have been fluctuating
with biggest movers being THAI and MAS. On average, SIA has been leading the pack
with the catching-up efforts by KAL and MAS. QAN, like SIA, has been experiencing
stable margins from 1994 to 1998. JAL is consistently below the rest with margins
between 5% and 9%.
On average, the EBITDA margin has been turned downward since 1996, a sign of
depressing profitability for Asia-Pacific carriers during the current economic recession.
Table 4: EBITDA Margin (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ANZ 15.0 15.7 13.5 11.3 9.7
BA 13.9 15.0 15.3 12.6 12.2
CAL* 18.2 13.9 10.7 11.0 13.8
CX* 22.6 20.2 21.0 17.0 17.1
JAL* 5.8 5.8 8.9 7.9 6.3
KAL* 20.8 21.7 19.0 24.6 20.1
MAS 17.2 22.8 27.7 25.6 20.4
QAN 12.9 12.1 12.2 12.5 13.7
SIA 25.9 27.0 27.4 24.9 26.7
THAI* 28.6 25.3 25.1 18.7 14.7
Average 18.1 18.0 18.1 16.6 15.5
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
3. RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE). The return on equity (ROE) measures the rate of
return on shareholders' investment, which is the net profit for the year divided by the
total shareholders' equity (Table 5). It measures how well the resources are managed to
generate profits; it is a critical measure of a company's overall success. The ROE trends
to mirror the trends of the PBT margin.
Table 5: ROE (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ANZ 16.5 21.0 16.8 9.8 7.9
BA 15.8 20.0 19.0 18.5 15.0
CAL* 0.3 4.0 5.0 5.9 5.0
CX* 15.5 17.5 12.9 7.8 6.3
JAL -12.4 -5.2 -3.4 -5.9 -34.0
KAL* 5.9 14.1 -22.6 -54.0 9.0
MAS 0.2 3.9 6.0 7.2 -6.1
QAN 9.2 7.9 10.1 9.5 10.3
SIA 9.7 10.2 10.5 9.8 9.1
THAI* 9.1 10.0 11.2 -13.4 NA
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
It is evident that all airlines except MAS experienced the pressure in 1997, while
the impact on MAS was finally felt in 1998. Among the individual carriers, BA tops the
others in this area with the highest average ROE from 1994 to 1998. JAL, on the other
hand, has consistently been in the negative zone and has fallen sharply in 1998 to -
34.0%. SIA and QAN are comparable with each other averaging around the same
percentage point. CX and ANZ peaked in 1995 but has been gradually weakening since
then.
The most prominent trend in Table 5 belongs to KAL. Its performance improved
slightly in 1995 but dropped drastically in 1996 followed by a much deeper plunge in
1997. However, it is expected to recover in 1998. THAI's performance in this area took
a sudden turn in 1997. By 1998, it is reported that it has a negative equity. In fact, the
reported impact in Table 5 on KAL, MAS and THAI provides clear evidence of serious
impact of the financial crisis on these carriers as their home economies has gone
through large contractions since 1997. As Japan was also in recession during 1998, JAL
had obviously felt the deep pain too.
4. NET DEBT/EQUITY RATIO. Net debt is the sum of loans, finance leases, hire
purchases arrangements plus convertible capital bonds net of short-term loans,
overdrafts and net cash. Equity refers to the value of total shareholder funds. Net debt is
expressed as a percentage of total equity to arrive at the above measures in Table 6 that
provide information on each company's leverage.
Table 6: Net D/E Ratio (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ANZ ° 72.4 81.5 49.8 65.6 62.9
BA 69.4 63.9 59.8 57.0 58.1
CAL* 60.0 68.5 91.3 105.0 192.1
CX 47.1 47.1 23.0 34.0 61.0
JAL* 376.5 420.3 450.1 490.1 696.9
KAL° 529.0 452.3 467.2 905.4 941.9
MAS* 181.4 198.3 184.9 156.3 231.2
QAN* 291.6 289.9 225.2 170.0 160.7
SIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
THAI 241.6 270.6 292.8 7994.0 -875.4
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
(") This figure was a result of the ratio of net debt to negative equity.
SIA has a very favorable debt structure that is fully supported by its cash reserve.
On the other hand, as the domestic currency is weakening, it is expected that the
financial leverage will substantially undermine Asian airlines' ability to service their
US dollar debts. THAI, in particular, experienced a drastic increase in its leverage in
1997 and 1998. In 1997, THAI's value of equity dropped significantly as a result of the
decrease in asset value together with the increase in liabilities. This is mainly attributed
to currency devaluation. At the same time, its net debt increased and all these factors
caused its ratio's jump to 7994.0%. In 1998, THAI's liabilities are expected to exceed
its assets and this will give rise to a peculiar situation where its equity value falls below
zero. Consequently, its Net D/E Ratio becomes negative, a clear sign of financial stress.
Japanese and Korean carriers have very high ratios due to high debt financing activities;
while BA, CX and ANZ, on the other hand, have much healthier ratios.
5. FOREIGN EXCHANGE GAIN OR LOSS. Foreign exchange gain or loss arises from the
translation of foreign currency loans, and the translation of monetary assets and
liabilities denominated in foreign currency. It is directly related to the strength of the
local currency against other currencies. We expressed the foreign exchange gain (or
loss) as a percentage of the total operating revenue for each airline in order to
understand the related financial burden posed on them. By converting the absolute
monetary figures into percentages, we will have a more meaningful comparison.
For the years 1994 to 1995, it is evident that most of the carriers have minimal
foreign exchange exposures. The percentage gain or loss was around zero percent, with
the main exceptions of CX (negative) and KAL (positive). In fact, except CX, KAL and
MAS, other airlines have rather stable performances in the area of foreign exchange.
It is interesting to notice that ANZ and QAN virtually have no foreign exchange
gains or losses for the years concerned, which should indicate both airlines have been
very successful in managing their exposures to foreign exchange risk, even in the face
of the present economic turbulence. CX, even though improving in this aspect, has been
a consistent under-performer and its poor performance has only bettered KAL and
MAS, especially in the midst of the currency crisis. Both carriers raked in huge foreign
exchange losses as a result of the recession. It was expected that THAI would suffer a
big foreign exchange loss in 1998. The damage of the currency crisis to K.AL, MAS
and THAI is evident.
Table 7: Foreign Exchange Gain Margin (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ANZ ° 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00
BA
CAL
CX
JAL
KAL*
MAS
QAN
SIA
THAi
-0.18 -0.71 0.64 0.73 -0.21
0.25 -0.44 -0.15 0.00 0.00
-3.53 -1.61 -1.51 -1.47 -0.03
-0.46 -0.29 0.31 0.21 -0.03
1.37 2.22 -3.06 -10.92 1.04
0.39 0.61 -0.23 0.15 -10.19
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19 1.05
0.01 -0.15 -0.86 -1.33 NA
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
OPERATING MEASURES
1. OVERALLLOAD FACTOR. The overall load factor takes into account two
components - passenger and cargo. It is the ratio of revenue tonne-kilometers (R.TK) to
available tonne-kilometers (ATK) and a key indicator of capacity utilization. An
airline's load factor is usually affected by many elements including competition, fares,
seasonal variations, economic conditions and the effectiveness of marketing programs.
Table 8: Overall Load Factor (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 ' 1997 1998 Mean
ANZ 68.1 65.3 65.4 67.7 67.5 66.8
BA 66.5 68.2 70.7 70.3 69.2 69.0
CAL* 77.9 78.0 80.2 81.1 83.5 80.1
CX* 69.0 69.5 72.6 69.5 68.3 69.8
JAL* 64.9 65.9 65.6 67.0 67.5 66.2
KAL* 69.7 71.7 72.8 72.3 66.7 70.6
MAS 63.9 63.9 62.3 60.3 60.6 62.2
QAN 63.3 65.9 64.3 64.6 63.2 64.3
SIA 69.5 69.8 69.4 70.5 69.1 69.7
THAI* 69.2 68.7 68.1 69.0 67.0 68.4
Average 68.2 68.7 69.1 69.2 68.3
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
According to Table 8, the overall load factor of each carrier is rather similar to one
another except for CAL, which has registered a much superior performance over the
others through the years 1994 to 1998.
The direct effects of the recession on the carriers' overall load factors seem not
clearly observable from the Table 8. In fact, there seems to have no observable trend
that could indicate any adverse effects that could result from the recession. In fact, the
individual overall load factors of the carriers seem to fluctuate around an average,
suggesting that the airlines' performances in this area appears to be "normal".
But the fact the average load factor was declined by almost one percentage point
from 1997 to 1998 gives some evident of an adverse impact of the crisis. In particular,
MAS experienced a dip of 2 percentage points in 1997; KAL and THAI had a drop of
5.5 percentage points and 2 percentage points in 1998, respectively. It is hard to ignore
the negative impact of the crisis.
2. BREAK-EVEN LOAD FACTOR. The break-even load factor is the theoretical load
factor when operating revenue equals operating expenses, implying that all the
operating expenses are covered by revenue and no profits or losses are made. In order
to reap profits and operate successfully in the long run, airlines have to operate at load
factors higher than their respective break-even levels. A low break-even load factor
would be preferred, as it would be relatively easier to achieve high profit margins.
Table 9: Break-even Load Factor (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Mean
ANZ* 72.8 67.8 69.7 74.3 78.8 72.7
BA 61.4 61.5 62.9 63.6 64.4 62.8
CAL* 76.1 77.0 77.8 78.4 81.2 78.1
CX* 58.5 59.8 63.1 66.1 64.8 62.5
JAL* 72.5 74.1 71.7 74.1 75.1 73.5
KAL* 67.1 68.6 76.8 69.6 69.4 70.3
MAS* 69.1 65.7 61.8 61.6 67.9 65.2
QAN* 67.0 68.9 67.5 68.7 68.4 68.1
SIA 65.5 62.5 62.6 65.9 65.2 64.3
THAI* 62.5 61.9 62.2 63.0 64.3 62.8
Average 67.3 66.8 67.6 68.5 70.0
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
Looking at Table 9, we can see that CAL has the highest break-even load factor, at
78.1%, while CX registers the lowest, at 62.8%, followed by BA and THAI at 62.8%.
Even though different cost structures could be the primary reason for this obvious
difference, but the fact that the average break-even load factor has been increasing since
1995 should indicate that not enough effort has been put in place to control the
operating expenses, even during current economic crisis. With the overall load factor
being declining and the break-even load factor being increasing, it does not portrait the
promising picture for the industry. It is hoped that we will see a declining trend across
the board in 1999 since many Asian carriers, CX and KAL in particular, have made
serious effort to rationalize their operations. Without the reversal of this upward trend,
Asian carriers would have missed a golden opportunity to enhance their
competitiveness during the current crisis.
3. YIELD. Yield is one of the most commonly used measures in the airline industry. It
is the ratio of the total operating revenue and the revenue tonne-kilometres (RTK),
taking into account of both passenger and cargo operations (Table 10). It measures the
amount of revenue earned from passengers and freight per kilometre flown. Yield is
usually expressed in cents per RTK, but in our case, it will be expressed in US dollars
per RTK for easier comparison.
Table 10: Overall Yield US_(_
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Mean
ANZ 0.69 0.76 0.71 0.65 0.51 0.66
BA 0.78 0.85 0.81 0.87 0.86 0.83
CAL* 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.41
CX* 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56
JAL 1.02 1.13 0.92 0.80 0.73 0.92
KAL* 0.48 0.50 0.44 0.26 0.35 0.41
MAS 0.61 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.43 0.58
QAN* 0.67 0.66 0.75 0.67 0.54 0.66
SIA 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.47
THAI* 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.45 0.44 0.56
Average 0.64 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.51
(*) Forecast figure for 1998
Yields of European airlines, represented here by BA, are the highest in the world
without considering the Japanese carriers. Not surprisingly, BA is seen performing well
above the average, only overshadowed by JAL, which has been deteriorating since
1995. Japanese airlines have been traditionally enjoying one of the highest yields in the
world due to its protected market and the strength of its currency. It is evident that a
gradual decrease of the yields seems to be the trend in the industry, especially from
1996 to 1998 indicating that the Asia economic crisis has seriously affected the overall
yields of carriers in the region.
In particular, THAI and KAL's yields dropped sharply in 1997, which was in part
due to the increased competition in a weak demand market for air transport but also as a
result of the drastic currency depreciation. MAS's worst yield came in 1998 when the
effects of the Asian crisis were finally felt in Malaysia.
4. STAFF COST MARGIN. Staff cost margin is the staff expenses expressed as a
percentage of the total operating expenses. Staff costs constitute a major portion of total
operating costs and therefore justify our attention, since the recession is very likely toaffect the costs.
According to Table 11, QAN, BA and CX have the highest margins among all
airlines in the study, with means of 29.82%, 28.54% and 27.56% respectively, which is
due to relatively higher labour costs. We can also see that KAL has the lowest average
margin of 10.09% in the period from 1994 to 1998. The closest comparison is THAI
with a mean of 18.70%. The main reason for KAL's low average margin is attributed to
relatively lower labour input costs. All other airlines, including THAI, are quite close
and fall into a narrow range 18.70% to 21.75%. We expected the staff cost margins of
JAL to be higher due to high labour input costs in Japan, but it turned out otherwise.
Except for JAL and SIA, the margins for all other carriers dipped in 1998. This, in part,
should be due to the regional crisis that has caused airlines to downsize in order to cut
costs and remain competitive. Another reason could be the fact that total operating
expenses are expected to rise faster than staff costs in 1998 for all Asian airlines. In
particular, SIA and THAI have been experiencing rising trends recently while others are
on the decreasing trend.
Table 11: Staff Cost Margin (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Mean
ANZ* 21.25 20.48 20.66 20.41 18.07 20.17
BA 28.59 28.94 29.25 28.77 27.17 28.54
CAL NA NA NA NA NA NA
CX* 27.19 27.31 27.37 28.92 26.99 27.56
JAL* 22.39 22.66 22.12 20.64 20.93 21.75
KAL* 10.67 11.39 10.34 9.36 8.69 10.09
MAS* 20.85 21.33 21.30 19.92 19.12 20.50
QAN* 30.23 30.79 30.29 29.45 28.34 29.82
SIA 17.73 19.29 17.60 18.60 18.90 18.42
THAI* 17.24 18.60 18.91 19.98 18.77 18.70
Average 21.79 22.31 21.98 21.78 20.78
(*) Forecast figurefor1998.
From Tables 9 and 11, we may say that the staff costs, which, on average, have
been decreasing since 1995, are not the main reason leading to the upward trend of
break-even load factor. Airlines need to pay attention to other components of the
operating costs to revert the problem.
5. FUEL COST MARGIN. Fuel costs, together with staff costs, are major cost items for
airline companies. Fuel cost margin, calculated similarly to the staff cost margin, is
expressed as a percentage of total operating expenses.
Table 12: Fuel Cost Mar0in (%)
Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Mean
ANZ* 11.74 11.43 11.64 12.97 12.22 12.00
BA 10.86 9.48 9.31 10.78 9.71 10.03
CAL NA NA NA NA NA NA
CX* 14.07 14.37 15.81 16.77 17.08 15.62
JAL* 11.50 11.11 11.09 12.91 12.92 11.91
KAL* 15.03 14.89 17.01" 19.26 19.47 17.13
MAS° 15.52 14.30 15.14 18.13 18.12 16.24
QAN* 11.32 10.59 11.10 12.25 11.85 11.42
SIA 18.28 16.44 14.80 17.10 17.10 16.74
THAI* 11.92 11.45 12.90 14.49 15.45 13.24
Average 13.36 12.67 13.20 14.96 14.88
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
According to Bonnassies (1998), many Asian airlines had stocked a considerable
amount of fuel. This could in part explain the expected drop in fuel cost margins in
1998, as fuel expenses remain relatively stable while operating costs increase.
Furthermore, the Asian economic crisis has depressed oil prices down to levels below
pre-Gulf War levels. Even though many Asian carriers are expected to purchase more
fuel in 1998 when their reserve fuels are mostly depleted, the depressed oil prices
would still most probably keep the margin low. CX would benefit much from the low
jet fuel prices due to the HK$/US$ peg.
On average, KA.L has the highest fuel cost margin, BA has the lowest. The margin
movements also tend to move in the same direction for all the above airlines each year.
The rise and fall of international jet fuel prices play an important role in this aspect,
which dictates the broad trend of change in fuel cost margin across the industry..
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III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We now move on some formal analysis by using the data
previous section. In summary, we have the following measures:
Financial Measures _ Measures
summarized in the
PBT Margin (PBT)
EBITDA Margin (EBITDA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Net D/E Ratio (NDE_Ratio)
Overall Load Factor (OLF)
Break-even Load Factor (BE_LF)
Yield (YIELD)
StaffCost Margin (Staff)
Fore_ Fuel Cost M_
Note: The symbol in the bracket is the variable name to be used for the discussionsin this section.
From the discussions in the last section, there are some evidences, even though non-
statistically, to indicate that
• The economic crisis will adversely affect all five of the financial measures;
• The crisis seems to have a serious "pushing-up" effect on the Break-even Load
Factor and a sizable downward pressure on the overall Yield;
• The crisis has a mild negative impact on the Overall Load Factor, while no
visible impact on staffand fuel cost margins (at least not yet).
These observations are useful when we attempt to further pinpoint the impact of the
crisis, which is the focus of this section.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Due to the diversity among the airlines, the variability for each measure is
intrinsically dominated by the difference maong the airlines. In order to properly
measure the variability over the years, we must "filter out" heterogeneity effect of
carriers. With this in mind, we can apply the standard two-way ANOVA, where we
treat carriers as the blocking effect. This leads to the results summarized in Table 13.
From Table 13, we can make the following observations:
• The financial measures are truly dominated by the airline effect. And relatively
speaking, the time effect, in part capturing the impact of the crisis, has bigger
impact on EBITDA than on any other financial measures.
• Both the airline effect and the time effect do not have significant impact on the
Net D/E Ratio and the Foreign Exchange Gain/Loss.
• For the operating measures, both the airline effect and the time effect will make
a significant impact with an only exception of the Overall Load Factor (a non-
significant time effect).
Table 13: Two-Way ANOVA Results
Variable P-value for F-Test
ll
Airline Effect Time Effect
PBT 0.000 0.314
EBITDA 0.000 0.143
ROE 0.001 0.209
NDE_Ratio 0.151 0.379
FX 0.764 0.768
OLF 0.000 0.479
BE_LF 0.000 0.040
YIELD 0.000 0.000
STAFF 0.000 0.004
FUEL 0.000 0.000
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
As all measures used are comparable across the carriers, for each of the measures,
we will pool all the observations together to create a single variable. This is equivalent
to crash a small panel data into a single variable without the time dimension. The main
reason for this pooling of a panel data is to further analyze any relationships among
these variables. 2 We start with a simple correlation analysis by generating the
correlation coefficient matrix (Table 14).
Table 14: Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Performance Measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 PBT 1 0.254 0.635 0.300 0.053-0.185 0.084 0.233-0.056
2 EBITDA 0.254 1 0.111 -0.174 -0.031 -0.595 -0.503 -0.412 0.592
3ROE 0.635 0.111 1 0.55;-0.060-0.383 0.193 0.427-0.3454FX 0.300-0.174 0.557 0.045 0.038 0.289 0.166-0.375
50LF 0.053-0.031-0.060 0.0451 1 0.446-0.436 -0.252 0.128]
6 BE_LF -0.185 -0.595 -0.383 0.038 i 0.446 1 -0.130 -0.292 -0.062 t
7YIELD 0.084-0.503 0.193 0.2891-0.436 -0.130 1 0.521-0.794j
8STAFF 0.233-0.412 0.427 0.166l-0.252 -0.292 0.521 1-0.5759 FUEL -0.056 0.592 -0.345 -0.375! 0.128 -0.062 -0.794 -0.575
Note: Numbers in bold and italicarc significantat I% and numbers in bold arc
significanta 5%. Some variablesha',;cmissingvalues.(n= 50)
From the above table, we can make the following observations:
• Among the remaining four financial measures, EBITDA does not significantly
correlate with another other three. The highest correlation among any two of
them is between PBT and ROE.
• PBT does not significantly correlate any of the five operating measures, which
is a bit of surprising.
• It is equally surprising to see that the OLF is not significantly correlated with
any of the four financial measures.
EBITDA is highly correlated with four of the five operating measures (the
exception is OLF).
After a preliminary check-up, we found that the Net D/E Ratio is very unstable in sense that it is very
skewed to the right, we decided to drop this variable in the rest of our discussion in this section. This
does not umply that this variable is not trnponant. It simply says that we are encountered with a
serious measurement problem.
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Among the operating measures, the highest correlation belongs to FUEL and
YIELD, which is at -0.794.
It seems to be counter-intuitive to see a positive correlation between Staff Cost
Margin and ROE, between Staff Cost Margin and YIELD, and between FuelCost Margin and EBITDA.
CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
In this part, we will investigate possible causal relationship among the variables. In
particular, when analyzing the financial measures, we will treat PBT, EBITDA and
ROE as dependent variables and all operating measures plus the Foreign Exchange
Gain/Loss (FX) as the explanatory (independent) variables.
1. DETERMINANTS OF PBT. We ftrst look into the role of the operating measures on
profit before tax ('PBT). Multiple regression model is used and led to the followingestimated equation:
PBT = -20.654 + 1.219FX + 0.386OLF- 0.294BE LF + 0.655Yield
(2-238) 3 (0.896) (-1.04_ (0.056)
+ 0.401Staff+ 0.762Fuel
(0.423) (0.996)
(R.2 = 0.229, Adjusted R 2 = 0.104)
The model is insignificant. Only FX has a very limited role in explaining PBT. And
none of the operating measures is significant, indicating that the operating measures do
not explain PBT very well. This implies that PBT may not be a good performance
measure if the primary focus is to analyze the impact of operating measures, as the ones
used in this study.
2. DETERMINANTS OF EBITDA. To avoid over-fitting, we have used a stepwise
procedure for variable selection and generated the following model:
EBITDA = 101.945- 0.973BE_LF- 12.963Yield- 0.499Staff
(-11.078) (-4.82) (-6.071)
(R 2 = 0.865, Adjusted R 2 = 0.854, DW = 1.6844)
The negative impacts of Break-even Load Factor and Staff Cost Margin on
EBITDA are expected. But it is puzzling to also see a negative role of Yield on
EBITDA. This counter-intuitive result is mainly caused by the conversion of the yield
on local currency into US dollar, which is subject to currency fluctuation. In the midst
of the current crisis, majority of Asian currencies have been depreciated substantially
(Table 2), while changes in EBITDA were in a much lesser extend.
The number m the bracket is the corresponding t-test statistic for the variable.
DW is the Durbin-Waston statistic, which is to test serial correlation of the residuals. With n -- 50, the
acceptance range for a two-sided D\V test is as follows: 1.54 < DW < 2.62 for two independent
variables; 1.59 < DW < 2.66 for three independent variables; 1.64 < DW < 2.70 for four independent
variables. For more detail, refer to Studenmund (1997, p.346).
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3. DETERMINANTS OF ROE. Using similar procedure as for EBITDA, we have the
following regression model that highlights its relationship with the operating measures
and the foreign exchange gain/loss:
ROE = 113.65 + 2.933FX - 1.392BE LF - 0.957Fuel
(4.29) (-4.421) (-1.6445 )
(R 2 = 0.555, Adjusted R2 = 0.522, DW = 2.185)
The estimated relationship between ROE and independent variables is intuitively
correct. From the discussions in the last section, we know that on average, carriers incur
losses in foreign exchange. The above relationship tells us that better management of
the foreign exchange risk will significantly improve the return on equity. As for the
break-even load factor, it will adversely affect ROE during the current crisis, as the
break-even load factor has been in an upward trend in recent years.
4. DETERlVlINANTS OF YIELD. As the last part of the casual analysis, we want to how
the basic operating measures affect the overall yield. This leads to the following
equation:
YIELD = 1.902 - 0.0089OLF - 0.0487Fuel
(-1.6446) (-8.455)
(R-" = 0.653, Adjusted R2 = 0.636, DW = 2.012)
The above relationship is plausible even though the Overall Load Factor is insignificant
at 5%. It is evident that the Fuel Cost Margin has a major role in affecting the overall
yield. 7
IV. PROBLEMS RECONCILED
After looking through various performance measures in Section III and quantitative
analysis in the previous section, we now turn to specific financial troubles faced by the
airlines as a result of the economic crisis. It is well known that the airline industry is
extremely sensitive to the economic environment due to the high operating leverage.
The extent to which a country's economy performs largely affects the carrier's overall
performance. In this section, we look into three main areas that have been largely
influenced by the financial crisis, namely (a) foreign exchange losses due to transaction
exposure; (b) inflated operating and financing costs; and (c) decrease in demand for air
travel. We will include Garuda Indonesia and Philippine Airlines (PAL) in our
discussions in this section.
5 Thep-value for variable FUEL in this equation is 10.8%, indicating that it is insignificant at 5%. We
included this variable to improve the model fit and to generate an acceptable DW statistic.
The p-value for variable OLF in this equation is 10.5%; so it is insignificant at 5%. We included this
variable to improve the model fit and to generate a better DW statistic.
7 On the other hand, we should be cautious when we interpret this relationship as the overall yield has
been convened to US Dollar, which is subject to exchange rate fluctuations.
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FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES
Transactional exposures arise out of changes in the value of foreign currencies
underlying outstanding contracts. The prevailing exchange rates will determine the
actual amount (in home currency) that has to be paid when the unsettled contracts are
due, resulting in exchange gains and losses. Examples include aircraft purchase
instalments that are usually denominated in US dollars, and obligations to repay a
Japanese yen debt.
There are several airlines in our study which have incurred relatively large foreign
exchange losses due to the weakening of their respective domestic currencies. These
airlines include THAI, PAL, MAS, KAL and Garuda. According to our findings in
Section III, 8 THAI is so far the most severely affected airline. Since July 1997, the
value of baht has declined by approximately 33%. THAI's foreign exchange loss
almost doubled in the 1997 fiscal year compared to the 1996 fiscal year. This was the
largest increase among all the expense items. In addition, its net debt to equity ratio
reached a staggering 7,994% in 1997 after translating all debts into THAI baht. It is
safe to say that the foreign exchange loss contributed largely to the increase in THAI's
overall expenses, resulting in a plunge in its 1997 PBT margin (Table 3) to a negative
35.27%. Previous year's PBT margin was a positive 6.26%.
PAL has been burdened by huge debts, which totalled around US$2.0 billion owing
to over 9,000 creditors and suppliers. The main contributing factor is PAL's ambitious
fleet expansion and modernisation plan in recent years, resulting serious financial
obligations adversely affected by the untimely economic crisis which has weakened the
Philippine peso by around 30% against the US dollar since mid 1997.
In the midst of the crisis, MAS has a relatively higher foreign exchange loss
margins among other airlines in the study. Before the monetary board intervened in an
attempt to stabilise the economy in September 1997, the Malaysian ringgit has already
depreciated approximately 34% against the US dollar. This severe devaluation of the
ringgit dealt a significant blow to the financial standing of MAS, which has a
comparably high average net debt to equity ratio (Table 6). Higher leverage would
imply higher transaction exposure risk. In 1998, the carrier's foreign exchange loss
margin was negative 10.19%, compared to a gain margin of 0.15% the previous fiscal
year (Table 7). Effective debt repayments in ringgit have increased by a large margin,
resulting in the increase in foreign exchange loss.
At the end of KAL's 1997 fiscal year, the Korean won fell by about 48% against the
US dollar. Its 1997 PBT margin fell deeper into the negative zone while its foreign
exchange loss margin increased from negative 3.06% to negative 10.92%. Its financial
reports revealed an increase in total operating expenses over the same period.
Therefore, the increase in foreign exchange loss margin could not have been caused by
a decrease in operating costs. Rather, the increase in foreign exchange losses was a
result of currency devaluation.
Comparatively, the Indonesian rupiah fell the most against the US dollar. In 1998,
the rupiah averaged around 80% weaker than the average rates existing before the
crisis. In this respect, Garuda has been reported to be in critical condition. Garuda's
foreign debt amounted to nearly US$300 million, of which S100 million was already
The findings exclude Garuda and PAL.
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due.Accordingto IndonisianMinister for StateEnterprises,major restructuringis
neededfor the airline, otherwise"Garuda planeswhich fly overseaswill be
confiscated".It is evidentthatthebasisfor theconfiscationis attributableto thenon-
repaymentof debts.
INFLATED OPERATING AND FINANCING COSTS
Operating costs include aircraft lease payments and fuel costs, which are two of the
major cost components for airline companies. Financing costs include debt interest
payments, on which we would focus our attention since many airlines have heavy debt
burdens. All the Asia-Pacific airlines included in this study, with the exception of
Cathay Pacific 9, are experiencing rising operating costs, mainly as a result of weakened
home currencies. From Table 9, it is clear that the average break-even load factor has
been increasing in recent years, signifying increasing costs. Debt-ridden airlines are
faced with high debt costs, in addition to rising operating costs. Rising operating and
financing costs have significantly affected the carriers like THAI, MAS, KAL, PAL
and Garuda.
Based on Table 3 (PBT Margin) and Table 4 (EBITDA Margin), we observe that in
1997, KAL's PBT decreased despite an increase in EBITDA. This would signify a
significant increase in interest as well as amortization expense. Depreciation expense
has decreased due to a revision in KAL's accounting policy I°. Tax expense is out of the
picture for both indicators (PBT and EBITDA). Therefore, interest and amortization
expenses must have increased. A further inquiry into K.AL's financial statements
revealed a 40% increase in the item "Interest and guarantee charges". Nothing was said
regarding "guarantee charges" in the financial report. With relevance to interest charges
however, we do see a large increase in debts (after all foreign debts are translated into
Korean won). Consequently, interest charges have increased substantially. From Table
12, it shows that KAL's fuel cost margin has increased from 17.01% in 1996 to 19.26%
in 1997. The increase is significant because fuel costs have risen at a faster rate relative
to total operating costs. In addition, the airline's fuel costs increased by about 17.3% in
1997 while its seat capacity rose by only 8.4%.
DECREASE IN DEMAND FOR AIR TRAVEL
The third factor that has been largely affected by currency devaluation, and the
subsequent economic recession, is the drastic decrease of demand in air services,
mainly passenger demand. The weakening home currencies have made travelling for
locals more expensive, thereby adversely affecting outbound traffic. We would expect
inbound traffic to increase, as Asian countries have become cheaper destinations.
However, reports in traffic statistics have indicated a general fall in inbound traffic too.
Reasons cited include the 1997 haze from burning forests in Indonesia, and political
and social unrest in the region. The already declining Japanese economy has also
9 Operating costs of CX did increase, but it was due mainly to increased flights and not to currency
devaluation.
J0The useful life of aircraft was increased from 10 years to 13 years, resulting therefore m a decrease in
depreciation expense of W197,000 million for the period. The salvage value of aircraft, property and
equipment are depreciated for a change, causing an increase in depreciation expense of W4,653
rrullion. The net effect is a fall in depreciation expense of W192,347 million.
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affectedintra-Asiatravel,addingto thedeclinein air travelbecauseJapanhasbeenthe
main origin marketin Asia-Pacific.The net effect is over-capacity during recession,
which is experienced in different severity by all of the Asian airlines in this study.
The overall yield (Table 10) has been falling since 1995, in part due to a prolonged
economic downturn in Japan. The falling yield is further compounded by weaker
currency and steeper price discounts during the current recession. Overall load factor
(Table 8) had also dipped in 1998, reflecting the problem of over-capacity amidst
falling traffic.
While other airlines are hit with falling demand due largely to currency devaluation,
CX's decline in demand is notably because of their now relatively strong Hong Kong
dollar that is pegged to the US dollar. CX's fares became more expensive to Asian
travellers and this lowered overall demand for CX even with aggressive discounting.
This, in turn, adversely affected the carrier's earnings; the impact is greater on the
carrier's revenue rather than on its costs, as opposed to the situation faced by otherAsian carriers.
OTHER ISSUES
The Japanese airlines have high inherent costs which resulted in relative weaker
cost-competitiveness. Before the crisis, this situation was compensated by high yields
as Japanese carriers have the highest average yields among the airlines studied.
However during the crisis, overall yields fell while costs of these airlines, which were
already high, increased further. This added to the erosion of profits, and for the case of
JAL, added to further losses. Deregulation and the new US bilateral, too, will likely
cause the yields to decline further, leaving JAL in the midst of increased competition
and high unit costs. Although its widely spread network provides exposure to the strong
European and U.S. markets, JAL remains leveraged to Japanese outbound market
trends. A prolonged recession in Japan has certainly depressed the domestic demand,
thus causing further downward pressure on its performance.
So far, Taiwan seems to one of few economies that are least affected in the region
by the Asian crisis. The New Taiwan' dollar devalued only slightly when compared to
many other Asian currencies. In this respect, CAL is relatively better off than most
other carriers. But a poor safety record in recent years (two air crashes - one in Nagoya
(1994) and one in Taipei (1998)) has seriously tarnished the carrier's image. Its
recovery would take considerable time to materialize. On top of this, CAL has to coupe
with increased competition from the new entrants such as EVA Air.
In Indonesia, the social unrest and political uncertainty crushed the investors'
confidence in the country and certainly affected air traffic. In 1998, passenger load
factors reached as low as 43%. Inbound flights had experienced near zero load factors
due to unrest. Another worrying issue is one concerning the millennium bug. Garuda is
presently the only airline in the region which is not Y2K compliant.
The misfortune of a temporary closure of PAL in September 1998 was a result of a
strike staged by the pilots' union in protest of the enforcement of a contractual term that
allows the airline's management to "retire pilots with 20 years experience or 20,000
flight hours". The system-wide strike paralysed operations and amassed losses; it
worsened PAL's condition in midst of the crisis. After talks broke down between the
management and the union, operations were ceased to mitigate losses and "preserve
assets". Although PAL resumed operations in October 1998, its financial viability is
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still hangingon thebalance.It is still lookingforawhiteknightto bail thecompanyout
of thediresituation.
At thispointof time,therecessionseemstobebottomingoutandAsian economies
are on the way to recover. Many of the Asia-Pacific airlines still have a considerable
way to go before their financial problems are resolved. Suitable strategies are needed to
aid the carriers ride out the economic downturn.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Asia's economic boom came to an abrupt end in the middle of 1997. All airlines in
the region have been adversely affected in one way or the other. The main source of
financial trouble in this period of economic downtum, as experienced by most airlines
in out study, is currency devaluation. This in turn created heavy financial burdens in 3
main areas: (a) foreign exchange losses due to transaction exposure, (b) inflated
operating and financing costs, and (c) decrease in demand for air travel. Airlines which
have suffered huge exchange losses include THAI, PAL, KAL, MAS and Garuda. This
group of airlines is suffering from high operating and financing costs, in particular, in
aircraft lease payments, debt interest payments and the erosion of the benefits that could
have been enjoyed if not for unfavourable exchange rates. All Asia-Pacific airlines in
our study are also affected by falling air traffic. Outbound traffic decreased as expected
while inbound traffic took a surprising decline. The reasons for the latter are the
regional haze, and social and political unrest. Another major factor to the overall
decline in air traffic is attributable to the deterioration of Japan as an origin market in
the Asia-Pacific region.
There are other issues that compounded the effects of the recession on the airlines.
Some of these were already existing before the downturn - several airlines were already
in financial trouble before the crisis started. The crisis worsened their situation and
made the need to resolve the prevailing problems more pressing. Japan's prolonged
recession has directly affected the performance of JAL. CAL has a poor reputation for
safety while Garuda was plagued with institutional burdens and the millennium bug.
PAL was in the middle of an ambitious fleet expansion and modernisation plan when
the recession struck. To make things worse, its operations were severely affected by a
system-wide strike, which eventually led to the temporary cessation of operations.
We have found that the Foreign Exchange Gain or Loss has a significant role in
influencing an airline's performance. Therefore proper hedging of foreign exchange
rate risk through the use of financial instruments is a good way to reduce exposure in
this area, especially when the economy takes a downturn. QAN has demonstrated that it
could still reap profits despite having a high average net debt to equity ratio. Although
the Australian dollar depreciated against the US dollar, and that US debts make up the
majority of QAN's large debts, QAN did not seem to suffer a heavy financial blow in
this aspect. Airlines should pay more attentions on risk management, especially during
aggressive fleet modernization and capacity expansion.
There should be an appropriate balance be_veen acquiring and leasing aircraft,
which should be integral part of risk management strategy for any carrier. Aggressive
capacity expansion through acquisition would considerably strain an airline's bottom
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lineduringaneconomicdownturn.Aircraftleasesdoincreasecostsin shortrun;butthe
benefitsof beingableto bettercontrolits capacityusuallyover-weighthepenaltyof
terminatingleases.The sale-and-lease-back strategy is also a good mechanism to
survive the financial storms. But this option may not be feasible for carriers with ageingfleet, like Thai Airways.
For debt-ridden carriers, it could consider convening its debts into equity/shares by
implementing major restructuring plans and cost-cutting measures. But such an exercise
is usually a tough sale to creditors. Furthermore, institutional constraints, such as,
foreign ownership, may make such as rescue plan infeasible for trouble carriers.
It is clear that the full impact of the crisis still has not been fully reflected at this
point of time. A similar research could be conducted at a time when Asia's economy
has recovered so that a better picture of how the airlines are affected by the crisis could
be obtained. In addition, since the scope of this study is limited to 11 key carriers in
Asia Pacific, a future study may be needed to have a much broader coverage of carriers
in the region.
Additional research is still needed in the area of airline financial management,
especially concrete risk management models. New capacity planning models must
weigh in the financial risks of the aircraft ownership.
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Abstract This paper presents an integrated picture of the reform and development of China's
air transportation industry in recent twenty years. According to the difference of its
characteristics, we divide the period into three states. In the first stage, the civil aviation
sector was separated from control of army so as to bring some business aspects to it. The
operating power of air transportation began to be separated from administrative bureau in the
second stage. Six trunk air carriers as well as more than a dozen of small airlines were
established to seek profit on the rapid growing market. In the third stage, the enterprises in
the industry were given more operating power and regulation of the market was somewhat
loose. Meanwhile, the growth of demand for air transportation slows down, and air carriers
compete intensely. Faced with the tendency of deregulation and globalization of the industry
in the world, China's government begins to transfer its policy implication from pro-
competition to consolidation. A wave of merger and acquisition in the industry of China is
coming.
18II 1/98 The Reform and Performance of Air Transportation Industry of China . 2
I. INTRODUCTION
As China moves from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, many sectors have
witnessed, for the last 19 years, either policy liberalization or a shift in decision-making power
from central to local government. By 1993 China's economy had become essentially a market
economy in the sense that some two-thirds or more of" national output was produced by
profit-seeking economic units. Although rural reforms turned out to be very successful, the
industrial reform proved to be much more difficult. Industry is the largest sector of the Chinese
economy, accounting for 50 percent of total output and 80 percent of exports, and employing
more than 100 million workers in 1992.
The core of China's industrial reform has been the reform of thousands of large- and medium-
size state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Most of the existing literature on the SOE reform is based
on cross-section studies of many industries. In a comprehensive survey of Chinese enterprise
reform, however, Jefferson and Rawski (1994, p. 50) pointed out: "The problem is complex: the
population of state-owned enterprises is large and diverse; the reforms are partial and uneven;
they consist of measures that permit (rather than mandate) new course of action; and outcomes
are ambiguous. A full analysis must penetrate to the enterprise level and transcend the evidence
available from anecdotes, small samples, and fragile statistical aggregates." This suggests an
industry-case-study approach.
This article describes the process of regulatory and enterprise reform in the Chinese airline
industry and its impact on the industry's performance. China's transport sector is one of the
largest sectors of the Chinese economy while aviation has been the fastest growing mode since
the early 1980s. Table 1 shows the composition of n°n'urban transport activities (passenger
kilometers) in recent years. The average annual growth rate of civil aviation in China was
20.7% during the 1980-94 period - 4.3 times the world average, while the average annual
growth rate of all modes of transportation was 9.9% in the same period. Air transport has also
become more important in intercity transport: its proportion of passenger kilometres of all
modes has increased from 1.7% in 1980 to 6.4% in 1994. In 1994 China ranked 8th in the
world in terms of total air passenger-kilometers performed, compared with its 33th place in
1980, while its domestic passenger-kilometers ranked 4th, just behind the U.S., Russia and
Japan.
TABLE 1: Modal Split in Non-Urban Transport in China (Billion passenger-kms)
Modes 1980 Ratio (%) 1985 1990 1996 Ratio (%) Annual Growth 1980-96
Rail 138.3 60.6 241.6 261.3 332.5 36.4 5.6
Road 73.0 32.0 172.5 262.1 490.9 53.7 12.7
Water 12.9 5.7 17.9 16.5 16.1 1.8 1.4
Air 4.0 1.7 I 1.7 23.0 74.8 8.2 20.2
Total 228.1 100.0 443.6 562.9 914.3 100.0 9.1
Sources: Transport (I 997).
This tremendous gro_,,'til is due to both the reform of the industra and the rapid national
economic expansion. \Ve divide the process of the reform into three stages The first stage
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started the early 80's when China's economic reform began and the central government
transfered its attention to economic development, and ended in 1987, when the civil aviation
reforming programme issued. In the period of preliminary reform, CAAC separated from the
army and some basic operating power gave to regional administrative bureaus, which stimulated
a tremendous growth of 25.8% per year during the stage. The second stage went through the
process of building six trunk airlines, from the establishment of China Southwestern Airlines in
the end of 1987 to the departure of both the China Southern Airlines and the Baiyun
International Airport (in Guangzhou city) from the Guangzhou civil aviation bureau in the end
of 1991. In this period, the CAAC monopoly was broken. Six commercial-orianted, trunk
airlines bagen to be built and many other new air carriers invested by local governments and
large enterprises also entered to seek big profit in the rapid growing market. The industry
formed a situation of oligopoly in which six trunk airlines share 75-80% of the market while the
other air carriers of more than a dozen fight for the rest. The third stage began in 1993, when
more operating power was released to the enterprises in aviation sector. The tremendous growth
of air transportation (say, more than 25% of annual growth) seems to cease in this period. Load
factor decreases and some inefficient air carriers loss money, airlines are competing intensly in
the imperfect regulated inviroment. China's airline industry offers an interesting and prominent
example of profound changes in a state industry caused by a historic reform experiment. Taken
together, these two observations suggest that an examination of this industry may be particularly
useful to study China's SOE reform and to further draw implications for the general process of
completing transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.
Our second objective in this article is to better understand the development of China's air
transport and its aviation policy. The airline industry is currently undergoing major structural
changes throughout the world. There is a world wide tendency to deregulate/liberalize the
airline industry and promote competition in both domestic and international markets. _
Globalization of the industry seems increasingly likely; experts predict that a small number (5-
10) of global carrier networks are to be formed within the next decade. The rapid growth of
China's economy, size of its population, and geopolitical importance of its location in Asia, all,
point that China will likely play a key role in shaping the pattern of airline nerworks in Asia and
the linkage with other continents. Despite its importance little has been written on theChinese
airline industry'. This article is a step towards filling that void.
The article is organized as follows. Section II contains a brief description of the history of
China's air transportation. Section II]-V describes three stages of regulatoD, and enterprise
reforms in the air transport sector respetively. The analysis goes with the mathodology of
industrial organization, focusing on the impact of change of government's regulation and
poIicies to enterprises" behaviors and market performance. Section VJ contains concluding
remarks
II. HISTORY (194%1980)
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China's airline industry was founded during the early 1950s when the country was established
and needed airlines as a national instrument to carry out its policy for government
administration, trade and tourism. Prior to 1980, the industry was a semi-military organization
with the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) as a department of army (firstly the
Air Force, then the Military Commission) for most of the years. The "chain of commend"
within CA.AC was a four-level administration system: CAAC, six regional civil aviation
bureaus, twenty-three provincial civil aviation bureaus, and seventy-eight civil aviation stations,
CAAC combined control of flight operations, airport management and administration of the
industry (such as traffic rights and other regulations) under the umbrella of a single operation.
The lower-level operation units could not make important operational decisions and were not
independent economic entities responsible for their own profits and losses. The industry was
regulated in every aspect of air services provision including market entry, route entry,
frequency, aircraft buying and leasing, pricing and even passenger eligibility for air travel and
was, therefore, a CA.AC monopoly.
Prior to the reform, China's air transportation industry suffered its unsatisfactory performances
of the traditional central planned system. First, the airline industry had been bearing persistent
financial losses. From 1953 to 1978, the industry had witnessed fourteen years of financial
losses even after taking account the central government's subsidy to the industry. Of the
fourteen years, the 1968-74 period produced seven consecutive years of losses totaling 360
million yuan (Shen, 1992).
Second, demand for air services was severely suppressed under the old system and as a result,
the development of the airline industry was stagnant. The air share of domestic intercity traffic
volume remained largely constant at about I percent over th£ 1950-80 period. The volume of air
transportation in whole country in 1975 waz only 1,538 million RPKs, less than 1% compared
that of top three airlines in the United States in 1997. The main task of air transportation was for
government administration: most passenger travel by air was for administrative affairs for
various levels of governments and large state-owned enterprises rather than doing business.
The lack of commercial demand made the airline market rather small. Moreover, the military
management of airlines and airports created no competition in the market and resulted in
inefficient and low quality services, further stifling demand. In fact, it took 24 3'ears (after
1950) for CAAC to reach the highest traffic level in the Chinese aviation history (Wang. 1989).
III. PRELIMINARY REFORM (1980-87)
The reform of airline industry in China was started from the end of 70's, which was mainly due
to the China's economic reform. The central government began to focus its attention on
economic development and expected to rebuild its economic structure and regulator3, system
through economic reform, transferring a centralized planning economy to a relatively
decentralized market economy gradually. As a result, the National Income in China has
increased 2.5 times during 80"s. with an average annual growth rate of 8.6°,L compared with
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that of 5.8% in 70's and 4.0% in 60% (CSSB, 1992).This strongly stimulated the demand for air
transportation and requested the reform of the industry.
On the eve of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee in October 1978, Mr. Deng
Xiaoping stated that civil aviation should follow a similar direction as a modern enterprise.
Since 1980, The administrative structure was reformed first in 1980 and then again in 1982
which effectively separated civil aviation from the army. This offered the industry the
opportunity to bring back business aspects. At the beginning of 1981 the central government
adopted the policy of 'self-responsible for losses and extra-profit retention' towards the airline
sector. The policy was further simplified to a one-nine division of airline revenue between the
state and CAAC. Within CAAC, six regional civil aviation bureaus were given the
responsibility of managing their own revenues and costs in 1979. The practice was further
extended to twenty-three provincial civil aviation bureaus a year later. Furthermore, CA.AC in
1982 extended the profit-retention system to six regional civil aviation bureaus and gave them
more autonomy in making operational decisions.
In spite of the fact that key decisions power were still left in central government, these
preliminary reform made the industry expand from 1.8 billion passenger-kms in 1977 to 18.2
billion passenger kms in 1987, with average annual growth reaching 25.8*/, (compared to that
of 8.5% from 1949-77). The labor productivity increased twice from 1980 to 1984 (Wang,
1989).
Moreover, it had no opportunity to improve its competitive ability in practice, as CAAC still
held most decision power for management of air aviation and there was no room to form the
competitive mechanism.
IV. REFORM OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAUS AND
ENTERPRISES IN CIVIL AVIATION (1987-92)
Reforming program
Though departing from the army, the airline industry could not meet the demands of China's
rapid economic expansion in the traditional strictly centralized administration. Meanwhile,
central government could not afford the immense investment on developing the !ndust_.
According to the principles of departure business from administration, reduction of
administrative levels, simplification of governmental functions and decentralization, a
comprehensive reforming program, "Report on Civil Aviation Reform Measures and
Implementation" issued by the State Council in January 1987. The main goal of this reform
program is to separate the regulator from also being the operator and to break the CA.AC
monopoly. The major ideas in the program included : (I) simplifying the traditional four-level
administration system to a two-level system: the national administration and the local bureaus.
(2) establishing six state-owned trunk airlines (Eastern China, North China, South China, North-
eastern. South-western and North-western) were to establish their own airlines which graduallly
would be accountable for their o_vn revenues and costs under the "complete responsibility
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system'. (3) separating airports operations from airway administration and making them become
independent businesses to serve for all the airlines. (4) easing the market entry of the industry.
(Wang, 1989):
Building of trunk airlines
The new program was implemented initially within the Chengdu and Shanghai regional civil
aviation bureaus, respectively. As a result, China Southwestern Airlines, based in Chengdu,
was established in December 1987. In the following June, China Eastern Airlines, based in
Shanghai, was established. With the success of the Chengdu and Shanghai "test-run," the other
four airlines were established, though the process lasted for five years: Air China (based in
Beijing) in late 1988, China Northwestern Airlines (based in Xi'an) and China Northern
Airlines (based in Shenyang) in 1989, and China Southern Airlines (based in Guangzhou) in
1992. These air carriers are profit-seeking units and are directly responsible for air services
provision. Each decides its flight frequency and sales outlets, selects inputs (e.g., crew
members, flight attendants and their employment and compensation contracts), proposes aircraft
purchase and route entry, and makes other operational decisions.
With the establishment of these independent, commercially-oriented airlines, the main task of
CA.AC is of regulation and coordination, such as issuing airline license, approving route entry
and exit, pricing, designing strategic plans for the industry, issuing policies and regulations to
maintain safety and to improve competition and efficiency, and negotiating bilateral air services
agreements with foreign countries. CAAC was expected no longer the operator of air
transportation, and the new role allows it to focus on designing efficient mechanisms to fulfill
its regulatory function in adjusting and regulating the market. Similarly, the main mandate of
regional civil aviation bureaus is administrative, such as coordinating air traffic control and
regional airport development. However, in fact, CAAC still kept the power in appointing and
removing chief managers in those trunk airlines and indirectly influenced their operation.
Market entry
With the easing entry of the market, many new air carriers was built and sought profit in air
transportation. There were 41 airlines established in China, of which 28 provided both
passenger and cargo services in the early of 90'5. Besides those trunk airlines under CA.AC,
second t-ype of those carriers was funded by local government - Shanghai Airlines, Xiamen
Airlines and Sichuan Airlines are the largest and most profitable among them. The third type of
them was jointly owned by CAAC, local government or large corporations e.g. Zhejiang
Airlines which was owned by China Eastern Airlines and the Government of Zhejiang
Province.
As for route entD,, CAAC simplified its approval procedure and in general encouraged air
carriers to open nex_ routes. Here airlines, in consultation with airports, proposes their new
routing plans and CAAC holds meetino_.s exery 3'ear to coordinate route entry among airlines.
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AlthoughCA.AC'sapprovalisrequiredforrouteentry,mostoftheairlines'requestseemedto
getapprovedwithoutmuch trouble.
Unexpectedtremendousdemand
The growth of air transportation was so dramatic that not only foreign experts but also China's
government officials and experts could not expect it. In 1985, the Research Center for
Development of the State Council, an economic brain mast of the central government, proposed
its estimates for the capacity of the China's air transportation till the year 2000 (DRCSC, 1988):
The total tonne-kilometers performed, the passenger-kilometers performed and the passengers
carried in air transportation in China in 2000 will reach 5-5.5 billions, 45-50 billions and 30-35
millions respectively, with an average annual growth rate of 13.1-13.6%, 12.9-13.5% and 1i.5-
12.3% during the last fifteen years ofthis century.
However, the actual figure exceeded the estimate by far. The China State Statistical Bureau
(1992) reported that the actual average annual growth rate of air transportation during the 80's
was nearly 20%, mainly due to the rapid economic development and the deregulation in the
airline industry.
Therefore, when 'the Ten-Year Program and the Eighth Five-Year Plan of Development for
Civil Aviation' was designed in 1990, almost all the important indicators were lifted from the
original estimation presented five years ago (CCTA, 1992). The total volume of traffic and the
passenger traffic in air transportation in 1995 were planned to reach 4.4 billion tonne-kms and
30 million passengers, with an average annual growth of 12.0% and 12.6% respectively. The
figure for 2000 was estimated as 6.5 billion torme-kms and 45 million passengers.
The revised estimate for 2000 is more than 20 percent over the original one in !985. However,
it can still be considered conservative, f_'cing the roaring increase during the early 90's. The
growth rate of air transportation reached 30 percent in 1991 and 1992. The total volume of
traffic reached 4.26 billion tonne-kilometers in 1992, almost catching up the estimate for 1995.
Meanwhile, the load factor in the whole industry in that year was raised to 78.4, in which
domestic load factor being 86.9, implying that much potential demand of around I0 million
passengers failed to be served.
Market concentration
Figure 1 Distribution of Market Share in RPKs in 1991
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The roaring expansion on demand made the average profit was not accompanied with the
market concentration decrease.
There often happens somewhat dramatic thing in history. When the government worried about
that the capacity of air transportation can't match the growing demand and all the China's
airlines were eager to order more aircraft, the peak of'the growth of air transportation appears to
have gone.
V. REFORM OF ENTERPRISES AND MARKET (1992 till now)
The airline industry has developed very fast since the end of" 70's and is becoming a critical
transportation mode in national economic growth. It has changed from the sector which
government needs to subsidize to the one with large profit ( the average profit rate in the
industry was 30% in 1990). However, there were still some problems worried with the
government. The first thing is that the air carrie_, especially the trunk airlines under the CAAC
had not enough operating power to become independent economic entities, their lower labor
productivity and poor service quality made them cripple in competition with foreign airlines in
the international market. Survey shows that on the most international routes served both by
domestic and foreign air carriers, the former usually share only one third of the market with
lower price and higher cost.
The second is that, after annual _ox_¢h rate of more than 25% in 80's and early 90's, the roaring
growth of air transportation seems to have ceased since 1993. Some inefficient airlines were
faced with high costs, excess capacity and low load factors, leading to heavy losses. In fact, the
average load factor in the industry dropped down from 78% in 1992 to 69% in 1994, and the
load factors on some routes even reduced to 20%.
The third thing is that the structure of investment in 80's did not meet the demand, too much on
aircraft and less on airport and other infrastructure. All the problems should be solved through
pushing the reform for_vard.
5.1 Change of Regulation :_nd Pt_licv
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Releasing more power to airlines
-9
By the end of 1992, the State Council had authorized the formation of 55 corporate groups that
would form a vanguard of the next phase of China's economic development. These groups were
given increased freedoms including special rights to manage their finances through a corporate
holding structure that held interests subsidiary companies. The top three airlines, Air China,
China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines, al] of which shared the market around
60%, were among them. This offered the top three airlines a key opportunity to diversify its
interests and to obtain more operating freedom. For example, in the China Eastern Air Group
(CEAG), the China Eastern Airlines (CEA) accounts for half of the seats on the Group Board
(including that of Chairman). The remainder of the Group is made up of 16 subsidiaries
operating in real estate, imports and exports, advertising, hotels and tourism, air catering, and
the China Eastern Air Group Finance Co. - a non-banking financial organization approved by
the headquarters of the Bank of China. CEA controls the majority of the voting stock in most ofthese companies.
After the formation of corporate groups, the three airlines were awarded the following s_cial
rights: (l) to buy or lease aircraft and other transport equipment (after consultation with
CAAC); (2) to borrow money from domestic or international markets as an independent legal
entity; (3) to appoint managers to most of the key posts ( with the exception of the presidents
and vice presidents of CEAG and its major subsidiaries); (4) to set pricing levels in accordance
to market demand conditions, subject to maintaining a 'base price' on average; (5) to approve
overseas postings for its staff (a discretion normally restricted to senior adminis_-ative levels
such as provincial governments).
Opening domestic market
In 1994, the CAAC announced to allow foreign investors to make joint venture on airport in
China (less than 50% of capital share) and to make joint venture or buy stock of China's airlines
(no more than 35% of capital share and 25% of voting stock). The first case of the joint venture
in the industry is Hainan Airlines, into which American Aviation injected some US$25 millions
to acquire its 23% of stock in 1995. China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines issued
their stock in Hong Kong Stock Exchange in the following year. The government prefer more
foreign investment on airport and other infrastructure, but the pace to open domestic market of
air transportation seems not fast.
Meanwhile, CAAC raised entry barrier by forbidding new entry and re-examining the
qualification of existing air carriers in 1993. This implies the CAAC begin to change its policy,
from pro-competitive policy to consolidation policy.
Investment mechanism and structure change
hi order to encourage local governments to invest on airport and other infrastructure. CA.AC
speeds up the decentralization of" airport administration. As an experiment to the efficiency of
decentralization, CAAC transferred the administrative power of the airport in Xiamen Cit_, to
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the Xiamen municipal government in 1988, including all the fixed and working capital of the
airport and personnel. This stimulated local government to invest on airport. During 1986-92,
46 airports in the country were built, upgraded or expanded, in which 31 were invested totally
or mainly from local governments. For the total investment of 4.4 billion yuan for 46 airports'
construction, local government shared 3 billions yuan.
In 1993, the Hongqiao Airport in Shanghai, the third largest airport in China, followed the suit.
Other airports were decentralized gradually over the next several years while new airports were
managed by local governments from inauguration. Shanghai municipal government, for
example, is encouraged to build another airport so as to meet the growing demand. A new
airport located in Pudong region is under construction. Its designed capacity is 60 million
passengers and its first runway will be in operation in the end of 1999, the local government
affords the 10.7 billion yuan (US$1.3 billion) for the project of first period.
Besides that, CAAC established the Fund of Infrastructure Construction for Civil Aviation in
1993. Domestic airlines should pay the with 10% of domestic revenue and 4-6% of international
revenue. Meanwhile, the corporate' income tax rate was reduced. The structure of source of
investment on infrastructure has been changed (see Table 2) and the sum of firm's own capital
and the input from the fund has increased and shared nearly half in the investment on
infrastructure. This new mechanism stimulates the investment on infrastructure to grow as an
annual rate of 53% during 1992-96 (see Table 7).
Table 2 Distribution of Sources of Investment on Infrastructure of Air Transport (million yuan)
1992 % 1993 % 1994 % ! 996 %
Gov. Capital 32 3.09 132 5.66 32 0.92 269 4.16
Loan from Fund. 266 25.71 272 11.66 261 ' 7.50 329 5.08
Loan from Bank 389 37.60 910 39.03 1334 38.40 2067 31.90
Firms'Capital 220 21.29 355 15.23 691 19.90 1565 24.14
Fund of Construction 0 0 470 20.16 782 22.51 1330 20.52
Charge on Airports 25 2.38 73 . 3.11 174 5.01 720 I 1.I I
Bond 103 9.93 N.A. N.A.
Foreign Loan N.A. 50 2.14 200 5.76 200 3.09
Others N.A. 70 3.00 N.A. N.A.
Total 1035 100.00 2331 I00.00 3474 100.00 6480 100.00
Data sources: Transport (1993-97)
5.2 Market Concentration
The breakup of CAAC into independent airlines and the entry of new carriers have si_ificantly
changed market structure. Before 1987 (the second-stage airline reform), the industry was a
CAAC monopoly. Now the Chinese airline industry may be characterized as an "oligopoly."
The market participants include ten CA.AC carriers (carriers under CA.AC) and more than a
dozen non-CA.AC carriers. Table 3 shows passenger traffic (including both domestic and
international traffic) performed by the Chinese airlines from 1992 to 1996. As can be seen, the
six CAA.C trunk airlines controlled the majoriD' of the market share. In 1992 the top three
airlines, namel._. Air China. China Southern and China Eastern. together had a 66% of the total
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revenue passengers performed while the other three trunk airlines had 21% market share. The
remaining 13% traffic was supplied by four other CAAC carriers and more than a dozen local
airlines. The dominance of the top three carriers was weakened however: their combined
market share fell from 66% in 1992 to 56% in 1996. The decline is due mainly to the growth of
local, non-CAAC carriers: their market share rose from 6.3% in ! 992 to ] 3.8% in 1996.
Table 3 Market Share and Market Concentration of Air Transportation (% in RTKs)
Air Carriers 1992 1993 1994 1996
Air China 32.1 30.5 28.2 25.3
Eastern 16.9 16.9 15.3 13.5
Southern 16.9 15.6 17.2 16.8
South Western 7.1 8.3 9.1 8.9
North Western 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.9
Northem 9.0 8.8 8.3 8. I
Others under CAAC 6.7 7.6 7.6 8.7
Local air carriers 6.3 7.3 10.3 13.8
Total I00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
R3 65.9 63.0 60.7 55.6
R6 87.0 85.1 82.1 77.6
Data sources:Transport (1993-97)
In fact, the rise of local carriers in China has been dramatic, local carriers started to serve
domestic routes in 1986 and regional routes (routes connecting Hong Kong and a city in the
mainland of China) in 1987. After entry they grew quickly, average growth rate reached 42%
during 1992-96 in spite oft he slowing down of demand and some disadvantages in competing
with the air carriers under CAAC which was much higher than the growth rate for CAAC
carriers. Note that services on the international routes are reserved only for the top three CAAC
carriers.
It is often argued in the airline research that the markets at the city-pair level are more relevant
for the purpose of competition and consumer welfare than the markets at the national level.
Table 4 thus examines concentration at the 30 largest domestic city-pair markets in China, in
descending order of market size. An equivalent number of firms is reported for each route.
(The equivalent number of firms is the inverted Herfindahl index, calculated using each carrier's
market share on the route). In 1993 there were, on average, 2.06 firms on one of the top 30
domestic routes. The number increased to 2.40 in 1994 (a 20% increase). The increase also
occurred for both the top 10 and top 20 city pairs. These observations suggest that there were
two or three "equivalent" carriers operating on busiest domestic routes and that concentration
declined at the route level between 1993 and 1994.
Table 4: Concentration at the 30 Largest Chinese City-pair Markets, 1993 and 1994
1993
Equivalent
City-pair Passengers Number
of Firms
Beijing-Guangzhou 907420 2.87
Guangz.hou-Shanghai 859876 2.86
Beijing-Shanghai 742683 2.11
1994
City-pair Passengers
Equivalent
Number
of Firms
Beij ing-Guangzhou 969751 2.5__
Guangzhou-Shanghai 840961 3 z'_,
Beijing-Shanghai 677707 ", •
_. --,t_1
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Ouangzhou-Haikou 521693 I. 27
Guangzhou-Ouilin 503810 1.05
Beijing-Xian 476154 1.62
Guangzhou-Chengdu 439011 2.12
Guangzhou-Hangzhou 418078 2.82
Beijing-Shenzhen 379833 1.80
Beijing-Chengdu 344531 1.55
Shanghai-Xiamen 330272 2.41
Shanghai-Shenzhen 328973 3.54
Guangzhou-Shantou 315867 1.00
Guangzhou-Xiamen 308342 2.43
Beijing-Nanjing 306411 1.82
Guangzhou- 300982 3.26
Chongqing
Guangzhou-Kunming 293841 1.72
Guangzhou-Wuhan 281408 1.37
Beij ing-Hangzhou 269155 2.69
Beijing-Dalian 257594 1.89
Guangzhou-Nanjing 252592 2.44
Shanghai-Fttzhou 224252 1.61
Chengdu-Lhasa 210159 1.00
Shanghai-Chengdu 204400 2.07
Shanghai-Xian 303165 2.41
Beijing-Untmqi 191415 1.59
Beijing-Shenyang 179719 1.00
Chengdu-Kunming 177325 2.98
Shanghai-Guilin 176606 1.86
Shanghai-Wuhan 175220 2.50
Guangzhou-Haikou 515944 2.15
Beijing-Xian 501146 1.61
Guangzhou-Chengdu 493649 2.66
Guangzhou-Hangzhou 450909 2.83
Guangzhou-Chongqing 438454 3.34
Beijing-Shenzhen 419293 3.19
Beijing-Chengdu 406779 2.25
Guangzahou-Wuhan 365573
Guangzhou-Shantou 353735
Nanjing-Beijing 353004
Guangzhou-Guilha 334228
Shanghai-Shenzhen 331711
Dalian-Beijing 331418
2.00
1.05
2.17
1.00
3.81
1.89
Hangzhou-Beijing 331135 2.29
Guangzhou-Xiamen 321365 3.05
Guangzhou-Kunming 318955 2.21
Shanghai-Xiamen 310201 2.70
Beijing-Shenyang 270628 1.85
Guangzhou-Nanjing 258030 2.48
Shanghai-Wuhan 257096 2.84
Shanghai-Fuzhou 255289 2.15
Beijing-Harbin 254769 3.93
Beijing-Wuhan 240347 2.85
Chengdu-Shanghai 238830 2.19
Chengdu-Lasa 223151 1.00
Shanghai-Xian 211704 1.30
Haikou-Shenzhen 209160 2.78
Average 353129 2.06 Average 382831 2.40
Notes: The equivalent number of firms
carrier's market share on that route.
Sources: Transport (1994, 95), Timetable (1993, 95),
5.3 Airlines' Competition
Pricing and price competition
is the inverted Herfmdahl index, calculated using
OAG (1994)
each
The 'base price'of airline tickets in China was set by CAAC, but changes in this base price
required the approval of China's State Council. Airlines were allowed the vary the average
ticket price 20% above or below this base price, to take account of'local conditions'.
As competition to sell tickets had become more intense, however, airlines had gradually
introduced more and more complex discount structures for individual tickets. Offpeak fares, for
example• might be sold at little more than half the standard fare as carriers sought to fill up
t:nder-used capaci b' on certain flights. Fares also varied in response to seasonal variations in
demand Deepdiscounts were also available for "students','teachers' various 'group bookin?.s"
alld so on. It was not clear that all airlines applied the rules for deciding which passengers
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Air China
Eastern
Shanghai Airlines
Nonhero
Northwestern
Total
qualifies for discounts in a consistent and systematic way leading to what some observers
described as 'non-standard' pricing. In fact, with the releasing operating power to air caners, the
execution of the CAAC's pricing regulation seems to be loose in recent years. Therefore, the
excess capacity of most airlines is driving the price competition into a cruel state. It is estimated
that the average ticket rate on domestic flights is 75.9% in 1995, 72.4% in 1996 and 68.9% in
1997. Table 5 shows the price competition in a domestic hot route in the first half of 1998.
Table 5. Price Com__petition on the Route Link_e of 1998:
Air Carriers Sched_ts Ave_
506 60
477 66
420 75
162 41
92 32
1639
9.1
Data sources: Bulikon of Shanghai Airlines (1998)
The price competition was so intense that a lot of airlines couldn't balance their budget. CAAC
had to re-announce the its price regulation and forbided the discounts of ticket price for all
routes bigger than 20% off.
Non-price competition
Besides price competition, domestic air carriers also fight in the domain of non-price aspects.
An important competitive device is a carrier's networking or route structure. In particular, a
network which can offer more destinations and convenient connections has a competitive
advantage. Although CAAC's approval is required for route entry, most of the airlines' requests
seemed to get approved without much trouble
The network pattern of air transportation has fundamentally changed from a single airline,
linear network to a local, "
hub-and-spoke system. The country has been decomposed into six
air regions which correspond to the operational bases of the six trunk airlines. By the end of
1996, there are 98 international routes and 757 domestic ones in operation for the CAAC air
carriers, in which 80 routes and more than 150 routes linking those six local hubs respectively.
Besides, the frequency in flight linking those hubs are so high that in top ten domestic routes in
frequency in 1996, six of them are linking hubs (see Table 6).
Table 6 Top Ten Domestic Routes in Air Transportation in 1996
Routes Passengers
(thousand)
Beijin - Guangz.hou* 1123
Beijin - Shanghai* 918 16
Shanghai -Guangz.hou* 844 4 l
Beijin - Xi'an* 616 9
Guangzhou - Haikou 397 7
Kunming - Xishuangbanna 575 3
Guangzhou - Chongq/ng 562 14
Beijin -Chengdu* 513 10
Cargo Flights Load Factor
(thousand to_
51 14.3 74.6
13.1 77.0
13.3 66.8
10.3 73.8
11.4 81.1
12.2 89.3
13.4 68.0
11.4 73.5
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Guangz.hou - Chengdu*
_zhou 509 23 12.8 72. l
502 15 8.5 72.2
.14
Datasources: Transport(1997)
Note: The routes withstar linklocal hubs.
By centering in its hub city, each trunk airline is a dominant carrier in its own region while
competing with each other on routes linking major cities of different regions. For instance,
China Eastern, a trunk carrier, competes with China Southern, another trunk carrier, on routes
Shanghai-Guangzhou (respective hub cities) and Nanjing-Xiamen (inter-regional, non-hub
cities). However, China Eastern is a dominant carrier on its intra-regional Shanghai-Ninbo
route, competing only with Shanghai Airlines, a local carrier. The inter-regional routes which
see competition between hub carriers usually are busy routes; they cover more than half volume
of total domestic air traffic. Another competitive device which carriers can use is flight
frequency. A high flight frequency on a route can reduce passengers' schedule delay costs
(load factor will fall, however) and thus improve service quality. Other competitive devices
include: flight scheduling, safety, aircraft type, airlines' travel agents and reservation, marketing
promotions, service quality (e.g., inflight services and meals), and flight punctuality.
Competition has played a positive role in the airlines' drive to maximize economic profits and/or
minimize costs, reflected in the improvements in their financial performance and productivity.
Competition is good for business; apart from forcing the players to be more competitive,
competition can create demand. Many Chinese, for example, have yet to fly an aircraft, so
flying is a noval experience for them. The entry of new local carriers in the late 1980s and early
1990s helped to fill that need especially for people living in remote areas.
Competition also plays an important role in .airline( adopting new technology and/or ensuring
the efficient use of technology. This is achieved through a longer-term view of investment in
technology and the principle of fitness survival. A necessary condition here is that the firm can
retain profit and make its capital purchase decision. In the Chinese airline industry,
observations suggest that now each carrier has greater incentives to acquire new and more
efficient aircraft and to develop efficient compute reservation systems and hub-and-spoke
delivering systems. CEA, for example, is considering to develop or license an 'expert system'for yield control.
5.4 Market Performance
Table 7 shows some new characteristics of market performance in air transportation industry of
China in the third stage of its reform. First. the investment on infrastructure grows rapidly. By
the end of 1996, there are 144 airports in operation in the mainland of China, in which 35 are
new ones built in four years and most others are also upgraded or expanded in that period
(Transport. 1993-97). This has expanded the capacitv of air transportation and raised servicequalit)'.
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Second, the load factor decreases to about 70%, which seems at normal level compared with
that of the most countries. Reaching normal load factor is helpful to form an efficient
environment for competition, eliminating inefficient firms and pushing the upgrade of
technology.
Third, the labor productivity grows constantly at an annual rate of 8.7%. However, as seen
Table 8, the index is almost one forth of IATA average. The labor productivity of China Eastern
Airlines and China Southern Airlines are three times and twice of the domestic average and
reach the lower middle of lATA average. This reveals one of the d!sadvantages when domestic
airlines compete in the international market.
Forth, the rate of flight on time decreases to 77.6%, which implies about 10 million passengers
suffered the delay and the service quality should be improved. This is another disadvantages in
competing in the international market.
Table 7 Market Performance of Air Transportation Industr_ in the Third Sta_e of Reform
Items Unit 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 ann. growth (%)
Fixed Asset bi. yuan 34.4 42.0 58.1 77.0 93.5 28.4
Net Fixed Asset bi. yuan 29.8 34.3 46.5 57.5 66.9 22.4
Investment on Infrastructure bi. yuan 1. I 2.2 3.4 4.6 6.0 52.8
Operating Income bi. yuan 16.8 22.5 32.8 41.6 48.2 30.1
Profit bi. yuan 3.0 1.7 1. I 6.3 8.3 29.0
Total Volume bi. ton-kms 4.28 4.75 5.24 6.28 6.94 12.8
Passenger Volume bi. px-kms 40.6 43.4 48.3 58.2 62.6 11.4
Employee thousand ] 10 125 132 t38 149 7.9
Total Available Seats thousands 35 48 57 NA NA NA
Load Factor % 78.4 71.8 69.0 71.5 69.3 -3.0
Domestic Load Factor % 86.9 7616 73.5 NA 72.4 -4.5
Rate on Time % 87.4 85.1 NA 71.7 77.6 -2.9
Utilization Rate hour/day ' 5.4 4.9 4.8 5.6 6.8 5.9
Total Volume Per Capita thou. ton-kms/px 38.59 40.92 44.32 51.92 53.94 8.7
Data sources: Transport (1993-97)
Table 8 Comparison of Labor Productivity of China's Airlines to Foreign Airlines (1997)
Airlines Pilots and Cabin Total Ton-Kms Pilot Ratio CA Ratio Productivity
co-Pilots Attendants Employees Flown (%) (%) (thousand
(million) ton-kms/px)
United Airlines 8289 21335 91721 21754 9.0 94 ",
-_._ 237
American Airlines. 8326 17690 80842 18583 10.3 21.9 230
British Airways 3249 14348 54200 13593 6.0 26.5 251
Japan Airlines 2004 5366 181 ]2 11403 I 1.1 29.6 630
Singapore Airlines 1264 5772 13549 10096 9.3 42.6 745
Korean Air Lines 1290 3529 17050 9305 7.6 20.7 546
Cathay Pacific 1444 5470 15747 7330 9.2 34.7 465
Thai Ai_vays 633 3917 24186 4467 2.6 16.2 185
Malaysia Airline 1191 4839 23524 3783 5.1 20.6 161System
Philippine Airlines 630 2137 13582 2144 4.6 15.7 158
China Southern 947 2117 16622 1741 57 127 105
China Eastern 607 1155 8539 1270 7 1 13.5 149
IATA Total 126000 278000 1611000 320079 7.8 I7.3 199
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CAAC ]49249 8050 54
Datasources:IATA (I998)
VI. Concluding Remarks
China's air transportation industry has made a great development through nearly twenty years of
regulatory and enterprise reform. However, there are still some problems make CAAC worries
about. International market is beneficial for airline industry because of its long distance and low
average cost. For the statistical data from major airports in mainland of China, the ratio of
international traffic volume is increasing rapidly. In the Hongqiao International Airport in
Shanghai, for example, the ratio of both regional (major from and to Hong Kong) and
international air traffic volume was one tenth in 1978, one fifth in 1980, one forth in 1987 and
one third in 1995. However, survey shows that on most international routes, China's airlines get
only one third of market share with lower price and higher cost compared with the foreign
airlines.
Faced with the intense competition in the international market and the tendency of deregulation
and globlization of the industry in the world, CA.AC worries about the disadvantages of
domestic airlines. It appears that its policy implication begin to transfer from pro-competition to
somewhat consolidation. Besides forbidding new entry, CAAC is encouraging acquisition and
merger in the industry. Air China has acquired the Dragon Airlines in Hong Kong, China
Northwestern has controlled Nanjing Airline and China Southwestern has merged with Guizahou
Airline, some bigger mergers are under consideration.
It is sure that a wave of merger and acquisition in the industry is coming, which will make a
deep impact on the market structure and firm's behavior in the industry.
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I1. Change of Govemmenrs Regulation
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Distribution of Investment on Infrastructure of Air Transport (million yuan)
1992 % 1993 % 1994 % 1996 %
Gov. Capital 32 3. 09 132 5. 66 32 0.92 269 4.16
Loan from Fund. 266 25.71 272 11.66 261 7.50 329 5.08
Loanfrom Bank 389 37.60 910 39.03 1334 38.40 2067 31.90
Firms'Capital 220 21.29 355 15.23 691 19.90 1565 24.14
FundofConstruction 470 20.16 782 22.51 1330 20.52
Chargeon Airports 25 2.38 73 3. 11 174 5. 01 720 11.11
Bond 103 9.93
Foreign Loan 50 2.14 200 5. 76 200 3.09
Others 70 3. 00
Total 1035 100.00 2331 100.00 3474 100.00 6480 100.00
The investment mechanism has been changed since the beginning of 90s. The fundation of construction
in air transport industry is gathered from domestic airlines (It is declared in 1993 that all domestic
airlines should present some ratio of operating income (10% of that from domestic routes and 4-6% of
that from international routes) to the foundation of construction in air transport industry which use as
the investment on infrastructure.)
It is considered that organized all behavior and performance of China's air transportation industry with
the theory of industrial organization
-Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
STRUCTURE:
number of sellers and buyers;
product differentiation;
barriers to entry;
vertical integration;
diversification.
CONDUCT:
pricing strategies;
Market between Beijing and Shanghai in Jan-June, ]998
Company SAL Air China East N-W North Total Flight per day
Formal Flights 420 506 477 92 162 1237 6.8
Tickets rate 75% 60% 66% 32% 41%
Relay Flights 0 995 549 0 0 1544
Total Flights 420 1501 1026 92 162 2781 15 4
product design strategies;
research and innovation;
promotional strategies;
plant investment strategies;
legal tactics.
PERS"ORMANCE:
allocative and 'X' efficiency;
equir3, ;
progressiveness;
macroeconomic stability.
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ENVIRONMENT
(l) MARKET:
supply side:
technology;
labor skills and organization;
legal framework;
raw material sources;
transportation cost.
demand side:
purchase method;
substitutability;
price elasticity;
rate of growth;
cyclicality and seasonality.
(2)GOVERNMENT(public policy):
taxes and subsidies;
regulation;
price controls;
antitrust;
international trade rules;
basic research;
information and education;
public ownership.
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The airline reform may be divided into two stages. The first stage occurred between 1980 and
1986 and the aim was to bring back business aspects to air transportation. The administrative
structure was reformed first in 1980 and then again in 1982 which effectively separated civil
aviation from the air force. Beginning 1981 the central government adopted the policy of"self-
responsible for losses and extra-profit retention" towards the airline sector. The policy was
further simplified to a one-nine division of airline revenue between the state and CAAC.
Within CAAC, six regional civil aviation bureaus became basic units for recording profits and
losses in 1979. The practice was further extended to twenty-three provincial civil aviation
bureaus a year later. Furthermore, CAAC in 1982 extended the profit-retention system to-six
regional civil aviation bureaus and gave them more autonomy in making operational decisions.
During this period, however, CA.AC continued to be the operater of all flights, all airports and
the National Air Traffic Service.
IV. AIR TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITION
This section examines the impact of the reform on the growth and development of China's
airline industry. In particular, the following aspects of the industry will be discussed: air traffic
growth and route development, market structure, and airline operation and competition.
4.1. Air traffic growth and route development
As indicated earlier, the Chinese airline industry was sta_ant in its growth prior to the airline
reform but has grown tremendously since the reform. Tables 2 and 3 further report data on,
respectively, air traffic volume and number of routes over the 1950-94 period. Both the total
tonne-kilometers and revenue passenger-kilometers performed in 1994 were about 20 iimes of
those in 1978. The total number of routes in 1994 was more than four times the number in 1980
(4.0, 4.3 and 4.7 times for domestic, regional and international routes, respectively).
*** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ***
*** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *'*
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Table 4 shows this recent growth in the context of world aviation. In 1994 China ranked $th
(l lth) in the world in terms of revenue passenger-kilometers (total tonne-kilometers) performed,
compared with its 33th (35th) place in 1980. In 1994 China's domestic passenger-kilometers
ranked 4th, behind the U.S., Russia, and Japan. Its annual growth rate during the 1980-94
period averaged around 21% for both domestic and international traffic. This rate was 4.3 times
the world average.
*** TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ***
4.2. Market structure and route concentration
*** TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE ***
4.3. Airline operation and competition
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The (former) centrally planned economies share at least one common feature with the market
economies: the _'ansport sector is one of the largest sectors of respective economy. It is no
small challenge to understand the functioning of this vital economic sector in the a'ansition
process. In this paper I have described the dramatic airline expansion in China. This expansion
is made possible, not only by China's general economic growth creating new levels of affluence
and business traval, but also by its enterprise and regulatory reform focusing on economic
incentives, corporate govemence and market competition. In more recent years, however,
traffic growth is probably more than matched by capacity, and rationalization of the indu'stry has
the potential to further improve efficiency while at the same time maintaining competition.
Based on the Chinese experience in airline reform, two lessons may be drawn for general
enterprise and industry reforms. First, major carriers' attitude towards entry and competition is
essential for the success of reform. This point is related to the role of economic/output
expansion in the initial stage of industrial reforms. From the above discussions, we have seen
that allowing (almost) free entry in air transport has had little adverse effect on state-owned
companies. This is because there is enough business for everyone. Political pressure to restrict
entry has consequently been limited and has been ourweighted by the objective of creating
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competitive markets. This would then build the momentum for furthering the shift to unlimited
competition and making it irreversible. As capacity becomes more adequate, however,
coordinated efforts may be needed to limit the entry of inefficient carriers or to allow them to be
merged with other carriers. Second, to deepen the SOE reform we need to examine the
transitional industrial policies such as merger/competition policy in the presence of various
imperfect markets (e.g., imperfect financial market). This approach will help re-focus our
attention of enterprise reform from the enterprise per se to the surrounding industrial and
market environment.
China, with a population more than double that of the U.S. and Western European combined,
will undoubtedly play a more important role in world aviation in the future. The _'affic growth
rate for China will depend upon its rate of economic growth and, in turn, on its political
evolution. The regulatory regime will continue to change to reflect these trends. These trends,
and the aviation system arising from them, will contribute to bringing China and other nations
closer together.
'. .i
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China's Air Transportation Industry
@ The change of China's air transportation from middle of $0's to the end of 90's
such as regulations, degree of control, change of number and scale of airlines(sentralization degree),
OOne paper could be organized to make a positive analysis that if the development of China's air
transportation industry matches with the theory of industrial organization, that is, the pattern of
'smacture-conduct-performance,.
-market structure change, degree of centralization change from unique one to six airlines, then to 41 (
including 28 carry both passengers and cargo); and rise a tendency of merging now. entry barrier:
Building of new airlines has been barried since the end of 1994. The change of demand
-- firms' conduct: profit-seeking? signal? profit ratio? cost?
-- market performance: service quality
In the study, we check that what is the characteristics fit with the theory and what is not. pay close
attention to effect ofgovenment's policy and economic reform.
This is a positive research.
O One paper could be organized to make a comparative study.Through compared to that of foreign
contries, we can find the disadvantages of China's airlines as well as the operating mechanism of the
industry. We can slao find optimal policy and scale, etc.
The Reform and Performance of Air Transportation Industry of China
framework of the paper
I. Introduction (I 949-80)
background of China's economy, history of China's air transponation(1949-80)
I1. Change of Government's Regulation (I 980-87)
1. In 1987-92, the reform ofseperating operating units, such as airlines, airports and fuel oil suppliersfrom administration bereau (CAAC) begin.
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111.Market Structure and Performance (I 987-92)
three stages: first is to separate CAAC into six airlines, depart airlines,airports and fuel oil suppliers
from administrators, market concentration decreases and a competition mechanism begin to be built.
The number of airlines increases rapidly, the scale of economy is far from reaching.
second is to raise the barrier of entry, competition of existing airlines; expansion of airlines, aircraft,
routes, service quality(phone call booking with free charge), etc.
third is to face the situation of supply over demand, load factor decreases, price as well as profit of
airlines decreases; government make a restriction for price reduction and encouraoe the merger ofairlines. ..-
substitution of other transportation
IV. Airlines' Behaviors (1992-97)
V. Change of Environment
An Analysis of the Development and Targets of China Civil Aviation Industry
Dr. Xingquan Xie*
Department of Policy and Regulation
R. & D. Center of CAAC
Beijing, China, 100028
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the development of China's civil aviation industry and its targets
in the future. As we have known, although hit by both the Asian financial crisis and
the severe summer floods, Chinese economy still obtained a growth rate of 7.8% in
1998, and the tax collected accordingly achieved an increase of RMB 100 billion
yuan, which laid a good foundation for improving the economic operation
environment in 1999.However, when both the railway and the post &
telecommunication industry speeded up their construction, and the development of
China's civil aviation industry appeared weak. Even though in 1998 the transportation
volumes of the whole industry were completed fairly, the state owned airlines fell into
great loss with negative growth in the passenger volume, which broke the record of
keeping profit for 23 years, and furthermore, with the benefit index of passenger seat
rate, loading factor, and revenue rate per kilometre passenger decreased continuously
while the operative cost increased greatly, the situation would be rather more serious.
What had happened to China's civil aviation in recent years? In order to answer the
question clearly, this paper firstly gives a look backward of the history of the reform
for the industry since 1978 in brief. In no doubt, the reform and open policy over the
last twenties years has equipped the civil airlines industry of China with the wings to
soar high.Then, this paper outlines the main achievements gotten in recent years by
the industry. The dramatic growth of the civil aviation industry of China can be
attributed to China's general economic growth now.In the next section of the paper,
our second objective in this paper is to analyze the major problems in the
development of the industry which are most of reasons for the great losses in the
airlines industry.Section 4 addresses the 5 targets for the industry in the next 5 years
(that is, the 10th Five-Year Plan of China). In other ward, these are the ways to draw
the civil aviation industry of China out of the disadvantage situation at present.
Final section contains several concluding remarks.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CCAI
2.1. The History of CCAI Reform
Prior to 1978, China Civil Aviation Industry (hereafter, abbr. as "CCAI") was a semi-
military organization with the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) as a
department of air force for most of the years. During the period CCAI had suffered
unsatisfactorily persistent financial losses, whose survival depended mainly on the
central government's subsidy to the industry. In 1979, the State Council held the Civil
Aviation Reform Conference and made a decision to separate the CCAI from the Air
Force. The central government made a policy that CCAI must be on the way for an
enterprise in the market economy, which pushed the civil aviation reform ahead
effectively. The State Council approved "Report on Civil Aviation Reform Measures
and Implementation" in February 1987. The comprehensive adjustment of agencies
and enterpriseswas held in the CCAI in the large scale.More specifically, the
following policy initiatives were included:(1)To separatethe regulator from also
being the operatorof the CCAI;(2) To separateairport operation from airlines
operation;(3)To encouragetheotherenterprisesin themarketentry;(4)To deregulate
the airlines industry and promote competition in both domestic and international
market.Fromthenon,anewerawasopenedfor theCCAI.
2.2.TheAchievementsof CCAI
Over the 20 yearssince the reform and opening-upin 1987, the CCAI obtained
brilliant achievementsand advancedwith surprisinglygiant stridesat a speedthree
timeshigherthanthatof theContractingStatesof ICAO consecutivelyfor years.The
annualaveragegrowth rate of China'sair traffic performedapproximatelydoubled
thatof thenationaleconomy,tripledthatof thedomestictransportationandfour times
that of theworld air transportindustry,and its ranking rosefrom the 37th placein
1978in theworld to thepresent10thplace.In1978,CCAI performedatotal traffic of
299 million tonne-kilometres,while the figure of 1997 was 8.67 billion tonne-
kilometres.In 1978,CCAI carried2,309,100passengers,while thefigure of 1997was
56.3million passengers.In 1978,thetotal lengthof air routesoperatedby CCAI was
148,900kilometres,while in 1997thefigure reached1,858,700kilometres.In 1978,
CCAI had 162 domesticand internationalair routes,while In 1997the figure was
967, including 109 internationalair routes and 7 regional air routes serving 57
international cities. In 1978, CCAI had 81 airports in use, most of which were
medium-sizedand small airports.While in 1997 the number of airports officially
servingscheduledairplanesreached141,including 14airportsavailablefor B747and
90 airportsavailablefor B737.By the end of 1998, the CCAI performed a total traffic
of 90.92 billion tonne-kilometres, representing an increase with the average annual
growth rate of 18.76%, and passengers-kilometres 5.7million with 17.44%, cargo &
mail 1.4 million tons with 16.70% in the past 20 years. These numbers performed in
1998 were about 31, 24 and 21 times of that in 1978 respectively. The average annual
growth rate of the total traffic statistics of CCAI was over 20% during the period.The
whole CCAI paid to the State a total amount of 4.09 billion yuan of taxes in 1998.
Among the enterprises directly subordinate to CAAC, China Yunnan Airlines and
Xinjiang Airlines made profits in the year, while Beijing Capital International Airport
and Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport maintained fairly good profit level; most
local airlines achieved relatively good benefits. In 1998 the units directly owned to
CAAC accomplished 15.44 billion yuan and local authorities accomplished 8.2 billion
yuan respectively in fixed assets investment, totaling 23.64 billion yuan, representing
an increase of 6.5% over the figure of the previous year.
3. THE PROBLEMES OF CCAI
3.1. To Operate Too Extensively and Neglect the Adaptation of the Industrial
Structure.
Such high growth rates performed in the past depended on the extensive expansion
measures, such as to put more freight capacity, to construct high standard airports and
corresponding facilities. The economic profits of the airlines industry depended on the
regulation of the ticket price. It's necessary that the air services was enlarged through
the extensive expansion when the air transport market was a seller's one. The CCAI,
however, was confronted against the substituting competition of the train and high
way, and the air transport market changed from seller's one to buyer's. Under the
situationthe conflict of industrialstructureof CCAI becameseriousand significant,
which wasthe resultof theextensiveoperationof theairlines.Theproblemreflected
asfollow:(1) Thatin theair servicesthepassengers'ervicesis emphasizedmorethan
the cargoes'one causednot to fill the lossof the passengers'one which was not
satisfied.This was the main reasonfor the dramaticlossesin the CCAI in recent
years.(2)Thegeneralaviationof Chinahasbeenstagnantsince1980,which hasbeen
out of theattentionof CAAC policy for theneartwenty years.(3)The routestructure
wasmainly the trunk intercity.The feeder line aviation was too weak to supply the
abundant passengers to the trunk route.(4) There was the tendency that the extra large
and international airport had been constructed in most of provinces, this was updated
too much. The reasonable supplication of large, media and small airports hadn't been
established already. Though one or more large and international airports are necessary
for some metropolises opening aboard, but the kind of airport was generally
constructed in most of the media and small cities, this reflected that considerations
were not taken into in economic way.
3.2. To Allow Too free Entry and Be Lack of the Competition Capacity with
the Small Scale
At the present time, there are 53 airlines with their own legal entities in China,
including 34 ones providing fixed air services and 19 ones doing general aviation.
These airlines have 485 airplanes that equal to the number of America Northwest
Airlines' airplanes, and are half of America Airlines' flight (990). The six airlines, that
is, Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, China Southwest, China Northwest and
China Northern, have more aircraft, which was convenient in adapting the team of
aircraft and time and route. However, Great Wall Airlines, Mail & Cargo Airway and
Shanxi Airlines have just three aircraft respectively. At the same time, Chang'an
Airlines, Guizhou Airlines, Allied Airline and Shenzhen Airlines just own 5-6 aircraft
respectively. This caused the no-scale economy in the past. As a result, the operative
cost of most of them was very high at all time, they were too weak to compete with
the foreign airlines in the international air transport market. The lack of the capacity
of the international competition was reflected from the fact that the revenue of the
international routes had been falling down from 1994.
3.3. The All-Round Interference with the Airline's Operation Hindered the Reasonable
Competition in the Air Transport Market.
CAAC has operated the civil aviation as the one enterprise for many years. It was
very important for the foundation of the competition market and the improvement of
the economic performance that the CAAC policy departed the govemment from the
airlines' operation and authorized the formation of the local airlines owned to the local
government after 1987. The major decision rights of the trunk airlines owned to
CAAC in investment (especially in flight purchasing and labor management) were
controlled by CAAC. The trunk airlines couldn't take part in the market competition
as an independent legal entity. Because of the consolidation of pricing and the
restriction of route entry the airlines were limited to compete in providing flight,
improving service and perfecting market. The role of price competition was neglected
which was the important weapon for market competition.Being lack of competition,
most of airlines had the lower level of management. They yet didn't in general set up
the measures of cost and yield management, and the category and technique of
marketing in the condition of marketing economy, which were more and more
importantfor their competition.Although CA.AC deregulated the price of air service
through the policy of "one price, various discount" since the end of 1997, the airlines'
competition evolved into the "throat cut" one in price because there was no variance
between the air services, and the seller's agent was out of control. In effect, this
sustained to the dramatic decline of economic performance of the whole civil
aviation. In order to convert and stop the decline tendency, CAAC decided to recover
the price decision right to the government upward from May 1998, and enhanced the
pricing management of air transport market.
3.4. The Relationship between CAAC and Air Force was not Sorted out in the Area of
the Air Traffic Control.
At the present time, China air traffic control system is regulated in unity, while
operated respectively by CAAC and Air Force. Thus, under the unified leadership of
the air traffic control committee of the State Council and the Military Commission of
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the national flight is
regulated by the air force in the whole. Under the condition, the military aviation is
regulated by the air force, however, the civil one by CAAC. The whole controlled
airspace is divided into two parts that belong to them respectively. With the rapid
development of CCAI, the problems of the above air traffic control system become
evident as follow:(1) The airspace is not utilized at its best yet because its designation
was not consolidated and reasonable;(2) The same airspace is regulated by one or
more parties so that in the event of emergence which needs to change the state of
flight, the request sometimes couldn't be replied by them in time. This situation causes
easily to accidents;(3) The air infrastructure construction was not unified and very
outdated, the skills for managing the air traffic control was very backward. This
situation had more or less affected the convenience and efficiency of the air traffic
control. Although the route of Beijing-Guangzhou-Shenzhen was transferred to
regulate completely by CAAC from the air force, this was just a start-point for
Chinese civil aviation. The air traffic control system had erected a serious barrier
when airlines wanted to found its route network, especially "hub-and-spoke" one.
These disadvantages had already limited the development of the airlines industry of
China and the maximum of utilization of the national airspace sources. Something
must be done to change the disadvantage situation as soon as possible.
3.5. The Monopoly of Supply of Fuel and Equipment Was Harmful to Minimize
Airlines' Cost.
The cost of fuel is the biggest item for international airlines at the present time, which
is half of operative cost, and one third of the total cost. For China, the cost of fuel
shares two third operative costs, one fifth to one forth of the total operative cost.
China Aviation Oil Supply Corporation monopolies to supply airlines the fuel
exclusively. Its fuel price is higher half to one time that of foreign market. This is one
of the most important reasons why our airlines have been having a high cost and
losing competitive advantages. For example, in Singapore market, the fuel price has
been sustaining $185 or so per ton, whilst in China market RMB 2,800 Yuan (about $
337) per ton. The fuel price in China is near twice (1.82 times) that of the
former.China Air Flight Equipment General Company has owned to the CAAC, who
purchases aircraft abroad on behalf of all of the airlines of China with authority. It in
effect plays a role of intermediate agency with exclusion. Because airlines cannot
purchase directly aircraft from the manufacture factory without intermediary services,
they therefore lose dramatic benefits.
The abovediscussions show that the supply system of fuel and equipment should be
reformed as soon as possible. One of the more important reform measures of China
civil aviation managing system is to destroy the monopolies of the above two
companies in the market, and drive competitiveness into the fuel and equipment
market.
3.6. The Economic Efficiency of CCAI Is Relatively Low.
The stagnation of economic efficiency of CCAI is mainly reflected by the serious
decline in profits. The trunk airlines owned to the CAAC made the profits RMB 18.4
billion Yuan in 1996, while up to 20.5 billion Yuan in 1997. But airlines incurred
dramatic losses rapidly in 1998 because of the impact of Asia financial crisis and
airlines' price competition. There are at least three other reasons for the decline in
profits. First, the main cause for the decline is the dramatic increase in the supply of
aircraft since 1993. The sudden increase of capacity immediately lowers load factors
and aircraft utilization rates in 1993 and 1994. Therefore, it is the first time for CCAI
to confront against the relative surplus of capacity. On the contrary, the cost of
airlines rapidly increases. Second, the supervising system of cost is too weak, and
airlines in general operate extensively. Third, the debt factor of the airlines is too
high, and financial cost increase quickly. In principal, the losses mainly attribute to
the decline of industrial competitiveness of aviation. The China airlines are not
responsive to the change of competitive situation of market in time.
4. THE TARGETS FOR CCAI
4.1. The Growth of CCAI Should Response to the National Economic Growth.
From the sixth plan for 5 years, the central government announced clearly that the
strong subsidiary and support were to be paid to the transport industry by the national
finance as a strategic point for the construction of national economy. As a prior
department in transport industry, at the end of the 8th Five - Year plan, CCAI
sustained to grow by the rate three times that of transport industry. The 9th Five -
Year plan declared that importance was still laid on the industry, and that the industry
was to be made a significant progress during the period of 1996-2010 to satisfy
primarily with the development of national economy in 2010. This suggested that the
total transport, passengers and cargo and mail should doubled before year 2000, up to
14.0 billion ton-kilometers, 0.1 billion passengers and 2 million tons by the annual
average growth rate 15% or so, and that after year 2000 CCAI should sustain the rate
of 10%. This rate in principal satisfied with the request for CCAI by the national
economy. In fact, the practical situation was not so satisfactory as the plan' schedule
in the total air transport traffic which was under the line made in 9th Five - Year plan.
Table 1: Growth Ratio of Air Transport from 1996 to 1998
Items 1996 1997 1998
Investment Total
(billion yuan) 9.92
increase (%) 57
Air transport traffic
Total (%)
18.23 23.64
20 6.5
Total(billion ton-kilometers) 8.05
12.7 7.5 6.3
8.67 9.22
Passengerscarried Total (million)55.51 56.30 57.15
Increase(%) 8.5 1.3 1.5
Cargo& mail
carriedTotal
(million ton) 1.14 1.247 1.392
Increase(%) 13.1 3.4 11.6
Sources:theannualreportof CAAC in 1998
From the aboveindex,we can find that there is a declinein the developmentof the
airlines industry.The decline,however,doesn'tshow that the CCAI hascompletely
satisfiedwith the developmentrequestof the national economy,and that national
subsidiaryandsupportwill not necessaryfor the industry in thefuture. Why did the
9th five yearsplan not realizesuccessfullyat all? Except for the outsidebackground
and the interior system,this is in somedegreerelative to the inefficient policy in
practice.There are a big gap betweenthe CCAI and the requestof the national
economicgrowth. In thefuture, somereformsshouldbemadeto adjustthemanaging
system,carry out thepreferentialpolicy, andregulatethe economicstructureof civil
aviation.The scaleof theCCAI must beenlargedthroughdevelopingnew economic
growthpointsto satisfywith the requestof nationaleconomy.The CCAI shouldtake
animportantpositionin themodemsystemof transport.
4.2.To Exertto DevelopAir CargoTransportandGeneralAviation
Thedevelopmentof air cargotransportandtheexpressserviceis to be regardedasthe
newtraffic growth point. Somethingshouldbe doneto acceleratethedevelopmentof
theair cargotransportandthe expressservice.Thedevelopment,asa new economic
growth point, can overcomethe problems,in somedegrees,which havebroughtby
thelower loadfactor of airlines andthe seriouswasteof capacity.At the sametime,
this is the major contentfor CCAI in adjustingthe structureof air transportservice.
With thedevelopmentof economy,theair cargotransportis moreandmoreimportant
for the social request.It is provedclearly by the fact that in recentthreeyearsthe
growth rate of the air cargo transportis higher than that of the total air traffic and
passengersvolume. In the air cargotransportand the expressbusiness,the growth
neededto kept through the expansionof the freights, routesand the airplanes,the
completionof the air cargoinfrastructure,perfectionof the cargoagencynetwork as
well asthe interlinewith theground transport.Generalaviation,asan importantpart
of CCAI, is now facedby badeconomicbenefitsandflight safetysituation,disorder
of the marketcompetition,deteriorationof theguaranteeingenvironment,aswell as
the imperfectionof the infrastructure.Since 1980, the general aviation had been
stagnant,which did not fit to the high growth of nationaleconomy.Gradually,with
the developmentof both the nationaleconomyandthesociety, it is becomingthehot
point to promote generalaviation.Themain part of the general aviation operators
needsto be constructedto adaptto the demandof the marketeconomy.First of all,
accordingto "the Law of Enterprise"and theprinciple of separatinggeneralaviation
from air transportbusiness,themajorairlines,the investoror theowner,shouldsetup
the new airlines with independentoperation and businessaccountingto operate
generalaviationconformableto thedemandsof themarketeconomy,suchasrunning
limited cooperationwith the local enterprisesor institutes, and setting up joint
ventureswith the foreign enterprises.Secondly,multiple generalaviationenterprises
are encouragedto be sponsored,in anotherword, both the nation-ownedand the
private enterprisesand the foreign businessare encouragedto operatethe general
aviation. Lastly, the charging system of general aviation must be reformed to
regularizethe flight and the airport fee standard.To return the right of pricing to
generalaviation enterpriseshas the priority in the chargingreform. The enterprises
shoulddeterminetheir own price accordingto the situationof marketdemandand
provision.The airport fee standardshouldbe regularized,and the illegal chargeisprohibited.
4.3.To AcceleratetheDevelopmentof China'sFeederAir TransportandForm
the"Hub-and-Spoke"System.
To develop the regional air transport is necessaryfor the whole industry's
development.Firstly, feeder air transport is crucial for the construction of the
completenation'sair transportnetwork.For example,in the developedcountries,air
transportid operatedin thenetworkcomprisedof the main,regionalandinternational
air routes.Secondly,regionalair transportis significantto theeconomicdevelopment.
With the improvementof the nationaleconomy,air transportplays a moreandmore
important role in both the nation'sand the regional economydevelopmentfor its
characteristicsof high speedandlong distance.Asa result, the local governmentsare
active in operating air transport especially for the poor areaswith the abundant
tourism resourceand raw materials.However, they are hamperedby the airport
constructionwhich needlargeamountof investment,comparedwith which, regional
air transportis moreflexible with low demandon theairportdegreeto assistthelocal
economicconstruction.Thirdly, regional air transport is important to enlargethe
marketpercentagesto increasethe economicbenefits.The regionalair transportis
efficient for air transport to obtain the market below 1,000 square kilometers
especiallyin therangeof 500-700squarekilometers.
Thepolicies to supportregionalair transportneededat presentmust bemadein time.
Measuresneedto be taken in the air routesmanagement,ticket price and boarding
program,which hadrestrainedChina'sregionalair transport.
Firstly, in the air routesmanagement,airlines shouldbe encouragedto operatethe
regionalair transporton onehand,blind competitionmustbepreventedon the other
hand.For a certainairlinesoperatingregionalair transport,a fixed rangeis necessary
andtheprincipal of enteringtheseair routesis to guaranteetheinterestof the airlines
based in this area especially for high efficient air routes, and complicated
considerationis neededin the market demandsituation,the cost receptionand the
airlinesbenefits,etc.
Secondly,in ticket price, asthe competitorsof the regionalairlines arenot from the
air transportindustry, but theothertransportmeasuresuchasrailwayandhighway,a
price standardwith high competitivenessis necessary.The airlines must strengthen
theinterior managementandcur cost,andthegovernmentshouldoffer somesupport
in theotherhand,for example,decreasethetariff of import, airport fee,air routefee,etc.
Thirdly, in boardingprogram,it is necessaryfor theairlinesto carryort strict security
examinationand check-inprogress.For example,settingup a pathexclusivefor the
regional passengerfrom the main passengerto simplify the boarding program,or
usingsmall aircraft to increasetheairplanesto maketheregionalair transportbecome
theauthentic"bus in theair" sothatto attractmorepassengers.
4.4.To keepthefull competitionbetweenairlines
Comparedwith foreign air transport industry, China's airlines have the general
competitionbetweenthem,but not full, especiallylack of the way of competitionon
thebasisof thepriceone.Undertheprotectionof CAAC and/orthe local government,
China'sair carriersoften exempt"from the bankrupt.As a result, the situationwould
lower theefficiency in arrangingtheairspacesourceanddecreasethepotential social
welfare. It's possiblefor CCAI that the airlines' competition would cause to the
blindedprice competition,therefore,makemanyairlines into bankruptat all on one
hand.However,thecompetitionwouldbring thesocietythebettercarriers,thebetter
servicesand the preferentialprice on the other hand. Furthermore,the airspace
sourceswould be utilized at most throughtheir competition.Inparticular, the price
decisionright wasperformedarbitrarilyby CAAC. This situationshouldbechanged.
Theairlinesshouldget thedecisionright in orderto determinetheprice accordingto
the passengertype, the seasonand festival. On the basisof price competition, the
carriersare encouragedto get the advantageposition in competition through the
measuresimproving thequality of their services,creatingthe famousmark, etc.It is
irreallistic for CAAC to determinethereasonableprice of thousandsof air routesfor
everyairline. It maybeappropriatefor the administrationto transformthe direct fare
regulationto themarketsurveillance,andlet airlinesmaketheir own price according
to thesituationof supplyanddemandandits marketstrategy.
To keepthecompetitionis crucial to thehealthydevelopmentof China'scivil aviation
industry. Under the market economy,airlines, big or small, local or government
owned, ought to prove its right to stand in the market. The operatorsshould be
courageousandpatientenoughto facetheresult of thecompetition,which is hardto
beattainedthroughtheexecutivemeasures.
4.5. To Operatein the largescaleandenhancethecapacityof competition
with theforeigncarriers
Becauseof the freeentry policy in someperiod,China'scarriersin generalwere too
small in the scale,therefore,too weak in the internationalmarket competition. In
addition,theyhadthehigherequity-debtratio.As a result, the operating cost couldn't
often cut down successfully. This is one of the main barriers for CCAI to transfer
from the extensive operation into the intensive one at present. Under these conditions,
it is necessary for CCAI that the structure of the exiting assets should be improved
and rearranged to the optimized compose through interline and merging between
airlines. The new policy of consolidation was made to encouraging takeovers and
mergers by CAAC recently. Target for CCAI at present is to realize the formation of
several corporate groups and the scale effect in economy.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As people knows that the planned economy has left deeper impression on Chinese
civil aviation industry. For a long time, both the commercialization and the later
reformation of China's civil aviation were not completely resulted in the unsettlement
of the enterprises' market subject status, the lack of the market mind and the weak
competitiveness. However, all the problems were shadowed by the rapid growth of
the air traffic and the insufficient supply in air transport market. So that the whole
industry turned ignorant at the buyer's market and the competition brought by other
transport measures and the foreign air carriers. It must be proposed that civil aviation
industry shouldbe basedon enhancingthe economicbenefits,targetedby benefit
maximization.Inshort, the difficulty that CCAI encounteredwasnot causedby the
shrinkageof air transportmarketdemands,but the lack of competitiveness.If CCAl
transformits operativeideas,carefully studythe marketandendeavorto adaptto the
market,CCAI will definitely stepout of thepredicamentandrealizethecirculationof
continuing,rapidandhealthydevelopment.
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Direct Flights Across Taiwan Strait and Their Impacts on
Eastern Asian Air Transportation Market
By Zheng-Yi Shon l
Yu-Hem Chang
Cheng-Chang Lin
National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan
In the past decades, Hong Kong has been successfully playing a role as a
gateway to China. It is also the most important hub between Taiwan and China
since 1988. According to the statistics, over 5 million passengers were
travelling on the link between Taipei and Hong Kong in 1997. Such a big
volume has made this link the busiest one in the world's international air links,
and contributed 1/6 of the passengers in the airport of Hong Kong, which was
the most crowded one with most international passengers in Asia before 1997.
But in the foreseeable future, Taiwan will possibly start some direct services to
China; the air link between Hong Kong and Taipei will then compete with
many links across Taiwan Strait. These changes may cause the transformation
of the market and network structure in eastern Asia. Niches of specific airlines
and airportswill disappear. This paper examines the issues of possible changes
in eastern Asian air transportation market. The current market environment, the
problems for direct flights across Taiwan Strait, the future role of Hong Kong,
and the market structure in the future wilt all be discussed.
1. Introduction
According to the statistics, the link between Taipei and Hong Kong has
been the busiest international route in the world since 1995 (International
Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] 1996). But back a decade ago, there
were only 750 thousand people in this route in 1986 (Tourism Bureau
1987). Nowadays over 5.5 million people are travelling from Taipei to Hong
Kong. Namely, the passenger volume has increased 7 times during the past,
including some of the worst years in the world's aviation industries ever
(Air Transport World 1993). The close relationship between Taipei and
Hong Kong should be one of the reasons of such a big movement, so could
the rapid growth of the economics in eastern Asian areas during the years.
But it is widely believed that the deregulation of travelling between Taiwan
and China was the most important factor.
Soon after the civil war in China, the declaration of martial law by
Taiwanese government has prohibited any forms of direct or indirect travels
to China since 1949. For almost 40 years, lots of Chinese in Taiwan were
not allowed to visit their relatives and friends in China; in the other hand,
PRC govemment did not welcome Taiwanese before the 'Open Door'
policy made in 1979, either. The martial law in Taiwan was finally lifted in
1987, and some indirect travel from Taiwan to China was then allowed with
at least one stop over. Because of the close relationships and geographical
advantages to both sides, Hong Kong is the most frequently used transit hub
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for peopletravellingbetweenTaiwanandChina.In 1997,thehugevolume
of cross-Straitpassengershascontributedmorethan1/6of the28.3million
passengersto the airport of Hong Kong, which is the largest one of
international traffic in Asia, and made the link between Taipei and Hong
Kong the busiest one in the world.
Not only Hong Kong, some other major hubs in eastern Asia are also
providing connection flights for the passengers across Taiwan Strait. Macau
is the biggest competitor of Hong Kong. With her outstanding location,
lower fares, and much less crowded terminal, Macau has attracted lots of
transit passengers from Taiwan. If the airport in Macau had not been built in
1995, the link between Taipei and Hong Kong would have been much
busier. In addition, foreign carriers are also providing some other links for
Taiwanese to get into China. Because of the less service frequencies and
inconvenient schedules which are not designed for cross-Taiwan Strait
travellers especially, these foreign hubs are not that important as Hong
Kong or Macau.
Although the current network in Asia can satisfy the visitors across
Taiwan Strait, yet the indirect flight may cause several problems to both
sides. Politically, the sovereignty of Hong Kong has already returned to
China after July 1st 1997. It has lost a third party status by view of either
side of Taiwan and China. Physically, it is highly inconvenient to stop over
Hong Kong, especially for those senior citizens from Taiwan.
Economically, it creates an unnecessary cost for travellers. After some
peace talks between Taiwan and China in recent years, the direct services
has seemed to be an inevitable policy in the coming 21 st century. That is to
say, at least 5 million passengers in eastern Asia will find their new ways to
fly in a restructured network. Other travellers from America and Europe will
also find some new, probably more efficient routes to visit China. This
change will certainly be the biggest variable to the air transportation market
in Asia and Pacific region. Apparently, a much more competitive market of
air passengers in this area is now emerging.
2. The Current Market Environment
Since there is no other alternatives for travelling, the actual scale of the
air transportation market between Taiwan and Hong Kong can be evaluated
by the passenger volume on the link. Through the statistics listed in table 1,
we can find that the traffic on this link is growing with the number of
Taiwanese visitors to China. Apparently, these two numbers are moving
towards the same direction. The deregulation of travelling in 1988 has
almost doubled the passenger on the Taiwan-Hong Kong link just in the first
year. In addition, we can find that the passengers from Taiwan to Hong
Kong are not only by-pass passengers. Most of the transit passengers have
also visited Hong Kong on the way to China or on the way back to Taiwan.
For the past 10 years, Taiwanese visitors have always been top ranked on
the list of arrivals in Hong Kong, and they have also been very generous to
the tour industry ofHong Kong.
Table 1 : persons travelled between Taiwan and China since 1986*
i?_ear
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Chinese
visited 0 0 0.38 4.85 7.52111.11 13.18 18.05 23.65 42.30 56.52 73.54
Taiwan
Taiwanese
0 0 438 541 948 947 1318 1527 1390 1532 1734 2117
visited China
Taiwanese
visited 220 354 1094 1133 1345 1298 1640 1777 1665 1761 1821 1782
Hong Kong
Taiwanese on
Taiwan-Hong 121 196 622 811 1246 1368 1747 1935 1745 1910 2135 1987
Kong links
Passenger
Volume on
Taiwan-Hong 375 428 845 1019 1437 1549 1940 2146 1984 2154 2788 2777
Kong links
* All listed data are one-way traffic only. Round-trip traffic should be doubled.
Source: Tourism Bureau (1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997)
Currently flights between Taipei and Hong Kong are operated by 9
carriers together, including China airlines (CI) of Taiwan and Cathay Pacific
(CX) of Hong Kong. Some other foreign airlines listed in table 2 from
specific countries with fifth freedom have also provided such services. With
free endorsement and frequent services, this market is mostly shared by CI
and CX. The privileges have created amazing profits for both of the two
airlines. CI and CX are now carrying over 84% of the total passengers, and
the revenue is estimated 600 miilion US dollars or more. Before 1996, links
between Taiwan and Hong Kong have contributed a quarter of the total
revenue to China Airlines, while the Taipei-Hong Kong link has contributed
15%-20% of the revenue for Cathay Pacific (Ionides 1996). An estimated
10%-15% of the revenue was still earned by these so-called 'golden links'
for both airlines in 19972. Other carriers are competing with lower fares, but
much less frequencies. During 1996 to 1997, carriers in Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Macau and China have signed lots of cooperative contracts to provide
low-fare alliance products as competing tools in this market. Intentionally
designed timetables for transit-only passengers are also popular within these
competing airlines.
2 China Airlines has reported 58.33 billion NT dollars revenue in 1997. The estu'nated
revenue on Hong Kong links was around t0 billion, which accounted for 17.14% of the
total revenue. In the same year, Cathay Pacific has announced a 30.65 billion H.K dollars
turnover, the revenue on Taipei-Hong Kong link should be as high as 3 billion that is 10%
of the total revenue if calculated with her market fare and passengers carried.
Table 2: Airlines Served on the links between Taiwan and Hong Kong
China Eva Cathy Dragonair
Airlines airways Pacific
Year end 1997
Service Routes TPE-HKG
KI-'IH-HKG TPE-HKG TPE-HKG KHH-HKG
Weekly Flights 813
10 88 21EachDirection 25
rMarket Share 38.13% 1.67% 46.11% 3.38%
Source: Civil Aviation Administration [CAA] (I 997)
Other Carriers includes
Singapore Airline, Thai Airways
Japan Asia Airline, British Airways
Garuda Indonesia
TPE-HKG
27
10.71%
3. Problems for Direct and Indirect Flights Across Taiwan Strait
It is quite clear that the success of Taipei-Hong Kong link is based on
the disconnection between Taiwan and China, but the separation itself has
created another dangerous but interesting fact: the hijack incidents. In the
past 6 years, there were totally 14 hijack incidents between Taiwan and
China. 12 of the 14 incidents occurred in the peak year during April 1993 to
June 1994. Because direct flights across Taiwan Strait is still a political
taboo to both sides, such kind of 'direct flight' is then a certain kind of
revenge to either side of Taiwan or China. The purposes of all the hijackers
in these hijack incidents have nothing to do with terrorism, but solely
embarrassing their organizations and governments, even friends and lovers,
and then asking political refuge from the government in other side through
these dangerous activities. Since there was no other claims for the hijackers,
all the cases were quickly solved within hours. The much stronger
restrictions for Chinese to visit Taiwan and the much better political effects
have made most of the hijack incidents initiated in China by PRC's citizens.
There are still other problems for indirect services. In the early days of
deregulation of travelling, most. of the travellers were senior citizens from
Taiwan to visit their real old friends and relatives in China. These people
were not familiar with the complex procedures of air travelling. The transfer
facilities in Kai Tak airport were also not that good as they are now in Chek
Lap Kok of Hong Kong. So in the beginning of 1990s, it was very easy to
find lots of Taiwanese who missed their connecting flights slept in the
comers around the airport of Hong Kong. Since then, direct linkage has
always been expected to be a total solution for all these chaos.
Unfortunately, there are also some technical problems for both sides.
Although the PRC government has promote their direct-link policy towards
Taiwan for over 20 years since its first announcement in 1979, a guiding
principle was not yet made until 1991. Even though, this principle was still
unacceptable by Taiwan because the legitimacy of all the aircraft and flight
attendants' licenses issued in Taiwan can not be admitted in China for their
political beliefs.
Moreover, Taiwan has also made some restrictions for direct flights
into China. In Taiwanese government's point of view, direct flight is
Ilothing more than a political trap set by China So basically, the
governmentin Taiwan has never taken positive attitude towards direct
flights. Nowadays policy makers in Taiwan are trying to make this issue as
a bargaining chip when negotiating with China. Different parties and
interest groups with different claims have also added much complexity to
this sensitive issue.
4. Progress Made in the Past Years
Although the difficulties for direct service across Taiwan Strait have
not been removed, yet there are still some progress made in the past 5 years.
First of all, some aircraft have already flown directly across Taiwan Strait.
During the peak years of hijack incidents, Taiwan has asked all the captains
of hijacked aircraft to stop over Hong Kong or Macau when flying back to
China. Although not confirmed, it is believed that the nearest 2 to 3 cases of
the 15 hijacked aircraft have flown directly across Taiwan Strait and back to
China directly. Taiwan did not made any complaint on these cases for they
think they have already asked the pilot to go back indirectly. So practically,
direct flights seemed to be allowed under such circumstances.
The opening of Macau airport and Air Macau in 1995 was the
milestone for direct flights. Air Macau has operated flights from Macau to
both Taiwan and China, it can easily use a same aircraft to provide service
from Taiwan to Macau, then to China. This convenience has created a niche
for Air Macau to compete with Hong Kong. With less congestion in the
airport and better-arranged schedule, Air Macau has shortened its minimum
transfer time to 50 minutes. The same aircraft service is even more attractive
to the transit passengers. With changing flight numbers, passengers can just
take the same aircraft from Taiwan to their destinations in China. Although
not a purely non-stop direct flight, this indirect service can actually be
viewed as a format of one stop direct flight. Soon after Air Macau's
successful policy testing, another regional airline that has both links from
Hong Kong to Taiwan and China, the Dragonair, also started its same
aircraft operation. This is a big step of the direct service policy.
Moreover, Air Macau is a joint venture of China and Macau. With over
51% shares owned by China, Air Macau is by all means a Chinese airline
registered in Macau. This is also the first Chinese airline that can fly into
Taiwan's territory, except those hijacks. Soon after Air Macau had started
operation, Cathay Pacific transferred her shares of Dragonair to the same
Chinese group which holds the major shares of Air Macau. Thanks to the
experience of Air Macau, Dragonair is still operating her services to both
Taiwan and China. It means that a Chinese airline, at least a Chinese owned
airline based in an autonomic zone, is freely to travel between Taiwan and
China.
The most interesting fact is that the Macau airport which was newly
built in 1995 is located in Guangzhou Flight Information Region (FIR) of
China. Aircraft land or take-off in Macau will fly over Guangzhou FIR of
China, and guided by or receiving flight information from this FIR. It is
certainly a format of first freedom. Currently there are 2 Taiwanese airlines
servedin the links betweenTaiwanandMacau;bothof them are enjoying
the services of Guangzhou FIR, but there is not any single agreement
between Taiwan and China. This is certainly a big movement.
Researchers have also contributed themselves in exploring the pros and
cons around direct services through their researches. Lots of important
issues are already under discussions now. The conflicts of laws of air
transport, the regulations of the quasi-international flights, the future
network structure, and the roles ofTaiwan, Hong Kong and China played in
direct service market have all been analysed academically and practically.
These researches are of much help for solving the technical problems of
direct services.
Finally, the direct sailing across Taiwan Strait is also encouraging the
direct flights. The so-called 'offshore trans-shipment centre' which allowed
ships of foreign countries and Flag of Convenience (F.O.C), the ship belong
to Taiwan or China but registered in a third country, to sail directly across
Taiwan Strait, has started operation at K.aohsiung in 1996. Before its
operation, all the ships were also asked for one stop over in Hong Kong or
other ports in a third place. Since ships and containers can now sail directly,
it should not be too difficult for aircraft and passengers to fly directly in the
future.
5. The Future Role of Hong Kong
As a major hub in eastern Asia, the future role of Hong Kong in air
transportation industry is highly concerned by different parties. Many of
them are predicting a considerable loss of traffic when the direct links
between Taiwan and China are connected (International Air Transport
Association [IATA] 1997; Wong 1997; Mackey 1997, 1998). This is just
what we can expect in the future. Through the analysis of possible
cormection(Shon, Chen, and Wong 1997), we can find that the first 4 prior
connections have linked to thedemand nodes that account for 1/3 of the
total travel demand. That is to say, at least 1/3 of the cross-Strait passengers
on the link between Taiwan and Hong Kong will mostly switch to direct
services, unless these passengers are also intending to visit Hong Kong.
Moreover, connected airports can also providing services to other demand
nodes with much more frequencies and much lower fares via domestic links
in China. These potential competitions would change the behaviour-of
travellers to other destinations, too. Even if the service frequencies of future
Taiwan-Hong Kong links can stay at the same level that is not likely to
happen, a simple market share indicator which uses only service frequencies
in table 5 has also suggested a 33.3% loss of the current Taiwan-Hong Kong
market. The much lower domestic fare will probably attract even more
traffic on these links.
Table3: EstimatedDemandShiftFromHongKongto DirectLinks
Directservicenodes XiamenShanghai
EstimatedRoundTripPublishedFares 334.21 333.56ReductionfromDirectService:USD
Weeklytransferservicefrequenciesto 10
majordemandnodes 97 196(HongKong:50;Macau:14)
EstimateddemandshiftfromHongKong* 4.32% 6.74%
Be_mg Guanzhou
369.47 33.34
317 248
8.70% 9.59%
Fuzhou
441.32
112
3.84%'
IATA's forecastingarearguingthatthelossof Taiwanesetravellersin
HongKong will be 'largely offset by the emergence of the large Chinese
outgoing travel market which is still in its infancy.'(IATA 1997) But other
possibilities could be very negative to the outbound traffic from China. First
of all, the PRC government is trying very hard to extend her global flying
network, major airlines in China are also starting alliance partnership with
foreign airlines. It's very possible for Chinese travellers to travel abroad
from their own residing cities in a very near future. Secondly, the links
between Taiwan and China can also provide services for Chinese travellers
to the destinations around the world. If direct links finally get connected, a
great number of cross-Pacific Chinese passengers who currently transfer in
Tokyo and Hong Kong may switch to Taipei because of the attractive fares
and frequencies provided there.
The success of Macau has also proved that the hub position of Hong
Kong is substitutable. Thanks to the better arrangement of the same aircraft
operation and considerate flight schedule, more and more Taiwanese are
now using Macau as a gateway to China. The passenger volume between
Taiwan and Macau has grown 5.45 times in the past 20 months. In 1997,
Taiwan-Macau link has served over one million passengers. Currently there
are 16 scheduled links from Macau to China, less than 21 links provided by
Hong Kong. But Macau has already served most of the cities with heavy
travel demands across Taiwan Strait. The cities connected and frequencies
provided by both Hong Kong and Macau are listed in table 6. With lower
fares and expending network, Macau has become a very strong competitor
in this market. The changes of load factor and passenger volume of Taiwan-
Macau link since 1996 is presented in figure 2. Although unstable, the trend
of growing passenger volume is obvious.
A sudden strong growth in traffic volume of Taiwan-Macau link can be
easily found after July 1998. The fast growing passengers were mostly
shifted from Hong Kong because of the chaos of the new Chek Lap Kok
airport starting operation. More or less, it has shown that hubs can be easily
• This percentage was calculated by a/b, where
a = the possible passenger volume shifted from Hong Kong = travellers to the node +
travellers to other major nodes transferred m the node (transfer sen'ice frequency in the
node / transfer sen'ice frequency in all nodes * transfer demaad)
b= total traffic volume berween Taiwan and Hong Kong
substituted if they are not doing well, or if they have lost their comparative
advantages.
Table 4: Current Links From Hong Kong and Macau to China and Taiwan
Transit
Airport
Hong Kong
Macau
Service Cities in
Taiwan
(Weekly Flights)
Taipei(205)
Kaohsiung(46)
Taipei(85)
Kaohsiung(35)
Service Cities in China
(Weekly Flights)
Beijing(45) Changsha(3) Chengdu(10)
Chongqing(7) Dalian(10) Fuzhou(22)
Guanzhou(36) Guiling(7) Haiko(7)
Hangzhou(14) Kunming(9) Ningbo(8)
Nanjing(7) Qingdao(7) Shenyang(6)
Shantou(14) Shanghai(49) Tianjin(7)
Wuhan(1) Xian(6) Xiamen(21)
Beijing(7) Chcngsha(2) Chongqing(4)
Dalian(1) Fuzhou(12) Guilin(5) Haiko(1)
Nanjing(2) Ninbo(2) Qingdao(2)
Shanghai(14) Sanya(1) Wengzhou(1)
Xiamen(14) Xian(4) Zhenzhou(2)
Load Factors and Passengers of Taiwan-Macau Link
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Figure 1: Load factors and passenger volume of Taiwan-Macau Links
It is quite clear that the futurerole of Hong Kong will be heavily
affectedby thedirect servicebetweenTaiwanandChina.Airlinesbasedin
Hong Kong will be shockedfirstly anddirectly.Dragonair,the regional
airlinethathasmostlinks from HongKongto bothChinaandTaiwanand
servedmainly for the passengersacrossTaiwanStrait, will be hit most
seriously.In 1996Dragonair has flown 2.2 billion kilometres on the routes
between Hong Kong and China, roughly 67% of the total kilometres flew by
the airline. 68.3% of total traffic revenue and 83% of the operating revenue
in Dragonair can be accounted for Chinese market. Taiwanese travellers, in
particular, have contributed 16.7% of the total revenue (Mackey 1998).
Heavily relying on the service between Taiwan and China, Dragonair will
face a big problem of recession after direct services start.
For Cathay Pacific, the major international carrier in Hong Kong, some
losses will also occur after direct links get connected. Obviously, the most
profitable link between Taiwan and Hong Kong will mostly be affected. In
addition to this golden link, drops of load factors in some international
routes can be expected, too. With a fairly good constructed international
network to over 50 destinations in the world, Taiwan can be a very good
competitor as a gateway to China. Travellers to China can access transfer
services easily in Taiwan, especially for those travellers from rest of Asia
and U.S that accounted for almost 75% of the total travellers to China in
1996 (National Tourism Administration of the People's Republic of China
1997).
6. The Market Share of the Biggest Pie in the Asian Air
Since the traffic on the busiest international air travel link of the world
is prepared to shift, one interesting issue would then be the future market
share of the direct service market. As described above, currently both China
airlines and Cathay Pacific have created amazing profit on the link between
Hong Kong and Taipei. But the biggest winner in the transfer passenger
market is the China National Aviation Corp, which is known as CNAC in
this area. CNAC is a Chinese based business group who holds major shares
of both Dragonair and Air Macau. These two airlines are enjoying a high net
profit margin because they can operate both links to Taiwan and China from
Hong Kong and Macau. However, the niches of the two airlines will soon
disappear after direct service start. Obviously, this market is going to be
restructured.
The key issue to the future market share is the definition of the routes.
If the links between Taiwan and China is defined as a domestic link, or area
link as they are now defining in Hong Kong and Macau, then only airlines
based in Taiwan and China can provide such services. That is to say, both
Air Macau and Dragonair are out of this game. In the other hand, if the
routes are defined as intemational routes, some foreig_a airlines may have
the chance to compete. The policy of direct links on both sides and the
experiences found in Hong Kong and Macau are showing that the area link
will be the case. There will be ve_ little chance for airlines in Hong Kong
or Macauto share this market, nor will it be possible for foreign nations to
get the fifth freedom on these links (Rao 1994). If so, some airlines in
Taiwan and China will be the biggest winner in the competition of the direct
service market. If the estimated 4 prior airports: Beijing, Shanghai,
Guanzhou and Xieman in China are going to be connected, airlines based in
these airports including Air China, China Eastern, Shanghai, China
Southern, and a much smaller Xiamen airlines of the local government will
be the best candidates to provide direct services. In Taiwan's side, the China
Airlines group who controls China airlines, Mandarin Airlines, and Formosa
Airlines, together with the Evergreen group who owns major shares of Eva
Airways and Uni Airlines, and the American International Group (AIG)
who holds major shares of Far Eastem Airlines and TransAsia Airlines will
be the most important players in the market. However, those airlines based
in China will probably dominate the cross-Strait market for they can provide
domestic extension services to other destinations in China, while airlines of
Taiwan can attract some outgoing passengers from China by using Taipei as
a global hub.
Although foreign airlines and entrepreneurs may have very little
chance to participate in this market, they are still trying to make some
earnings indirectly. The most famous case is the investment of AIG group,
an American life insurance company, to the airline industry in Taiwan.
Currently AIG is the major stockholder of both two of Taiwan's best
regional carriers. They are also considering buying the public released
shares of China Airlines which is the biggest one of the two international
carriers in Taiwan (South China Morning Post 1998). As a professional
investor, AIG feels confident for the return of cross-Strait links, they also
believe the future of these Taiwanese airlines (Paisley 1997).
Singapore Airlines is the second foreigner that moves for her interests
in the cross-Strait market. Recently Singapore Airlines and China Airlines
have announced a forge strategic alliance plan and signed a Memorandum
of Understanding for a long term, multidimensional co-operative
relationships which includes stock exchange, business operations,
reinvestment, and flight safety (China Airlines' Home Page 1998). These
two partners will try to exchange 5% of the equity stake to cross hold each
other's shares in the first stage, and the ratio of cross-holding equity stake
may increase to 25% in the long run. This is just another format for
foreigners to share this market.
It is believed that competitions among the airlines can be very intense,
but the market size is also big enough to accept most of the competitors.
There were 2.1 million Taiwanese visited China in 1997, with natural
growth rate from a simple regression model, the passenger volume can be as
high as 2.5 million in 2000 in prediction 3. This is just the case of current
indirect operated flights. Apparently, some trips will be induced by the
3A regression model can be reached using the statistical data listed in table 1. The model
has suggested an annual growth rate of 7%, which predicted 2.16, 2.33, and 2.49 million
Taiwanese passengers travelting to China in L99S, 1999 and 2000.
lower fares and convenience of direct services. Moreover, the small amount
of 73 thousand Chinese citizens visited Taiwan in 1997 has also shown
some potential of this market. Further deregulation of travelling and touring
activities will fill the Chinese passengers on the major links across Taiwan
Strait. Even if the strict regulation for Chinese to visit Taiwan can not be
removed, a certain number of curios Chinese travellers going abroad will
still try to find their transit in Taipei. Under such circumstances, transit
would be the only chance for Chinese to visit this island which should
belong to them in their beliefs. If curiosity can easily lift up the volume, the
traffic on the link will still grow for many times.
7. Conclusions
Issues around direct flights across Taiwan Strait are always one of the
hottest topics in eastern Asia transport market. Although the direct links
have not been connected yet, they are still highly concerned by different
disciplines of politics, laws, and management. Airlines and related business
also watch closely to these issues for policy changes will easily affect their
interests in Chinese market which the future of the air transportation in
eastern Asia is heavily depending on. In the past decades, Hong Kong was
the most important hub in this market; it will still be an important one in the
future. It is proved, however, traffic on the link between Hong Kong and
Taiwan can be shifted to the link between Macau and Taiwan, so can it be
shifted to the links across Taiwan Strait. Moreover, outgoing passengers
from China transferred in Hong Kong can also find transit services in
Taiwan. These movements will possibly cause a big change in eastern Asian
air transport system for there are millions of passengers travelling in this
area.
The uncertainties of direct links across Taiwan Strait are still leaving
some problems unsolved. Whether the direct links will be defined as
international routes or domestic routes are not clear; the selection of hubs
and airlines to provide direct services are not yet made; even the type of
freedoms and bilateral agreements can also change the market and network
quite a lot. A much bigger volume of passengers can also be found if further
travelling deregulation for Chinese to travel across Taiwan Strait can be
made. All these variables are making issues around direct flights worthy of
continuous observant.
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